1 /* 2 * Copyright 1995-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved 4 * 5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use 6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 9 */ 10 11 #include <limits.h> 12 #include <string.h> 13 #include <stdio.h> 14 #include "../ssl_local.h" 15 #include "statem_local.h" 16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 17 #include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" 18 #include <openssl/buffer.h> 19 #include <openssl/objects.h> 20 #include <openssl/evp.h> 21 #include <openssl/rsa.h> 22 #include <openssl/x509.h> 23 #include <openssl/trace.h> 24 #include <openssl/encoder.h> 25 26 /* 27 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. 28 */ 29 typedef struct x509err2alert_st { 30 int x509err; 31 int alert; 32 } X509ERR2ALERT; 33 34 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ 35 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { 36 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 37 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 38 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c 39 }; 40 41 int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL *s, 42 ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb, 43 ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb, 44 void *mutatearg) 45 { 46 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); 47 48 if (sc == NULL) 49 return 0; 50 51 sc->statem.mutate_handshake_cb = mutate_handshake_cb; 52 sc->statem.mutatearg = mutatearg; 53 sc->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb = finish_mutate_handshake_cb; 54 55 return 1; 56 } 57 58 /* 59 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or 60 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) 61 */ 62 int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type) 63 { 64 int ret; 65 size_t written = 0; 66 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 67 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); 68 69 /* 70 * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message 71 * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation. 72 */ 73 if (s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb != NULL 74 && !s->statem.write_in_progress 75 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE 76 && s->init_num >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { 77 unsigned char *msg; 78 size_t msglen; 79 80 if (!s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 81 s->init_num, 82 &msg, &msglen, 83 s->statem.mutatearg)) 84 return -1; 85 if (msglen < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH 86 || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, msglen)) 87 return -1; 88 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, msg, msglen); 89 s->init_num = msglen; 90 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 91 s->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s->statem.mutatearg); 92 s->statem.write_in_progress = 1; 93 } 94 95 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], 96 s->init_num, &written); 97 if (ret <= 0) 98 return -1; 99 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) 100 /* 101 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll 102 * ignore the result anyway 103 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added 104 */ 105 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 106 || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET 107 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE 108 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) 109 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, 110 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], 111 written)) 112 return -1; 113 if (written == s->init_num) { 114 s->statem.write_in_progress = 0; 115 if (s->msg_callback) 116 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, 117 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ussl, 118 s->msg_callback_arg); 119 return 1; 120 } 121 s->init_off += written; 122 s->init_num -= written; 123 return 0; 124 } 125 126 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) 127 { 128 size_t msglen; 129 130 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) 131 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) 132 || msglen > INT_MAX) 133 return 0; 134 s->init_num = (int)msglen; 135 s->init_off = 0; 136 137 return 1; 138 } 139 140 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 141 { 142 int ver_min, ver_max, ok; 143 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 144 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); 145 146 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 147 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 148 return 0; 149 } 150 151 /* Reset any extension flags */ 152 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); 153 154 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { 155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); 156 return 0; 157 } 158 159 /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ 160 if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { 161 int negotiated_minversion; 162 int md5sha1_needed_maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) 163 ? DTLS1_VERSION 164 : TLS1_1_VERSION; 165 166 /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ 167 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, md5sha1_needed_maxversion) <= 0) { 168 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 169 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, 170 "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" 171 " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" 172 " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" 173 " above, or load different providers"); 174 return 0; 175 } 176 177 ok = 1; 178 179 /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ 180 negotiated_minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION; 181 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_min, negotiated_minversion) < 0) 182 ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, negotiated_minversion); 183 if (!ok) { 184 /* Shouldn't happen */ 185 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 186 return 0; 187 } 188 } 189 190 ok = 0; 191 if (s->server) { 192 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); 193 int i; 194 195 /* 196 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers 197 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the 198 * ClientHello. 199 */ 200 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { 201 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); 202 int cipher_minprotover = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) 203 ? c->min_dtls 204 : c->min_tls; 205 int cipher_maxprotover = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) 206 ? c->max_dtls 207 : c->max_tls; 208 209 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, cipher_minprotover) >= 0 210 && ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, cipher_maxprotover) <= 0) { 211 ok = 1; 212 break; 213 } 214 } 215 if (!ok) { 216 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, 217 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, 218 "No ciphers enabled for max supported " 219 "SSL/TLS version"); 220 return 0; 221 } 222 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { 223 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ 224 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); 225 } else { 226 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ 227 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); 228 229 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; 230 } 231 } else { 232 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 233 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); 234 else 235 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, 236 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); 237 238 /* mark client_random uninitialized */ 239 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); 240 s->hit = 0; 241 242 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; 243 244 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) 245 s->statem.use_timer = 1; 246 } 247 248 return 1; 249 } 250 251 /* 252 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: 253 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator 254 */ 255 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 256 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) 257 258 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, 259 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) 260 { 261 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ 262 static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72" 263 "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; 264 /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ 265 static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69" 266 "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; 267 268 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { 269 size_t hashlen; 270 271 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ 272 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); 273 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ 274 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY 275 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) 276 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); 277 else 278 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); 279 280 /* 281 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake 282 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because 283 * that includes the CertVerify itself. 284 */ 285 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY 286 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { 287 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, 288 s->cert_verify_hash_len); 289 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; 290 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, 291 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { 292 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 293 return 0; 294 } 295 296 *hdata = tls13tbs; 297 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; 298 } else { 299 size_t retlen; 300 long retlen_l; 301 302 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); 303 if (retlen_l <= 0) { 304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 305 return 0; 306 } 307 *hdatalen = retlen; 308 } 309 310 return 1; 311 } 312 313 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) 314 { 315 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 316 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 317 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; 318 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 319 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; 320 void *hdata; 321 unsigned char *sig = NULL; 322 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 323 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; 324 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); 325 326 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { 327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 328 goto err; 329 } 330 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; 331 332 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) { 333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 334 goto err; 335 } 336 337 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 338 if (mctx == NULL) { 339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 340 goto err; 341 } 342 343 /* Get the data to be signed */ 344 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { 345 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 346 goto err; 347 } 348 349 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { 350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 351 goto err; 352 } 353 354 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, 355 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), 356 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, 357 NULL) 358 <= 0) { 359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 360 goto err; 361 } 362 363 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { 364 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 365 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, 366 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) 367 <= 0) { 368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 369 goto err; 370 } 371 } 372 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 373 /* 374 * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal 375 * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. 