PROTOCOL revision 1.24.4.2 1 This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
2 protocol.
3
4 Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
5 filexfer protocol described in:
6
7 https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
8
9 Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
10 are individually implemented as extensions described below.
11
12 The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
13 PROTOCOL.agent
14
15 1. Transport protocol changes
16
17 1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64 (a] openssh.com"
18
19 This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
20 (rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
21 in:
22
23 https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
24
25 1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib (a] openssh.com"
26
27 This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
28 algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
29 start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
30 avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
31
32 The method is documented in:
33
34 https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
35
36 1.3. transport: Certificate key algorithms
37
38 OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
39 authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
40 in at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-ssh-cert/
41
42 1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
43
44 OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
45 specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
46 and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
47 curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
48 generated.
49
50 1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
51
52 OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
53 perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
54 4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
55 calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
56 plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
57 protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
58 "decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
59 session plaintext.
60
61 Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
62 to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
63 length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
64 length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
65 verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
66
67 As such, the MAC covers:
68
69 mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
70
71 where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
72 contains:
73
74 byte padding_length
75 byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
76 byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length
77
78 1.6 transport: AES-GCM
79
80 OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
81 Because of problems with the design of the algorithm negotiation in this
82 RFC, OpenSSH (and other SSH implementations) use different rules as
83 described in:
84
85 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-sshm-aes-gcm/
86
87 1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305 (a] openssh.com authenticated encryption
88
89 OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
90 as described in:
91
92 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sshm-chacha20-poly1305/
93
94 1.8 transport: ping facility
95
96 OpenSSH implements a transport level ping message SSH2_MSG_PING
97 and a corresponding SSH2_MSG_PONG reply.
98
99 #define SSH2_MSG_PING 192
100 #define SSH2_MSG_PONG 193
101
102 The ping message is simply:
103
104 byte SSH_MSG_PING
105 string data
106
107 The reply copies the data (which may be the empty string) from the
108 ping:
109
110 byte SSH_MSG_PONG
111 string data
112
113 Replies are sent in order. They are sent immediately except when rekeying
114 is in progress, in which case they are queued until rekeying completes.
115
116 The server advertises support for these messages using the
117 SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO mechanism (RFC8308), with the following message:
118
119 string "ping (a] openssh.com"
120 string "0" (version)
121
122 The ping/reply message is implemented at the transport layer rather
123 than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
124 short packet lengths, which would not be possible with other
125 approaches.
126
127 1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
128
129 OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures
130 designed to thwart the so-called "Terrapin" attack against the
131 early SSH protocol. These are collectively referred to as
132 "strict KEX" and documented in an Internet-Draft:
133
134 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-sshm-strict-kex/
135
136 1.10 transport: SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication
137
138 This protocol extension allows the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO to be sent
139 during user authentication. RFC8308 does allow a second
140 SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO notification, but it may only be sent at the end
141 of user authentication and this is too late to signal per-user
142 server signature algorithms.
143
144 Support for receiving the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message during user
145 authentication is signalled by the client including a
146 "ext-info-in-auth (a] openssh.com" key via its initial SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO
147 set after the SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message.
148
149 A server that supports this extension MAY send a second
150 SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO message any time after the client's first
151 SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, regardless of whether it succeed or fails.
152 The client SHOULD be prepared to update the server-sig-algs that
153 it received during an earlier SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with the later one.
154
155 2. Connection protocol changes
156
157 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow (a] openssh.com"
158
159 The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
160 message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
161 more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
162 an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
163 while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
164 the peer.
165
166 This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
167 otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
168 processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
169 descriptor.
170
171 OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
172 signalling: "eow (a] openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
173 an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
174 experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
175
176 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
177 uint32 recipient channel
178 string "eow (a] openssh.com"
179 boolean FALSE
180
181 On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
182 the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
183 originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
184
185 As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
186 remain open after a "eow (a] openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
187 still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
188 window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
189
190 NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
191 of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
192 message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
193 Other SSH implementations may be listed to receive this message
194 upon request.
