| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/pae/ |
| ieee802_1x_key.h | 20 size_t ckn_bytes, u8 *ick, size_t ick_bytes);
21 int ieee802_1x_icv_aes_cmac(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_bytes, const u8 *msg,
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| ieee802_1x_key.c | 156 * ICK = KDF(Key, Label, Keyid, ICKLength)
159 size_t ckn_bytes, u8 *ick, size_t ick_bytes)
167 return aes_kdf(cak, 8 *cak_bytes, "IEEE8021 ICK",
169 8 * ick_bytes, ick);
177 * ICV = AES-CMAC(ICK, M, 128)
179 int ieee802_1x_icv_aes_cmac(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_bytes, const u8 *msg,
185 res = omac1_aes_128(ick, msg, msg_bytes, icv);
187 res = omac1_aes_256(ick, msg, msg_bytes, icv);
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| ieee802_1x_kay_i.h | 78 u8 *ick, size_t ick_bytes);
79 int (*icv_hash)(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_bytes,
109 struct mka_key ick; member in struct:ieee802_1x_mka_participant
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| ieee802_1x_kay.c | 1906 participant->ick.key, participant->ick.len,
3207 participant->ick.key, participant->ick.len,
3793 /* to derive ICK from CAK and CKN */
3794 participant->ick.len = participant->cak.len;
3799 participant->ick.key,
3800 participant->ick.len)) {
3801 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "KaY: ICK derivation failed");
3804 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "KaY: Derived ICK",
[all...] |
| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/eap_common/ |
| eap_pax_common.c | 125 * @ick: Buffer for the derived Integrity Check Key
130 u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick, u8 *mid)
138 e, 2 * EAP_PAX_RAND_LEN, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN, ick) ||
146 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-PAX: ICK", ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN);
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| eap_pax_common.h | 90 u8 *mk, u8 *ck, u8 *ick, u8 *mid);
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| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/eap_peer/ |
| eap_pax.c | 40 u8 ick[EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data
181 data->mk, data->ck, data->ick,
217 eap_pax_mac(req->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
315 if (eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
424 eap_pax_mac(req->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
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| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/eap_server/ |
| eap_server_pax.c | 38 u8 ick[EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN]; member in struct:eap_pax_data
166 if (eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
282 if (eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
410 data->ick, data->mid) < 0) {
445 if (eap_pax_mac(data->mac_id, data->ick, EAP_PAX_ICK_LEN,
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| /src/sys/arch/sparc64/sparc64/ |
| cpu_in_cksum.S | 229 clr %g4 ! In case we are using EMBEDANY (ick)
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| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/common/ |
| wpa_common.c | 669 u8 *ick, size_t *ick_len, int akmp, int cipher,
684 * ICK = L(FILS-Key-Data, 0, ICK_bits)
767 os_memcpy(ick, tmp, *ick_len);
769 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ICK", ick, *ick_len);
802 int fils_key_auth_sk(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_len, const u8 *snonce,
816 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ICK", ick, ick_len);
824 * Key-Auth = HMAC-Hash(ICK, SNonce || ANonce || STA-MAC || AP-BSSID
845 res = hmac_sha384_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len
[all...] |
| wpa_common.h | 478 u8 *ick, size_t *ick_len, int akmp, int cipher,
480 int fils_key_auth_sk(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_len, const u8 *snonce,
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| /src/sys/arch/mac68k/mac68k/ |
| macromasm.s | 517 movl %a0,%sp@(FR_HW) | we will RTS to trap routine (ick)
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| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/ap/ |
| wpa_auth.c | 2956 u8 ick[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN]; local
2972 &sm->PTK, ick, &ick_len,
3024 res = fils_key_auth_sk(ick, ick_len, snonce, anonce,
3034 forced_memzero(ick, sizeof(ick));
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| /src/external/bsd/wpa/dist/src/rsn_supp/ |
| wpa.c | 5562 u8 ick[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN]; local
5812 &sm->ptk, ick, &ick_len,
5856 res = fils_key_auth_sk(ick, ick_len, sm->fils_nonce,
5863 forced_memzero(ick, sizeof(ick));
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