t1_lib.c revision 1.1.1.2
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <openssl/objects.h> 114 #include <openssl/evp.h> 115 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117 #include "ssl_locl.h" 118 119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 120 121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 124 SSL_SESSION **psess); 125 #endif 126 127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 128 tls1_enc, 129 tls1_mac, 130 tls1_setup_key_block, 131 tls1_generate_master_secret, 132 tls1_change_cipher_state, 133 tls1_final_finish_mac, 134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 135 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 tls1_alert_code, 139 }; 140 141 long tls1_default_timeout(void) 142 { 143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 145 return(60*60*2); 146 } 147 148 int tls1_new(SSL *s) 149 { 150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 151 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 152 return(1); 153 } 154 155 void tls1_free(SSL *s) 156 { 157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 159 { 160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 161 } 162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 163 ssl3_free(s); 164 } 165 166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 167 { 168 ssl3_clear(s); 169 s->version = s->method->version; 170 } 171 172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 173 static int nid_list[] = 174 { 175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 200 }; 201 202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 203 { 204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 207 return 0; 208 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 209 } 210 211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 212 { 213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 214 switch (nid) 215 { 216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 217 return 1; 218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 219 return 2; 220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 221 return 3; 222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 return 4; 224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 225 return 5; 226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 227 return 6; 228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 229 return 7; 230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 231 return 8; 232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 233 return 9; 234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 235 return 10; 236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 237 return 11; 238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 239 return 12; 240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 241 return 13; 242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 243 return 14; 244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 245 return 15; 246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 247 return 16; 248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 249 return 17; 250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 251 return 18; 252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 253 return 19; 254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 255 return 20; 256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 257 return 21; 258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 259 return 22; 260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 261 return 23; 262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 263 return 24; 264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 265 return 25; 266 default: 267 return 0; 268 } 269 } 270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 271 272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 273 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 274 { 275 int extdatalen=0; 276 unsigned char *ret = p; 277 278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 281 return p; 282 283 ret+=2; 284 285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 286 287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 288 { 289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 290 unsigned long size_str; 291 long lenmax; 292 293 /* check for enough space. 294 4 for the servername type and entension length 295 2 for servernamelist length 296 1 for the hostname type 297 2 for hostname length 298 + hostname length 299 */ 300 301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 303 return NULL; 304 305 /* extension type and length */ 306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 307 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 308 309 /* length of servername list */ 310 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 311 312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 314 s2n(size_str,ret); 315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 316 ret+=size_str; 317 } 318 319 /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */ 320 { 321 int el; 322 323 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 324 { 325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 326 return NULL; 327 } 328 329 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 330 331 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 332 s2n(el,ret); 333 334 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 335 { 336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 337 return NULL; 338 } 339 340 ret += el; 341 } 342 343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 344 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 345 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 346 { 347 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 348 long lenmax; 349 350 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 351 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 353 { 354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 355 return NULL; 356 } 357 358 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 359 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 360 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 361 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 362 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 363 } 364 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 365 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 366 { 367 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 368 long lenmax; 369 370 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 371 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 373 { 374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 375 return NULL; 376 } 377 378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 379 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 380 381 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 382 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 383 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 384 * resolves this to two bytes. 385 */ 386 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 387 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 388 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 389 } 390 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 391 392 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 393 { 394 int ticklen; 395 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 396 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 397 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 398 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 399 { 400 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 401 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 402 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 403 return NULL; 404 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 405 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 406 ticklen); 407 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 408 } 409 else 410 ticklen = 0; 411 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 412 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 413 goto skip_ext; 414 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 415 * rest for ticket 416 */ 417 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 419 s2n(ticklen,ret); 420 if (ticklen) 421 { 422 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 423 ret += ticklen; 424 } 425 } 426 skip_ext: 427 428 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 429 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 430 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 431 { 432 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 433 434 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 435 return NULL; 436 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 437 return NULL; 438 439 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 440 s2n(col + 2, ret); 441 s2n(col, ret); 442 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 443 ret += col; 444 } 445 #endif 446 447 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 448 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 449 { 450 int i; 451 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 452 OCSP_RESPID *id; 453 454 idlen = 0; 455 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 456 { 457 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 458 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 459 if (itmp <= 0) 460 return NULL; 461 idlen += itmp + 2; 462 } 463 464 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 465 { 466 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 467 if (extlen < 0) 468 return NULL; 469 } 470 else 471 extlen = 0; 472 473 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 475 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 476 return NULL; 477 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 478 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 479 s2n(idlen, ret); 480 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 481 { 482 /* save position of id len */ 483 unsigned char *q = ret; 484 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 485 /* skip over id len */ 486 ret += 2; 487 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 488 /* write id len */ 489 s2n(itmp, q); 490 } 491 s2n(extlen, ret); 492 if (extlen > 0) 493 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 494 } 495 496 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 497 return p; 498 499 s2n(extdatalen,p); 500 return ret; 501 } 502 503 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 504 { 505 int extdatalen=0; 506 unsigned char *ret = p; 507 508 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 509 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 510 return p; 511 512 ret+=2; 513 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 514 515 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 516 { 517 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 518 519 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 520 s2n(0,ret); 521 } 522 523 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 524 { 525 int el; 526 527 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 528 { 529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 530 return NULL; 531 } 532 533 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 534 535 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 536 s2n(el,ret); 537 538 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 539 { 540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 541 return NULL; 542 } 543 544 ret += el; 545 } 546 547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 548 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 549 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 550 { 551 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 552 long lenmax; 553 554 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 555 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 556 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 557 { 558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 559 return NULL; 560 } 561 562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 563 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 564 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 565 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 566 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 567 568 } 569 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 570 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 571 572 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 573 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 574 { 575 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 576 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 577 s2n(0,ret); 578 } 579 580 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 581 { 582 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 583 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 584 s2n(0,ret); 585 } 586 587 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 588 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 589 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 590 { 591 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 592 593 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 594 return NULL; 595 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 596 return NULL; 597 598 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 599 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 600 s2n(sol, ret); 601 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 602 ret += sol; 603 } 604 #endif 605 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 606 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 607 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 608 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 609 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 610 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 611 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 612 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 613 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 614 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 615 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 616 ret+=36; 617 618 } 619 620 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 621 return p; 622 623 s2n(extdatalen,p); 624 return ret; 625 } 626 627 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 628 { 629 unsigned short type; 630 unsigned short size; 631 unsigned short len; 632 unsigned char *data = *p; 633 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 634 635 s->servername_done = 0; 636 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 637 638 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 639 goto ri_check; 640 n2s(data,len); 641 642 if (data > (d+n-len)) 643 goto ri_check; 644 645 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 646 { 647 n2s(data,type); 648 n2s(data,size); 649 650 if (data+size > (d+n)) 651 goto ri_check; 652 #if 0 653 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 654 #endif 655 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 656 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 657 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 658 /* The servername extension is treated as follows: 659 660 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 661 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 662 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 663 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 664 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 665 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 666 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 667 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 668 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 669 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 670 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 671 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 672 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 673 the value of the Host: field. 674 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 675 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 676 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 677 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 678 679 */ 680 681 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 682 { 683 unsigned char *sdata; 684 int servname_type; 685 int dsize; 686 687 if (size < 2) 688 { 689 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 690 return 0; 691 } 692 n2s(data,dsize); 693 size -= 2; 694 if (dsize > size ) 695 { 696 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 697 return 0; 698 } 699 700 sdata = data; 701 while (dsize > 3) 702 { 703 servname_type = *(sdata++); 704 n2s(sdata,len); 705 dsize -= 3; 706 707 if (len > dsize) 708 { 709 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 710 return 0; 711 } 712 if (s->servername_done == 0) 713 switch (servname_type) 714 { 715 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 716 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 717 { 718 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || 719 ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)) 720 { 721 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 722 return 0; 723 } 724 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 725 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 726 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 727 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 728 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 729 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 730 return 0; 731 } 732 s->servername_done = 1; 733 734 } 735 else 736 s->servername_done = strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 737 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 738 739 break; 740 741 default: 742 break; 743 } 744 745 dsize -= len; 746 } 747 if (dsize != 0) 748 { 749 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 750 return 0; 751 } 752 753 } 754 755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 756 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 757 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 758 { 759 unsigned char *sdata = data; 760 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 761 762 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 