195
196 2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
197 "no-more-sessions (a] openssh.com"
198
199 Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
200 attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
201 additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
202 request "no-more-sessions (a] openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
203
204 When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
205 (i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
206 will send the following global request:
207
208 byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
209 string "no-more-sessions (a] openssh.com"
210 char want-reply
211
212 On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
213 future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
214 connection.
215
216 Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
217 (that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
218
219 NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
220 of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
221 servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
222 listed to receive this message upon request.
223
224 2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun (a] openssh.com"
225
226 OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun (a] openssh.com"
227 channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
228 with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
229 interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
230 requested by the client with the following packet:
231
232 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
233 string "tun (a] openssh.com"
234 uint32 sender channel
235 uint32 initial window size
236 uint32 maximum packet size
237 uint32 tunnel mode
238 uint32 remote unit number
239
240 The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
241 layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
242
243 SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */
244 SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */
245
246 The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
247 be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically choose an interface. A
248 server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
249 the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
250 open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
251
252 Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
253 over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
254 and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
255 are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
256 SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
257
258 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
259 uint32 recipient channel
260 string data
261
262 The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
263
264 uint32 packet length
265 uint32 address family
266 byte[packet length - 4] packet data
267
268 The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
269 It may be one of:
270
271 SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */
272 SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */
273
274 The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
275 without any link layer header.
276
277 The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
278
279 uint32 packet length
280 byte[packet length] frame
281
282 The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
283 header.
284
285 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
286
287 OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
288 using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per
289 TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
290
291 Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
292 to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
293
294 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
295 string "direct-streamlocal (a] openssh.com"
296 uint32 sender channel
297 uint32 initial window size
298 uint32 maximum packet size
299 string socket path
300 string reserved
301 uint32 reserved
302
303 Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
304 server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
305 GLOBAL_REQUEST.
306
307 byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
308 string "forwarded-streamlocal (a] openssh.com"
309 uint32 sender channel
310 uint32 initial window size
311 uint32 maximum packet size
312 string socket path
313 string reserved for future use
314
315 The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
316 remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass
317 information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
318 The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
319
320 Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
321 to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
322
323 byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
324 string "streamlocal-forward (a] openssh.com"
325 boolean TRUE
326 string socket path
327
328 Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
329 by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
330
331 byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
332 string "cancel-streamlocal-forward (a] openssh.com"
333 boolean FALSE
334 string socket path
335
336 2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00 (a] openssh.com"
337 and "hostkeys-prove-00 (a] openssh.com"
338
339 OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
340 a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
341 has completed. This is documented in an Internet-Draft
342
343 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-sshm-hostkey-update/
344
345 2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request
346
347 The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a
348 signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one
349 extension signal "INFO (a] openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on
350 BSD-derived systems.
351
352 3. Authentication protocol changes
353
354 3.1. Host-bound public key authentication
355
356 This is trivial change to the traditional "publickey" authentication
357 method. The authentication request is identical to the original method
358 but for the name and one additional field:
359
360 byte SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
361 string username
362 string "ssh-connection"
363 string "publickey-hostbound-v00 (a] openssh.com"
364 bool has_signature
365 string pkalg
366 string public key
367 string server host key
368
369 Because the entire SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message is included in
370 the signed data, this ensures that a binding between the destination
371 user, the server identity and the session identifier is visible to the
372 signer. OpenSSH uses this binding via signed data to implement per-key
373 restrictions in ssh-agent.
374
375 A server may advertise this method using the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO
376 mechanism (RFC8308), with the following message:
377
378 string "publickey-hostbound (a] openssh.com"
379 string "0" (version)
380
381 Clients should prefer host-bound authentication when advertised by
382 server.