376 */ 377 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 378 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, 379 (int)s->session->master_key_length, 380 s->session->master_key) 381 <= 0 382 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { 383 384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 385 goto err; 386 } 387 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); 388 if (sig == NULL 389 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { 390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 391 goto err; 392 } 393 } else { 394 /* 395 * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not 396 * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal 397 */ 398 if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { 399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 400 goto err; 401 } 402 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); 403 if (sig == NULL 404 || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { 405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 406 goto err; 407 } 408 } 409 410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 411 { 412 int pktype = lu->sig; 413 414 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 415 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 416 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) 417 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); 418 } 419 #endif 420 421 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { 422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 423 goto err; 424 } 425 426 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ 427 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { 428 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 429 goto err; 430 } 431 432 OPENSSL_free(sig); 433 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); 434 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; 435 err: 436 OPENSSL_free(sig); 437 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); 438 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 439 } 440 441 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) 442 { 443 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 444 const unsigned char *data; 445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 446 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; 447 #endif 448 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 449 int j; 450 unsigned int len; 451 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 452 size_t hdatalen = 0; 453 void *hdata; 454 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 455 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 456 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; 457 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); 458 459 if (mctx == NULL) { 460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 461 goto err; 462 } 463 464 pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); 465 if (pkey == NULL) { 466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 467 goto err; 468 } 469 470 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, sctx) == NULL) { 471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 472 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); 473 goto err; 474 } 475 476 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { 477 unsigned int sigalg; 478 479 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { 480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); 481 goto err; 482 } 483 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { 484 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 485 goto err; 486 } 487 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { 488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 489 SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); 490 goto err; 491 } 492 493 if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { 494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 495 goto err; 496 } 497 498 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) 499 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", 500 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); 501 502 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ 503 /* 504 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without 505 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) 506 */ 507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 508 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) 509 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 510 && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 511 || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) 512 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 513 && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { 514 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); 515 } else 516 #endif 517 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { 518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 519 goto err; 520 } 521 522 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { 523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 524 goto err; 525 } 526 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 528 goto err; 529 } 530 531 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { 532 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 533 goto err; 534 } 535 536 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", 537 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); 538 539 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, 540 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), 541 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, 542 NULL) 543 <= 0) { 544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 545 goto err; 546 } 547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 548 { 549 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); 550 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 551 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 552 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { 553 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) 554 goto err; 555 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); 556 data = gost_data; 557 } 558 } 559 #endif 560 561 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { 562 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 563 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, 564 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) 565 <= 0) { 566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 567 goto err; 568 } 569 } 570 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { 571 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 572 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, 573 (int)s->session->master_key_length, 574 s->session->master_key) 575 <= 0) { 576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); 577 goto err; 578 } 579 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { 580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 581 goto err; 582 } 583 } else { 584 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); 585 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION 586 /* Ignore bad signatures when fuzzing */ 587 if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) 588 j = 1; 589 #endif 590 if (j <= 0) { 591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); 592 goto err; 593 } 594 } 595 596 /* 597 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client 598 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the 599 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest 600 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We 601 * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual 602 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. 603 */ 604 if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) 605 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 606 else 607 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 608 err: 609 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); 610 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; 611 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); 612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST 613 OPENSSL_free(gost_data); 614 #endif 615 return ret; 616 } 617 618 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) 619 { 620 size_t finish_md_len; 621 const char *sender; 622 size_t slen; 623 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 624 625 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ 626 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) 627 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; 628 629 /* 630 * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode 631 * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible 632 * moment. If we didn't already do this when we sent the client certificate 633 * then we need to do it now. 634 */ 635 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 636 && !s->server 637 && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) 638 && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE 639 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) 640 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 641 && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 642 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) { 643 ; 644 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 645 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 646 } 647 648 if (s->server) { 649 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 650 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 651 } else { 652 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 653 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 654 } 655 656 finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, 657 sender, slen, 658 s->s3.tmp.finish_md); 659 if (finish_md_len == 0) { 660 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 661 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 662 } 663 664 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; 665 666 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { 667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 668 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 669 } 670 671 /* 672 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for 673 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. 674 */ 675 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 676 && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, 677 s->session->master_key_length)) { 678 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 679 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 680 } 681 682 /* 683 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks 684 */ 685 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { 686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 687 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 688 } 689 if (!s->server) { 690 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, 691 finish_md_len); 692 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; 693 } else { 694 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, 695 finish_md_len); 696 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; 697 } 698 699 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; 700 } 701 702 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) 703 { 704 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { 705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 706 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 707 } 708 709 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; 710 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; 711 } 712 713 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) 714 { 715 unsigned int updatetype; 716 717 /* 718 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must 719 * be on a record boundary. 720 */ 721 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 723 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 724 } 725 726 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) 727 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); 729 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 730 } 731 732 /* 733 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we 734 * didn't recognise. 735 */ 736 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED 737 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { 738 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); 739 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 740 } 741 742 /* 743 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need 744 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should 745 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). 