763 { 764 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 765 return 0; 766 } 767 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 768 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 769 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 770 { 771 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 772 return 0; 773 } 774 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 775 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 776 #if 0 777 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 778 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 779 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 780 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 781 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 782 #endif 783 } 784 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 785 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 786 { 787 unsigned char *sdata = data; 788 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 789 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 790 791 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) 792 { 793 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 794 return 0; 795 } 796 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 797 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 798 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 799 { 800 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 801 return 0; 802 } 803 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 804 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 805 #if 0 806 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 807 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 808 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 809 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 810 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 811 #endif 812 } 813 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 814 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 815 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 816 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 817 { 818 unsigned char *sdata = data; 819 820 if (size < 2) 821 { 822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 823 return 0; 824 } 825 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 826 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 827 { 828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 829 return 0; 830 } 831 832 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 833 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 835 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 836 else 837 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 838 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 839 { 840 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 841 return 0; 842 } 843 } 844 #endif 845 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 846 { 847 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 848 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 849 { 850 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 851 return 0; 852 } 853 } 854 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 855 { 856 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 857 return 0; 858 renegotiate_seen = 1; 859 } 860 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 861 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 862 { 863 864 if (size < 5) 865 { 866 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 867 return 0; 868 } 869 870 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 871 size--; 872 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 873 { 874 const unsigned char *sdata; 875 int dsize; 876 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 877 n2s(data,dsize); 878 size -= 2; 879 if (dsize > size ) 880 { 881 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 882 return 0; 883 } 884 while (dsize > 0) 885 { 886 OCSP_RESPID *id; 887 int idsize; 888 if (dsize < 4) 889 { 890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 891 return 0; 892 } 893 n2s(data, idsize); 894 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 895 if (dsize < 0) 896 { 897 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 898 return 0; 899 } 900 sdata = data; 901 data += idsize; 902 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 903 &sdata, idsize); 904 if (!id) 905 { 906 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 907 return 0; 908 } 909 if (data != sdata) 910 { 911 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 912 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 913 return 0; 914 } 915 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 916 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 917 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 918 { 919 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 920 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 921 return 0; 922 } 923 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 924 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 925 { 926 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 927 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 928 return 0; 929 } 930 } 931 932 /* Read in request_extensions */ 933 n2s(data,dsize); 934 size -= 2; 935 if (dsize > size) 936 { 937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 938 return 0; 939 } 940 sdata = data; 941 if (dsize > 0) 942 { 943 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 944 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 945 &sdata, dsize); 946 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 947 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 948 { 949 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 950 return 0; 951 } 952 } 953 } 954 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 955 * so ignore it. 956 */ 957 else 958 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 959 } 960 961 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 962 data+=size; 963 } 964 965 *p = data; 966 967 ri_check: 968 969 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 970 971 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && 972 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 973 { 974 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 976 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 977 return 0; 978 } 979 980 return 1; 981 } 982 983 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 984 { 985 unsigned short type; 986 unsigned short size; 987 unsigned short len; 988 unsigned char *data = *p; 989 int tlsext_servername = 0; 990 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 991 992 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 993 goto ri_check; 994 995 n2s(data,len); 996 997 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 998 { 999 n2s(data,type); 1000 n2s(data,size); 1001 1002 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1003 goto ri_check; 1004 1005 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1006 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1007 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1008 1009 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1010 { 1011 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1012 { 1013 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1014 return 0; 1015 } 1016 tlsext_servername = 1; 1017 } 1018 1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1020 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1021 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1022 { 1023 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1024 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1025 1026 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1027 { 1028 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1029 return 0; 1030 } 1031 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1032 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1033 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1034 { 1035 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1036 return 0; 1037 } 1038 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1039 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1040 #if 0 1041 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1042 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1043 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1044 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1045 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1046 #endif 1047 } 1048 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1049 1050 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1051 { 1052 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1053 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1054 { 1055 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1056 return 0; 1057 } 1058 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1059 || (size > 0)) 1060 { 1061 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1062 return 0; 1063 } 1064 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1065 } 1066 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1067 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1068 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1069 { 1070 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1071 1072 if (size < 2) 1073 { 1074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1075 return 0; 1076 } 1077 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1078 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1079 { 1080 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1081 return 0; 1082 } 1083 1084 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1085 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1086 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1087 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1088 else 1089 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1090 1091 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1092 { 1093 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1094 return 0; 1095 } 1096 } 1097 #endif 1098 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1099 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1100 { 1101 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1102 * a status request message. 