383
384 4. SFTP protocol changes
385
386 4.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
387
388 When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
389 to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
390 the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
391 fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
392 current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
393 SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
394
395 uint32 id
396 string targetpath
397 string linkpath
398
399 4.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
400
401 OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
402 standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
403 hello packet:
404
405 uint32 3 /* protocol version */
406 string ext1-name
407 string ext1-version
408 string ext2-name
409 string ext2-version
410 ...
411 string extN-name
412 string extN-version
413
414 Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
415 string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
416 ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
417 extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
418 check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
419
420 4.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename (a] openssh.com"
421
422 This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
423 are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
424 draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
425 SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
426
427 uint32 id
428 string "posix-rename (a] openssh.com"
429 string oldpath
430 string newpath
431
432 On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
433 rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
434 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
435 "1".
436
437 4.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs (a] openssh.com" and
438 "fstatvfs (a] openssh.com"
439
440 These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
441 interfaces. The "statvfs (a] openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
442 pathname, and is formatted as follows:
443
444 uint32 id
445 string "statvfs (a] openssh.com"
446 string path
447
448 The "fstatvfs (a] openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
449
450 uint32 id
451 string "fstatvfs (a] openssh.com"
452 string handle
453
454 These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
455 return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
456
457 uint32 id
458 uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */
459 uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */
460 uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
461 uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */
462 uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */
463 uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */
464 uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */
465 uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */
466 uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */
467 uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */
468 uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */
469
470 The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
471
472 #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */
473 #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */
474
475 Both the "statvfs (a] openssh.com" and "fstatvfs (a] openssh.com" extensions are
476 advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
477
478 4.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink (a] openssh.com"
479
480 This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
481 request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
482 following format:
483
484 uint32 id
485 string "hardlink (a] openssh.com"
486 string oldpath
487 string newpath
488
489 On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
490 link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
491 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
492 "1".
493
494 4.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync (a] openssh.com"
495
496 This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
497
498 uint32 id
499 string "fsync (a] openssh.com"
500 string handle
501
502 On receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
503 respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
504
505 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
506 "1".
507
508 4.7. sftp: Extension request "lsetstat (a] openssh.com"
509
510 This request is like the "setstat" command, but sets file attributes on
511 symlinks. It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
512 following format:
513
514 uint32 id
515 string "lsetstat (a] openssh.com"
516 string path
517 ATTRS attrs
518
519 See the "setstat" command for more details.
520
521 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
522 "1".
523
524 4.8. sftp: Extension request "limits (a] openssh.com"
525
526 This request is used to determine various limits the server might impose.
527 Clients should not attempt to exceed these limits as the server might sever
528 the connection immediately.
529
530 uint32 id
531 string "limits (a] openssh.com"
532
533 The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
534
535 uint32 id
536 uint64 max-packet-length
537 uint64 max-read-length
538 uint64 max-write-length
539 uint64 max-open-handles
540
541 The 'max-packet-length' applies to the total number of bytes in a
542 single SFTP packet. Servers SHOULD set this at least to 34000.
543
544 The 'max-read-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_READ packet.
545 Even if the client requests a larger size, servers will usually respond
546 with a shorter SSH_FXP_DATA packet. Servers SHOULD set this at least to
547 32768.
548
549 The 'max-write-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_WRITE packet
550 the server will accept. Servers SHOULD set this at least to 32768.
551
552 The 'max-open-handles' is the maximum number of active handles that the
553 server allows (e.g. handles created by SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
554 packets). Servers MAY count internal file handles against this limit
555 (e.g. system logging or stdout/stderr), so clients SHOULD NOT expect to
556 open this many handles in practice.
557
558 If the server doesn't enforce a specific limit, then the field may be
559 set to 0. This implies the server relies on the OS to enforce limits
560 (e.g. available memory or file handles), and such limits might be
561 dynamic. The client SHOULD take care to not try to exceed reasonable
562 limits.
563
564 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
565 "1".
566
567 4.9. sftp: Extension request "expand-path (a] openssh.com"
568
569 This request supports canonicalisation of relative paths and
570 those that need tilde-expansion, i.e. "~", "~/..." and "~user/..."