746 */ 747 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) 748 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; 749 750 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { 751 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 753 } 754 755 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 756 } 757 758 /* 759 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen 760 * to far. 761 */ 762 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 763 { 764 const char *sender; 765 size_t slen; 766 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 767 768 if (!s->server) { 769 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; 770 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; 771 } else { 772 sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; 773 slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; 774 } 775 776 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, 777 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); 778 779 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { 780 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 781 return 0; 782 } 783 784 return 1; 785 } 786 787 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, 788 PACKET *pkt) 789 { 790 size_t remain; 791 792 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); 793 /* 794 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have 795 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, 796 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes 797 */ 798 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { 799 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER 800 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) 801 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER 802 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { 803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 804 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 805 } 806 } else { 807 if (remain != 0) { 808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 809 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 810 } 811 } 812 813 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ 814 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { 815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 816 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 817 } 818 819 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; 820 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { 821 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 822 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 823 } 824 825 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { 826 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 827 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; 828 829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 830 /* 831 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of 832 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no 833 * SCTP is used 834 */ 835 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), 836 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); 837 #endif 838 } 839 840 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; 841 } 842 843 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) 844 { 845 size_t md_len; 846 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 847 int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s); 848 int ok; 849 850 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ 851 if (s->server) { 852 /* 853 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We 854 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than 855 * TLSv1.3 856 */ 857 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL) 858 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); 859 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) 860 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; 861 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 862 && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { 863 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 864 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 865 } 866 } 867 868 /* 869 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the 870 * message must be on a record boundary. 871 */ 872 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 873 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { 874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); 875 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 876 } 877 878 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ 879 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { 880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); 881 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 882 } 883 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; 884 885 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; 886 887 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { 888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); 889 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 890 } 891 892 ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, 893 md_len); 894 #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION 895 if (ok != 0) { 896 if ((PACKET_data(pkt)[0] ^ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md[0]) != 0xFF) { 897 ok = 0; 898 } 899 } 900 #endif 901 if (ok != 0) { 902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); 903 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 904 } 905 906 /* 907 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks 908 */ 909 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { 910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 911 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 912 } 913 if (s->server) { 914 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, 915 md_len); 916 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; 917 } else { 918 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, 919 md_len); 920 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; 921 } 922 923 /* 924 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing 925 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) 926 */ 927 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { 928 if (s->server) { 929 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { 930 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 931 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 932 } 933 } else { 934 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ 935 size_t dummy; 936 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, 937 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, 938 &dummy)) { 939 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 940 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 941 } 942 if (!tls13_store_server_finished_hash(s)) { 943 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 944 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 945 } 946 947 /* 948 * For non-QUIC we set up the client's app data read keys now, so 949 * that we can go straight into reading 0.5RTT data from the server. 950 * For QUIC we don't do that, and instead defer setting up the keys 951 * until after we have set up the write keys in order to ensure that 952 * write keys are always set up before read keys (so that if we read 953 * a message we have the correct keys in place to ack it) 954 */ 955 if (!SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) 956 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, 957 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { 958 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 959 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 960 } 961 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { 962 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 963 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 964 } 965 } 966 } 967 968 if (was_first 969 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) 970 && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) 971 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); 972 973 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; 974 } 975 976 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) 977 { 978 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { 979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 980 return CON_FUNC_ERROR; 981 } 982 983 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; 984 } 985 986 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ 987 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, 988 X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp) 989 { 990 int len; 991 unsigned char *outbytes; 992 int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE; 993 994 if (for_comp) 995 context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION; 996 997 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); 998 if (len < 0) { 999 if (!for_comp) 1000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1001 return 0; 1002 } 1003 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) 1004 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { 1005 if (!for_comp) 1006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1007 return 0; 1008 } 1009 1010 if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp) 1011 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) { 1012 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1013 return 0; 1014 } 1015 1016 return 1; 1017 } 1018 1019 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ 1020 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) 1021 { 1022 int i, chain_count; 1023 X509 *x; 1024 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; 1025 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; 1026 X509_STORE *chain_store; 1027 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); 1028 1029 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) 1030 return 1; 1031 1032 x = cpk->x509; 1033 1034 /* 1035 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. 1036 */ 1037 if (cpk->chain != NULL) 1038 extra_certs = cpk->chain; 1039 else 1040 extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs; 1041 1042 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) 1043 chain_store = NULL; 1044 else if (s->cert->chain_store) 1045 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; 1046 else 1047 chain_store = sctx->cert_store; 1048 1049 if (chain_store != NULL) { 1050 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, 1051 sctx->propq); 1052 1053 if (xs_ctx == NULL) { 1054 if (!for_comp) 1055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); 1056 return 0; 1057 } 1058 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { 1059 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); 1060 if (!for_comp) 1061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); 1062 return 0; 1063 } 1064 /* 1065 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we 1066 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately 1067 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying 1068 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can 1069 */ 1070 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); 1071 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ 1072 ERR_clear_error(); 1073 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); 1074 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); 1075 if (i != 1) { 1076 #if 0 1077 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ 1078 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 1079 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); 1080 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); 1081 #endif 1082 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); 1083 if (!for_comp) 1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); 1085 return 0; 1086 } 1087 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); 1088 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { 1089 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); 1090 1091 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) { 1092 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1093 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); 1094 return 0; 1095 } 1096 } 1097 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); 1098 } else { 1099 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); 1100 if (i != 1) { 1101 if (!for_comp) 1102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); 1103 return 0; 1104 } 1105 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) { 1106 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1107 return 0; 1108 } 1109 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { 1110 