1103 */ 1104 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1105 { 1106 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1107 return 0; 1108 } 1109 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1110 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1111 } 1112 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1113 { 1114 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1115 return 0; 1116 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1117 } 1118 data+=size; 1119 } 1120 1121 if (data != d+n) 1122 { 1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1124 return 0; 1125 } 1126 1127 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1128 { 1129 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1130 { 1131 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1132 { 1133 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1134 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1135 { 1136 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1137 return 0; 1138 } 1139 } 1140 else 1141 { 1142 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1143 return 0; 1144 } 1145 } 1146 } 1147 1148 *p = data; 1149 1150 ri_check: 1151 1152 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1153 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1154 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1155 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1156 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1157 * absence on initial connect only. 1158 */ 1159 if (!renegotiate_seen && 1160 (s->new_session || !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) 1161 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1162 { 1163 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1165 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1166 return 0; 1167 } 1168 1169 return 1; 1170 } 1171 1172 1173 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1174 { 1175 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1176 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1177 * and elliptic curves we support. 1178 */ 1179 int using_ecc = 0; 1180 int i; 1181 unsigned char *j; 1182 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1183 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1184 1185 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1186 { 1187 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1188 1189 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1190 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1191 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1192 { 1193 using_ecc = 1; 1194 break; 1195 } 1196 } 1197 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION); 1198 if (using_ecc) 1199 { 1200 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1201 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1202 { 1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1204 return -1; 1205 } 1206 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1207 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1208 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1209 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1210 1211 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1212 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1213 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2; 1214 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1215 { 1216 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1218 return -1; 1219 } 1220 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <= 1221 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) 1222 s2n(i,j); 1223 } 1224 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1225 1226 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1227 { 1228 int r = 1; 1229 1230 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1231 { 1232 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1233 if (!r) 1234 return -1; 1235 } 1236 1237 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1238 { 1239 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1240 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1241 1242 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1243 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1244 else 1245 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1246 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1247 { 1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1249 return -1; 1250 } 1251 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1252 } 1253 1254 if (r == 2) 1255 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1256 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1257 } 1258 #endif 1259 1260 return 1; 1261 } 1262 1263 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1264 { 1265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1266 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1267 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1268 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1269 */ 1270 1271 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1272 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1273 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1274 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1275 1276 if (using_ecc) 1277 { 1278 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1279 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1280 { 1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1282 return -1; 1283 } 1284 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1285 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1286 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1287 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1288 } 1289 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1290 1291 return 1; 1292 } 1293 1294 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1295 { 1296 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1297 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1298 1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1300 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1301 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1302 */ 1303 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1304 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1305 */ 1306 #endif 1307 1308 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1309 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1310 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1311 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1312 1313 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1314 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1315 * the certificate has changed. 1316 */ 1317 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1318 { 1319 int r; 1320 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1321 switch (r) 1322 { 1323 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 1324 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1325 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1326 break; 1327 /* status request response should be sent */ 1328 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 1329 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1330 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1331 else 1332 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1333 break; 1334 /* something bad happened */ 1335 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1336 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1337 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1338 goto err; 1339 } 1340 } 1341 else 1342 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 1343 1344 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1345 { 1346 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1347 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1348 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ 1349 1350 int r = 1; 1351 1352 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1353 { 1354 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1355 if (!r) 1356 { 1357 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1358 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1359 goto err; 1360 } 1361 } 1362 1363 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1364 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1365 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1366 1367 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1368 { 1369 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1370 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1371 { 1372 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1373 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1374 1375 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1376 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1377 else 1378 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1379 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1380 { 1381 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1382 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1383 goto err; 1384 } 1385 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1386 } 1387 } 1388 1389 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1390 { 1391 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1392 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1393 * abort the handshake. 