571 These paths are expanded using shell-like rules and the resultant
572 path is canonicalised similarly to SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
573
574 It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following
575 format:
576
577 uint32 id
578 string "expand-path (a] openssh.com"
579 string path
580
581 Its reply is the same format as that of SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
582
583 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
584 "1".
585
586 4.10. sftp: Extension request "copy-data"
587
588 This request asks the server to copy data from one open file handle and
589 write it to a different open file handle. This avoids needing to transfer
590 the data across the network twice (a download followed by an upload).
591
592 byte SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
593 uint32 id
594 string "copy-data"
595 string read-from-handle
596 uint64 read-from-offset
597 uint64 read-data-length
598 string write-to-handle
599 uint64 write-to-offset
600
601 The server will copy read-data-length bytes starting from
602 read-from-offset from the read-from-handle and write them to
603 write-to-handle starting from write-to-offset, and then respond with a
604 SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
605
606 It's equivalent to issuing a series of SSH_FXP_READ requests on
607 read-from-handle and a series of requests of SSH_FXP_WRITE on
608 write-to-handle.
609
610 If read-from-handle and write-to-handle are the same, the server will
611 fail the request and respond with a SSH_FX_INVALID_PARAMETER message.
612
613 If read-data-length is 0, then the server will read data from the
614 read-from-handle until EOF is reached.
615
616 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
617 "1".
618
619 This request is identical to the "copy-data" request documented in:
620
621 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00#section-7
622
623 4.11. sftp: Extension request "home-directory"
624
625 This request asks the server to expand the specified user's home directory.
626 An empty username implies the current user. This can be used by the client
627 to expand ~/ type paths locally.
628
629 byte SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
630 uint32 id
631 string "home-directory"
632 string username
633
634 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
635 "1".
636
637 This provides similar information as the "expand-path (a] openssh.com" extension.
638
639 This request is identical to the "home-directory" request documented in:
640
641 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00#section-5
642
643 4.12. sftp: Extension request "users-groups-by-id (a] openssh.com"
644
645 This request asks the server to return user and/or group names that
646 correspond to one or more IDs (e.g. as returned from a SSH_FXP_STAT
647 request). This may be used by the client to provide usernames in
648 directory listings.
649
650 byte SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
651 uint32 id
652 string "users-groups-by-id (a] openssh.com"
653 string uids
654 string gids
655
656 Where "uids" and "gids" consists of one or more integer user or group
657 identifiers:
658
659 uint32 id-0
660 ...
661
662 The server will reply with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY:
663
664 byte SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY
665 uint32 id
666 string usernames
667 string groupnames
668
669 Where "username" and "groupnames" consists of names in identical request
670 order to "uids" and "gids" respectively:
671
672 string name-0
673 ...
674
675 If a name cannot be identified for a given user or group ID, an empty
676 string will be returned in its place.
677
678 It is acceptable for either "uids" or "gids" to be an empty set, in
679 which case the respective "usernames" or "groupnames" list will also
680 be empty.
681
682 This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
683 "1".
684
685 5. Miscellaneous changes
686
687 5.1 Public key format
688
689 OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in
690 authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting
691 of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob.
692 The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for
693 the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253
694 section 6.6 for RSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys and
695 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-ssh-cert/
696 for the OpenSSH certificate formats.
697
698 5.2 Private key format
699
700 OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format
701 described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format
702 (RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA and ECDSA keys
703 and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8.
704
705 5.3 KRL format
706
707 OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This
708 format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file.
709
710 5.4 Connection multiplexing
711
712 OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in
713 PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a
714 master instance and later clients.
715
716 5.5. Agent protocol extensions
717
718 OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented
719 in the PROTOCOL.agent file.
720
721 $OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.60 2026/02/09 22:09:48 dtucker Exp $
722 $NetBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.24.4.2 2026/05/07 17:49:22 martin Exp $
723