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); 1111 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) { 1112 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1113 return 0; 1114 } 1115 } 1116 } 1117 return 1; 1118 } 1119 1120 EVP_PKEY *tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc) 1121 { 1122 if (sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL) 1123 return sc->session->peer_rpk; 1124 if (sc->session->peer != NULL) 1125 return X509_get0_pubkey(sc->session->peer); 1126 return NULL; 1127 } 1128 1129 int tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **peer_rpk) 1130 { 1131 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; 1132 int ret = 0; 1133 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; 1134 PACKET extensions; 1135 PACKET context; 1136 unsigned long cert_len = 0, spki_len = 0; 1137 const unsigned char *spki, *spkistart; 1138 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc); 1139 1140 /*- 1141 * ---------------------------- 1142 * TLS 1.3 Certificate message: 1143 * ---------------------------- 1144 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2 1145 * 1146 * enum { 1147 * X509(0), 1148 * RawPublicKey(2), 1149 * (255) 1150 * } CertificateType; 1151 * 1152 * struct { 1153 * select (certificate_type) { 1154 * case RawPublicKey: 1155 * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo 1156 * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; 1157 * 1158 * case X509: 1159 * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; 1160 * }; 1161 * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; 1162 * } CertificateEntry; 1163 * 1164 * struct { 1165 * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; 1166 * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; 1167 * } Certificate; 1168 * 1169 * The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server 1170 * has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message 1171 * (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no 1172 * suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate 1173 * message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list" 1174 * field having length 0). 1175 * 1176 * ---------------------------- 1177 * TLS 1.2 Certificate message: 1178 * ---------------------------- 1179 * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-3 1180 * 1181 * opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>; 1182 * 1183 * struct { 1184 * select(certificate_type){ 1185 * 1186 * // certificate type defined in this document. 1187 * case RawPublicKey: 1188 * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; 1189 * 1190 * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246 1191 * case X.509: 1192 * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; 1193 * 1194 * // Additional certificate type based on 1195 * // "TLS Certificate Types" subregistry 1196 * }; 1197 * } Certificate; 1198 * 1199 * ------------- 1200 * Consequently: 1201 * ------------- 1202 * After the (TLS 1.3 only) context octet string (1 byte length + data) the 1203 * Certificate message has a 3-byte length that is zero in the client to 1204 * server message when the client has no RPK to send. In that case, there 1205 * are no (TLS 1.3 only) per-certificate extensions either, because the 1206 * [CertificateEntry] list is empty. 1207 * 1208 * In the server to client direction, or when the client had an RPK to send, 1209 * the TLS 1.3 message just prepends the length of the RPK+extensions, 1210 * while TLS <= 1.2 sends just the RPK (octet-string). 1211 * 1212 * The context must be zero-length in the server to client direction, and 1213 * must match the value recorded in the certificate request in the client 1214 * to server direction. 1215 */ 1216 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { 1217 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) { 1218 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 1219 goto err; 1220 } 1221 if (sc->server) { 1222 if (sc->pha_context == NULL) { 1223 if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) { 1224 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 1225 goto err; 1226 } 1227 } else { 1228 if (!PACKET_equal(&context, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) { 1229 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 1230 goto err; 1231 } 1232 } 1233 } else { 1234 if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) { 1235 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); 1236 goto err; 1237 } 1238 } 1239 } 1240 1241 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) 1242 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_len) { 1243 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1244 goto err; 1245 } 1246 1247 /* 1248 * The list length may be zero when there is no RPK. In the case of TLS 1249 * 1.2 this is actually the RPK length, which cannot be zero as specified, 1250 * but that breaks the ability of the client to decline client auth. We 1251 * overload the 0 RPK length to mean "no RPK". This interpretation is 1252 * also used some other (reference?) implementations, but is not supported 1253 * by the verbatim RFC7250 text. 1254 */ 1255 if (cert_len == 0) 1256 return 1; 1257 1258 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { 1259 /* 1260 * With TLS 1.3, a non-empty explicit-length RPK octet-string followed 1261 * by a possibly empty extension block. 1262 */ 1263 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &spki_len)) { 1264 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1265 goto err; 1266 } 1267 if (spki_len == 0) { 1268 /* empty RPK */ 1269 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EMPTY_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY); 1270 goto err; 1271 } 1272 } else { 1273 spki_len = cert_len; 1274 } 1275 1276 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &spki, spki_len)) { 1277 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1278 goto err; 1279 } 1280 spkistart = spki; 1281 if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL, &spki, spki_len, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq)) == NULL 1282 || spki != (spkistart + spki_len)) { 1283 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1284 goto err; 1285 } 1286 if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { 1287 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1288 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); 1289 goto err; 1290 } 1291 1292 /* Process the Extensions block */ 1293 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { 1294 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != (cert_len - 3 - spki_len)) { 1295 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); 1296 goto err; 1297 } 1298 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) 1299 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1300 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 1301 goto err; 1302 } 1303 if (!tls_collect_extensions(sc, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, 1304 &rawexts, NULL, 1)) { 1305 /* SSLfatal already called */ 1306 goto err; 1307 } 1308 /* chain index is always zero and fin always 1 for RPK */ 1309 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(sc, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, 1310 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { 1311 /* SSLfatal already called */ 1312 goto err; 1313 } 1314 } 1315 ret = 1; 1316 if (peer_rpk != NULL) { 1317 *peer_rpk = pkey; 1318 pkey = NULL; 1319 } 1320 1321 err: 1322 OPENSSL_free(rawexts); 1323 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1324 return ret; 1325 } 1326 1327 unsigned long tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) 1328 { 1329 int pdata_len = 0; 1330 unsigned char *pdata = NULL; 1331 X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL; 1332 unsigned long ret = 0; 1333 X509 *x509 = NULL; 1334 1335 if (cpk != NULL && cpk->x509 != NULL) { 1336 x509 = cpk->x509; 1337 /* Get the RPK from the certificate */ 1338 xpk = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cpk->x509); 1339 if (xpk == NULL) { 1340 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1341 goto err; 1342 } 1343 pdata_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, &pdata); 1344 } else if (cpk != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { 1345 /* Get the RPK from the private key */ 1346 pdata_len = i2d_PUBKEY(cpk->privatekey, &pdata); 1347 } else { 1348 /* The server RPK is not optional */ 1349 if (sc->server) { 1350 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1351 goto err; 1352 } 1353 /* The client can send a zero length certificate list */ 1354 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) { 1355 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1356 goto err; 1357 } 1358 return 1; 1359 } 1360 1361 if (pdata_len <= 0) { 1362 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1363 goto err; 1364 } 1365 1366 /* 1367 * TLSv1.2 is _just_ the raw public key 1368 * TLSv1.3 includes extensions, so there's a length wrapper 1369 */ 1370 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { 1371 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { 1372 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1373 goto err; 1374 } 1375 } 1376 1377 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) { 1378 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1379 goto err; 1380 } 1381 1382 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { 1383 /* 1384 * Only send extensions relevant to raw public keys. Until such 1385 * extensions are defined, this will be an empty set of extensions. 1386 * |x509| may be NULL, which raw public-key extensions need to handle. 1387 */ 1388 if (!tls_construct_extensions(sc, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, 1389 x509, 0)) { 1390 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1391 goto err; 1392 } 1393 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1394 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1395 goto err; 1396 } 1397 } 1398 1399 ret = 1; 1400 err: 1401 OPENSSL_free(pdata); 1402 return ret; 1403 } 1404 1405 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1406 CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) 1407 { 1408 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { 1409 if (!for_comp) 1410 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1411 return 0; 1412 } 1413 1414 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp)) 1415 return 0; 1416 1417 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1418 if (!for_comp) 1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1420 return 0; 1421 } 1422 1423 return 1; 1424 } 1425 1426 /* 1427 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result 1428 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is 1429 * freed up as well. 1430 */ 1431 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, 1432 int clearbufs, int stop) 1433 { 1434 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; 1435 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; 1436 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); 1437 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); 1438 1439 if (clearbufs) { 1440 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) 1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP 1442 /* 1443 * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS 1444 * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions 1445 * MUST NOT be used. 1446 * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. 1447 */ 1448 || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s))) 1449 #endif 1450 ) { 1451 /* 1452 * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf 1453 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits 1454 */ 1455 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); 1456 s->init_buf = NULL; 1457 } 1458 1459 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { 1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1461 return WORK_ERROR; 1462 } 1463 s->init_num = 0; 1464 } 1465 1466 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server 1467 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) 1468 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; 1469 1470 /* 1471 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 1472 * post handshake exchange 1473 */ 1474 if (cleanuphand) { 1475 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ 1476 s->renegotiate = 0; 1477 s->new_session = 0; 1478 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; 1479 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1480 1481 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); 1482 1483 if (s->server) { 1484 /* 1485 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the 1486 * NewSessionTicket 1487 */ 1488 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) 1489 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); 1490 1491 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ 1492 ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good); 1493 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; 1494 } else { 1495 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { 1496 /* 1497 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, 1498 * so we remove this one from the cache. 1499 */ 1500 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode 1501 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) 1502 != 0) 1503 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); 1504 } else { 1505 /* 1506 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the 1507 * NewSessionTicket 1508 */ 1509 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); 1510 } 1511 if (s->hit) 1512 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, 1513 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); 1514 1515 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; 1516 ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, 1517 &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); 1518 } 1519 1520 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { 1521 /* done with handshaking */ 1522 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; 1523 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; 1524 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; 1525 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); 1526 } 1527 } 1528 1529 if (s->info_callback != NULL) 1530 cb = s->info_callback; 1531 else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL) 1532 cb = sctx->info_callback; 1533 1534 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ 1535 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); 1536 1537 if (cb != NULL) { 1538 if (cleanuphand 1539 || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 1540 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 1541 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); 1542 } 1543 1544 if (!stop) { 1545 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ 1546 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); 1547 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; 1548 } 1549 1550 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; 1551 } 1552 1553 int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt) 1554 { 1555 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ 1556 int skip_message, i; 1557 uint8_t recvd_type; 1558 unsigned char *p; 1559 size_t l, readbytes; 1560 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 1561 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); 1562 1563 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1564 1565 do { 1566 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { 1567 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, 1568 &p[s->init_num], 1569 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 1570 0, &readbytes); 1571 if (i <= 0) { 1572 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1573 return 0; 1574 } 1575 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1576 /* 1577 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur 1578 * in the middle of a handshake message. 1579 */ 1580 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { 1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1582 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); 1583 return 0; 1584 } 1585 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE 1586 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { 1587 /* 1588 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is 1589 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. 1590 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do 1591 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello 1592 * with a valid cookie. 1593 */ 1594 return 0; 1595 } 1596 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; 1597 s->init_num = readbytes - 1; 1598 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; 1599 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; 1600 return 1; 1601 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { 1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, 1603 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); 1604 return 0; 1605 } 1606 s->init_num += readbytes; 1607 } 1608 1609 skip_message = 0; 1610 if (!s->server) 1611 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK 1612 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) 1613 /* 1614 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- 1615 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if 1616 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' 1617 * MAC. 1618 */ 1619 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { 1620 s->init_num = 0; 1621 skip_message = 1; 1622 1623 if (s->msg_callback) 1624 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, 1625 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ussl, 1626 s->msg_callback_arg); 1627 } 1628 } while (skip_message); 1629 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ 1630 1631 *mt = *p; 1632 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); 1633 1634 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { 1635 /* 1636 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible 1637 * ClientHello 1638 * 1639 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read 1640 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read 1641 */ 1642 l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 1643 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; 1644 1645 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; 1646 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 1647 } else { 1648 n2l3(p, l); 1649 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ 1650 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 1651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1652 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); 1653 return 0; 1654 } 1655 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; 1656 1657 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; 1658 s->init_num = 0; 1659 } 1660 1661 return 1; 1662 } 1663 1664 static int grow_init_buf(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t size) 1665 { 1666 1667 size_t msg_offset = (char *)s->init_msg - s->init_buf->data; 1668 1669 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, size)) 1670 return 0; 1671 1672 if (size < msg_offset) 1673 return 0; 1674 1675 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + msg_offset; 1676 1677 return 1; 1678 } 1679 1680 int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len) 1681 { 1682 size_t toread, readbytes; 1683 unsigned char *p; 1684 int i; 1685 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 1686 SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); 1687 1688 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { 1689 /* We've already read everything in */ 1690 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; 1691 return 1; 1692 } 1693 1694 toread = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; 1695 while (toread > 0) { 1696 size_t chunk = toread > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH ? SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH : toread; 1697 1698 /* 1699 * We incrementally allocate the buffer to guard against the peer 1700 * claiming a very large message size and then not sending it. 1701 */ 1702 if (!grow_init_buf(s, s->init_num + chunk + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); 1704 return 0; 1705 } 1706 1707 /* init_msg location can change after grow_init_buf */ 1708 p = s->init_msg; 1709 i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, 1710 &p[s->init_num], chunk, 0, &readbytes); 1711 if (i <= 0) { 1712 s->rwstate = SSL_READING; 1713 *len = 0; 1714 return 0; 1715 } 1716 s->init_num += readbytes; 1717 toread -= readbytes; 1718 } 1719 1720 /* 1721 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for 1722 * Finished verification. 1723 */ 1724 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { 1725 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1726 *len = 0; 1727 return 0; 1728 } 1729 1730 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ 1731 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { 1732 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 1733 s->init_num)) { 1734 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1735 *len = 0; 1736 return 0; 1737 } 1738 if (s->msg_callback) 1739 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, 1740 (size_t)s->init_num, ussl, s->msg_callback_arg); 1741 } else { 1742 /* 1743 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of 1744 * processing the message 1745 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished 1746 * message. 1747 */ 1748 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) 1749 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ 1750 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) 1751 || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET 1752 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { 1753 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO 1754 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 1755 || memcmp(hrrrandom, 1756 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, 1757 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 1758 != 0) { 1759 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 1760 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { 1761 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1762 *len = 0; 1763 return 0; 1764 } 1765 } 1766 } 1767 if (s->msg_callback) 1768 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, 1769 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ussl, 1770 s->msg_callback_arg); 1771 } 1772 1773 *len = s->init_num; 1774 return 1; 1775 } 1776 1777 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { 1778 { X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE }, 1779 { X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1780 { X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1781 { X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1782 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1783 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED }, 1784 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1785 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1786 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED }, 1787 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR }, 1788 { X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1789 { X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED }, 1790 { X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1791 { X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR }, 1792 { X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1793 { X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1794 { X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1795 { X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1796 { X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1797 { X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1798 { X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1799 { X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1800 { X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1801 { X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1802 { X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR }, 1803 { X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE }, 1804 { X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1805 { X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR }, 1806 { X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1807 { X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1808 { X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR }, 1809 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1810 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1811 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE }, 1812 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1813 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1814 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1815 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1816 { X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA }, 1817 { X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR }, 1818 1819 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ 1820 { X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN } 1821 }; 1822 1823 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) 1824 { 1825 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; 1826 1827 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) 1828 if (tp->x509err == x509err) 1829 break; 1830 return tp->alert; 1831 } 1832 1833 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 1834 { 1835 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) 1836 return 0; 1837 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); 1838 } 1839 1840 /* 1841 * SSL/TLS/DTLS version comparison 1842 * 1843 * Returns 1844 * 0 if versiona is equal to versionb 1845 * 1 if versiona is greater than versionb 1846 * -1 if versiona is less than versionb 1847 */ 1848 int ssl_version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int versiona, int versionb) 1849 { 1850 int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s); 1851 1852 if (versiona == versionb) 1853 return 0; 1854 if (!dtls) 1855 return versiona < versionb ? -1 : 1; 1856 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(versiona, versionb) ? -1 : 1; 1857 } 1858 1859 typedef struct { 1860 int version; 1861 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth)(void); 1862 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth)(void); 1863 } version_info; 1864 1865 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION 1866 #error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. 1867 #endif 1868 1869 /* Must be in order high to low */ 1870 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { 1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 1872 { TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method }, 1873 #else 1874 { TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1875 #endif 1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 1877 { TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method }, 1878 #else 1879 { TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1880 #endif 1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 1882 { TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method }, 1883 #else 1884 { TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1885 #endif 1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 1887 { TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method }, 1888 #else 1889 { TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1890 #endif 1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 1892 { SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method }, 1893 #else 1894 { SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1895 #endif 1896 { 0, NULL, NULL }, 1897 }; 1898 1899 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION 1900 #error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. 1901 #endif 1902 1903 /* Must be in order high to low */ 1904 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { 1905 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 1906 { DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method }, 1907 #else 1908 { DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1909 #endif 1910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 1911 { DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method }, 1912 { DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL }, 1913 #else 1914 { DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL }, 1915 { DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL }, 1916 #endif 1917 { 0, NULL, NULL }, 1918 }; 1919 1920 /* 1921 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. 1922 * 1923 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method 1924 * @method: the intended method. 1925 * 1926 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. 1927 */ 1928 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) 1929 { 1930 int version = method->version; 1931 1932 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) 1933 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; 1934 1935 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) 1936 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; 1937 1938 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) 1939 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; 1940 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) 1941 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; 1942 1943 return 0; 1944 } 1945 1946 /* 1947 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable 1948 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has 1949 * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. 1950 */ 1951 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) 1952 { 1953 size_t i; 1954 int curve; 1955 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); 1956 1957 if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) 1958 return 0; 1959 1960 /* 1961 * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername 1962 * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok 1963 */ 1964 if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL 1965 || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) 1966 return 1; 1967 1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1969 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) 1970 return 1; 1971 #endif 1972 1973 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) 1974 return 1; 1975 1976 /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */ 1977 for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { 1978 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ 1979 switch (i) { 1980 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: 1981 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: 1982 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: 1983 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: 1984 continue; 1985 default: 1986 break; 1987 } 1988 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) 1989 continue; 1990 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) 1991 return 1; 1992 /* 1993 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is 1994 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this 1995 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. 1996 */ 1997 curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); 1998 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) 1999 return 1; 2000 } 2001 2002 return 0; 2003 } 2004 2005 /* 2006 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by 2007 * `SSL *` instance 2008 * 2009 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method 2010 * @version: Protocol version to test against 2011 * 2012 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 2013 */ 2014 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, 2015 const SSL_METHOD **meth) 2016 { 2017 const version_info *vent; 2018 const version_info *table; 2019 2020 switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) { 2021 default: 2022 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ 2023 return ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; 2024 case TLS_ANY_VERSION: 2025 table = tls_version_table; 2026 break; 2027 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: 2028 table = dtls_version_table; 2029 break; 2030 } 2031 2032 for (vent = table; 2033 vent->version != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; 2034 ++vent) { 2035 const SSL_METHOD *(*thismeth)(void) = s->server ? vent->smeth 2036 : vent->cmeth; 2037 2038 if (thismeth != NULL 2039 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 2040 && ssl_method_error(s, thismeth()) == 0 2041 && (!s->server 2042 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION 2043 || is_tls13_capable(s))) { 2044 if (meth != NULL) 2045 *meth = thismeth(); 2046 return 1; 2047 } 2048 } 2049 return 0; 2050 } 2051 2052 /* 2053 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version 2054 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest 2055 * supported protocol version. 2056 * 2057 * @s server SSL handle. 2058 * 2059 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. 2060 */ 2061 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 2062 { 2063 const version_info *vent; 2064 const version_info *table; 2065 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 2066 2067 /* 2068 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version 2069 * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed 2070 * s->method). 2071 */ 2072 if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version) 2073 return 1; 2074 2075 /* 2076 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its 2077 * highest protocol version). 2078 */ 2079 if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version) 2080 table = tls_version_table; 2081 else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version) 2082 table = dtls_version_table; 2083 else { 2084 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ 2085 return 0; 2086 } 2087 2088 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { 2089 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) 2090 return s->version == vent->version; 2091 } 2092 return 0; 2093 } 2094 2095 /* 2096 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS 2097 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This 2098 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is 2099 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. 2100 * 2101 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. 2102 * @version: the intended limit. 2103 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. 2104 * 2105 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. 2106 */ 2107 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) 2108 { 2109 int valid_tls; 2110 int valid_dtls; 2111 2112 if (version == 0) { 2113 *bound = version; 2114 return 1; 2115 } 2116 2117 valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; 2118 valid_dtls = 2119 /* We support client side pre-standardisation version of DTLS */ 2120 (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2121 || (DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) 2122 && DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_VERSION)); 2123 2124 if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) 2125 return 0; 2126 2127 /*- 2128 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. 2129 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. 2130 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. 2131 * 2132 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not 2133 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user 2134 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's 2135 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the 2136 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. 2137 * 2138 * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, 2139 * returning success. 2140 */ 2141 switch (method_version) { 2142 default: 2143 break; 2144 2145 case TLS_ANY_VERSION: 2146 if (valid_tls) 2147 *bound = version; 2148 break; 2149 2150 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: 2151 if (valid_dtls) 2152 *bound = version; 2153 break; 2154 } 2155 return 1; 2156 } 2157 2158 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) 2159 { 2160 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION 2161 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { 2162 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; 2163 } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) 2164 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION 2165 /* 2166 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 2167 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still 2168 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and 2169 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is 2170 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. 2171 */ 2172 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { 2173 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; 2174 } else { 2175 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; 2176 } 2177 } 2178 2179 /* 2180 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the 2181 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and 2182 * the version specific method. 2183 * 2184 * @s: server SSL handle. 2185 * 2186 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. 2187 */ 2188 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, 2189 DOWNGRADE *dgrd) 2190 { 2191 /*- 2192 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: 2193 * 2194 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, 2195 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. 2196 * 2197 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the 2198 * handle version. 2199 */ 2200 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 2201 int server_version = ssl->method->version; 2202 int client_version = hello->legacy_version; 2203 const version_info *vent; 2204 const version_info *table; 2205 int disabled = 0; 2206 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; 2207 2208 s->client_version = client_version; 2209 2210 switch (server_version) { 2211 default: 2212 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { 2213 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) 2214 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; 2215 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; 2216 /* 2217 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't 2218 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope 2219 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol 2220 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return 2221 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) 2222 */ 2223 return 0; 2224 } 2225 /* 2226 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after 2227 * a HelloRetryRequest 2228 */ 2229 /* fall thru */ 2230 case TLS_ANY_VERSION: 2231 table = tls_version_table; 2232 break; 2233 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: 2234 table = dtls_version_table; 2235 break; 2236 } 2237 2238 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; 2239 2240 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ 2241 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) 2242 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; 2243 2244 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { 2245 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; 2246 unsigned int best_vers = 0; 2247 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; 2248 PACKET versionslist; 2249 2250 suppversions->parsed = 1; 2251 2252 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { 2253 /* Trailing or invalid data? */ 2254 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; 2255 } 2256 2257 /* 2258 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. 2259 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: 2260 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with 2261 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to 2262 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." 2263 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. 2264 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. 2265 */ 2266 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) 2267 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; 2268 2269 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { 2270 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) 2271 continue; 2272 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) 2273 best_vers = candidate_vers; 2274 } 2275 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { 2276 /* Trailing data? */ 2277 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; 2278 } 2279 2280 if (best_vers > 0) { 2281 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 2282 /* 2283 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we 2284 * negotiated TLSv1.3 2285 */ 2286 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) 2287 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; 2288 return 0; 2289 } 2290 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); 2291 s->version = best_vers; 2292 ssl->method = best_method; 2293 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers)) 2294 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2295 2296 return 0; 2297 } 2298 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; 2299 } 2300 2301 /* 2302 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest 2303 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 2304 */ 2305 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) 2306 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; 2307 2308 /* 2309 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in 2310 * the ClientHello. 2311 */ 2312 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { 2313 const SSL_METHOD *method; 2314 2315 if (vent->smeth == NULL || ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) 2316 continue; 2317 method = vent->smeth(); 2318 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { 2319 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); 2320 s->version = vent->version; 2321 ssl->method = method; 2322 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) 2323 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2324 2325 return 0; 2326 } 2327 disabled = 1; 2328 } 2329 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; 2330 } 2331 2332 /* 2333 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the 2334 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and 2335 * the version specific method. 2336 * 2337 * @s: client SSL handle. 2338 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. 2339 * @extensions: The extensions received 2340 * 2341 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. 2342 */ 2343 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, 2344 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) 2345 { 2346 const version_info *vent; 2347 const version_info *table; 2348 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; 2349 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 2350 2351 origv = s->version; 2352 s->version = version; 2353 2354 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ 2355 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, 2356 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO 2357 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, 2358 extensions, 2359 NULL, 0)) { 2360 s->version = origv; 2361 return 0; 2362 } 2363 2364 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE 2365 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { 2366 s->version = origv; 2367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); 2368 return 0; 2369 } 2370 2371 switch (ssl->method->version) { 2372 default: 2373 if (s->version != ssl->method->version) { 2374 s->version = origv; 2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); 2376 return 0; 2377 } 2378 /* 2379 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't 2380 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope 2381 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol 2382 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return 2383 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) 2384 */ 2385 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { 2386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2387 return 0; 2388 } 2389 return 1; 2390 case TLS_ANY_VERSION: 2391 table = tls_version_table; 2392 break; 2393 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: 2394 table = dtls_version_table; 2395 break; 2396 } 2397 2398 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); 2399 if (ret != 0) { 2400 s->version = origv; 2401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); 2402 return 0; 2403 } 2404 if (ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, ver_min) < 0 2405 || ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, ver_max) > 0) { 2406 s->version = origv; 2407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); 2408 return 0; 2409 } 2410 2411 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) 2412 real_max = ver_max; 2413 2414 /* Check for downgrades */ 2415 /* TODO(DTLSv1.3): Update this code for DTLSv1.3 */ 2416 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && real_max > s->version) { 2417 /* Signal applies to all versions */ 2418 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, 2419 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 2420 - sizeof(tls11downgrade), 2421 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) 2422 == 0) { 2423 s->version = origv; 2424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 2425 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 2426 return 0; 2427 } 2428 /* Only when accepting TLS1.3 */ 2429 if (real_max == TLS1_3_VERSION 2430 && memcmp(tls12downgrade, 2431 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE 2432 - sizeof(tls12downgrade), 2433 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) 2434 == 0) { 2435 s->version = origv; 2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 2437 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); 2438 return 0; 2439 } 2440 } 2441 2442 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { 2443 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) 2444 continue; 2445 2446 ssl->method = vent->cmeth(); 2447 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { 2448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2449 return 0; 2450 } 2451 return 1; 2452 } 2453 2454 s->version = origv; 2455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); 2456 return 0; 2457 } 2458 2459 /* 2460 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version 2461 * @s: The SSL connection 2462 * @min_version: The minimum supported version 2463 * @max_version: The maximum supported version 2464 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole 2465 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled 2466 * protocol. 2467 * 2468 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the 2469 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx 2470 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B 2471 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, 2472 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. 2473 * 2474 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, 2475 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol 2476 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. 2477 * 2478 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure 2479 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. 2480 */ 2481 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version, 2482 int *max_version, int *real_max) 2483 { 2484 int version, tmp_real_max; 2485 int hole; 2486 const SSL_METHOD *method; 2487 const version_info *table; 2488 const version_info *vent; 2489 const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 2490 2491 switch (ssl->method->version) { 2492 default: 2493 /* 2494 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't 2495 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope 2496 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol 2497 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return 2498 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) 2499 */ 2500 *min_version = *max_version = s->version; 2501 /* 2502 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version 2503 * flexible method. 2504 */ 2505 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) 2506 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2507 return 0; 2508 case TLS_ANY_VERSION: 2509 table = tls_version_table; 2510 break; 2511 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: 2512 table = dtls_version_table; 2513 break; 2514 } 2515 2516 /* 2517 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols 2518 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version 2519 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method 2520 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". 2521 * 2522 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above 2523 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above 2524 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. 2525 * 2526 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes 2527 * the selected version. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. 2528 * 2529 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, we support a contiguous 2530 * range of at least two methods. If we hit a disabled method, 2531 * then hole becomes true again, but nothing else changes yet, 2532 * because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. 2533 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes 2534 * selected, as we start from scratch. 2535 */ 2536 *min_version = version = 0; 2537 hole = 1; 2538 if (real_max != NULL) 2539 *real_max = 0; 2540 tmp_real_max = 0; 2541 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { 2542 /* 2543 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the 2544 * "version capability" vector. 2545 */ 2546 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { 2547 hole = 1; 2548 tmp_real_max = 0; 2549 continue; 2550 } 2551 method = vent->cmeth(); 2552 2553 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) 2554 tmp_real_max = vent->version; 2555 2556 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { 2557 hole = 1; 2558 } else if (!hole) { 2559 *min_version = method->version; 2560 } else { 2561 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) 2562 *real_max = tmp_real_max; 2563 version = method->version; 2564 *min_version = version; 2565 hole = 0; 2566 } 2567 } 2568 2569 *max_version = version; 2570 2571 /* Fail if everything is disabled */ 2572 if (version == 0) 2573 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; 2574 2575 return 0; 2576 } 2577 2578 /* 2579 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for 2580 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. 2581 * 2582 * @s: client SSL handle. 2583 * 2584 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. 2585 */ 2586 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 2587 { 2588 int ver_min, ver_max, ret; 2589 2590 /* 2591 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent 2592 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. 2593 */ 2594 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 2595 return 0; 2596 2597 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); 2598 2599 if (ret != 0) 2600 return ret; 2601 2602 s->version = ver_max; 2603 2604 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { 2605 if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { 2606 /* 2607 * Even though this is technically before version negotiation, 2608 * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate 2609 * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when 2610 * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer 2611 * about this immediately. 2612 */ 2613 if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max)) 2614 return 0; 2615 } 2616 } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) { 2617 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ 2618 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; 2619 } 2620 2621 s->client_version = ver_max; 2622 return 0; 2623 } 2624 2625 /* 2626 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is 2627 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be 2628 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is 2629 * 1) or 0 otherwise. If provided a pointer it will also return the position 2630 * where the group was found. 2631 */ 2632 int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, 2633 size_t num_groups, int checkallow, size_t *pos) 2634 { 2635 size_t i; 2636 2637 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) 2638 return 0; 2639 2640 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { 2641 uint16_t group = groups[i]; 2642 2643 if (group_id == group 2644 && (!checkallow 2645 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { 2646 if (pos != NULL) 2647 *pos = i; 2648 return 1; 2649 } 2650 } 2651 2652 return 0; 2653 } 2654 2655 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ 2656 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, 2657 const unsigned char *hashval, 2658 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, 2659 size_t hrrlen) 2660 { 2661 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2662 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; 2663 2664 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); 2665 2666 if (hashval == NULL) { 2667 hashval = hashvaltmp; 2668 hashlen = 0; 2669 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ 2670 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) 2671 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), 2672 &hashlen)) { 2673 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2674 return 0; 2675 } 2676 } 2677 2678 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ 2679 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { 2680 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2681 return 0; 2682 } 2683 2684 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ 2685 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; 2686 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; 2687 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) 2688 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { 2689 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2690 return 0; 2691 } 2692 2693 /* 2694 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted 2695 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after 2696 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. 2697 */ 2698 if (hrr != NULL 2699 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) 2700 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 2701 s->s3.tmp.message_size 2702 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { 2703 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2704 return 0; 2705 } 2706 2707 return 1; 2708 } 2709 2710 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) 2711 { 2712 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); 2713 } 2714 2715 int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) 2716 { 2717 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); 2718 X509_NAME *xn = NULL; 2719 PACKET cadns; 2720 2721 if (ca_sk == NULL) { 2722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); 2723 goto err; 2724 } 2725 /* get the CA RDNs */ 2726 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { 2727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2728 goto err; 2729 } 2730 2731 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { 2732 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; 2733 unsigned int name_len; 2734 2735 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) 2736 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { 2737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2738 goto err; 2739 } 2740 2741 namestart = namebytes; 2742 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { 2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); 2744 goto err; 2745 } 2746 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { 2747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 2748 goto err; 2749 } 2750 2751 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { 2752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); 2753 goto err; 2754 } 2755 xn = NULL; 2756 } 2757 2758 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); 2759 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; 2760 2761 return 1; 2762 2763 err: 2764 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); 2765 X509_NAME_free(xn); 2766 return 0; 2767 } 2768 2769 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 2770 { 2771 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; 2772 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); 2773 2774 if (s->server) { 2775 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); 2776 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) 2777 ca_sk = NULL; 2778 } 2779 2780 if (ca_sk == NULL) 2781 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl); 2782 2783 return ca_sk; 2784 } 2785 2786 int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, 2787 WPACKET *pkt) 2788 { 2789 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ 2790 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2792 return 0; 2793 } 2794 2795 if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { 2796 int i; 2797 2798 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { 2799 unsigned char *namebytes; 2800 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); 2801 int namelen; 2802 2803 if (name == NULL 2804 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 2805 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, 2806 &namebytes) 2807 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { 2808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2809 return 0; 2810 } 2811 } 2812 } 2813 2814 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 2815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2816 return 0; 2817 } 2818 2819 return 1; 2820 } 2821 2822 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ 2823 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs, 2824 const void *param, size_t paramlen) 2825 { 2826 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; 2827 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); 2828 2829 if (tbs == NULL) { 2830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); 2831 return 0; 2832 } 2833 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2834 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); 2835 2836 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); 2837 2838 *ptbs = tbs; 2839 return tbslen; 2840 } 2841 2842 /* 2843 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, 2844 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once 2845 */ 2846 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 2847 { 2848 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { 2849 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) 2850 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 2851 return 0; 2852 2853 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); 2854 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { 2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2856 return 0; 2857 } 2858 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, 2859 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { 2860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2861 EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); 2862 s->pha_dgst = NULL; 2863 return 0; 2864 } 2865 } 2866 return 1; 2867 } 2868 2869 /* 2870 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest 2871 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request 2872 */ 2873 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) 2874 { 2875 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { 2876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2877 return 0; 2878 } 2879 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, 2880 s->pha_dgst)) { 2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2882 return 0; 2883 } 2884 return 1; 2885 } 2886 2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG 2888 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, 2889 PACKET *pkt, 2890 PACKET *tmppkt, 2891 BUF_MEM *buf) 2892 { 2893 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; 2894 int comp_alg; 2895 COMP_METHOD *method = NULL; 2896 COMP_CTX *comp = NULL; 2897 size_t expected_length; 2898 size_t comp_length; 2899 int i; 2900 int found = 0; 2901 2902 if (buf == NULL) { 2903 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2904 goto err; 2905 } 2906 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&comp_alg)) { 2907 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 2908 goto err; 2909 } 2910 /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */ 2911 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) { 2912 for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) { 2913 if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) { 2914 found = 1; 2915 break; 2916 } 2917 } 2918 if (!found) { 2919 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 2920 goto err; 2921 } 2922 } 2923 if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) { 2924 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 2925 goto err; 2926 } 2927 switch (comp_alg) { 2928 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib: 2929 method = COMP_zlib_oneshot(); 2930 break; 2931 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli: 2932 method = COMP_brotli_oneshot(); 2933 break; 2934 case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd: 2935 method = COMP_zstd_oneshot(); 2936 break; 2937 default: 2938 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); 2939 goto err; 2940 } 2941 2942 if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL 2943 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length) 2944 || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length)) { 2945 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 2946 goto err; 2947 } 2948 2949 /* Prevent excessive pre-decompression allocation */ 2950 if (expected_length > sc->max_cert_list) { 2951 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); 2952 goto err; 2953 } 2954 2955 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length || comp_length == 0) { 2956 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 2957 goto err; 2958 } 2959 2960 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length) 2961 || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length) 2962 || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length, 2963 (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) 2964 != (int)expected_length) { 2965 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); 2966 goto err; 2967 } 2968 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; 2969 err: 2970 COMP_CTX_free(comp); 2971 return ret; 2972 } 2973 #endif 2974
Indexes created Wed Oct 21 00:26:06 UTC 2026