1394 */ 1395 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1396 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1397 } 1398 } 1399 1400 #endif 1401 err: 1402 switch (ret) 1403 { 1404 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1405 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1406 return -1; 1407 1408 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1409 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1410 return 1; 1411 1412 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1413 s->servername_done=0; 1414 default: 1415 return 1; 1416 } 1417 } 1418 1419 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1420 { 1421 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1422 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1423 1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1425 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server 1426 * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed. 1427 */ 1428 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1429 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1430 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 1431 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1432 { 1433 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 1434 size_t i; 1435 unsigned char *list; 1436 int found_uncompressed = 0; 1437 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0)) 1438 { 1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1440 return -1; 1441 } 1442 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1443 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1444 { 1445 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 1446 { 1447 found_uncompressed = 1; 1448 break; 1449 } 1450 } 1451 if (!found_uncompressed) 1452 { 1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 1454 return -1; 1455 } 1456 } 1457 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1458 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1459 1460 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1461 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1462 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1463 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1464 1465 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1466 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 1467 { 1468 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 1469 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 1470 1471 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1472 { 1473 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1474 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1475 } 1476 1477 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 1478 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 1479 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 1480 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 1481 { 1482 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1483 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1484 } 1485 } 1486 #endif 1487 1488 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 1489 * tell the callback 1490 */ 1491 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 1492 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1493 { 1494 int r; 1495 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 1496 * there is no response. 1497 */ 1498 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 1499 { 1500 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 1501 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 1502 } 1503 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 1504 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 1505 if (r == 0) 1506 { 1507 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 1508 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1509 } 1510 if (r < 0) 1511 { 1512 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1513 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1514 } 1515 } 1516 1517 switch (ret) 1518 { 1519 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1520 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1521 return -1; 1522 1523 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1524 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1525 return 1; 1526 1527 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1528 s->servername_done=0; 1529 default: 1530 return 1; 1531 } 1532 } 1533 1534 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client 1535 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS 1536 * session ticket extension at the same time. 1537 */ 1538 1539 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 1540 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 1541 { 1542 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 1543 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 1544 unsigned short i; 1545 1546 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 1547 * to permit stateful resumption. 1548 */ 1549 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1550 return 1; 1551 1552 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 1553 return 1; 1554 if (p >= limit) 1555 return -1; 1556 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 1557 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 1558 { 1559 i = *(p++); 1560 p+= i; 1561 if (p >= limit) 1562 return -1; 1563 } 1564 /* Skip past cipher list */ 1565 n2s(p, i); 1566 p+= i; 1567 if (p >= limit) 1568 return -1; 1569 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 1570 i = *(p++); 1571 p += i; 1572 if (p > limit) 1573 return -1; 1574 /* Now at start of extensions */ 1575 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 1576 return 1; 1577 n2s(p, i); 1578 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 1579 { 1580 unsigned short type, size; 1581 n2s(p, type); 1582 n2s(p, size); 1583 if (p + size > limit) 1584 return 1; 1585 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1586 { 1587 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will 1588 * trigger a full handshake 1589 */ 1590 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1591 return 1; 1592 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket 1593 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake 1594 */ 1595 if (size == 0) 1596 { 1597 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1598 return 0; /* Cache miss */ 1599 } 1600 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 1601 { 1602 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of 1603 * generating the session from ticket now, 1604 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on 1605 * external mechanism to calculate the master 1606 * secret later. */ 1607 return 0; 1608 } 1609 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, 1610 ret); 1611 } 1612 p += size; 1613 } 1614 return 1; 1615 } 1616 1617 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 1618 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 1619 SSL_SESSION **psess) 1620 { 1621 SSL_SESSION *sess; 1622 unsigned char *sdec; 1623 const unsigned char *p; 1624 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 1625 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 1626 HMAC_CTX hctx; 1627 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 1628 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 1629 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 1630 if (eticklen < 48) 1631 goto tickerr; 1632 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 1633 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 1634 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 1635 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 1636 { 1637 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 1638 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 1639 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 1640 if (rv < 0) 1641 return -1; 1642 if (rv == 0) 1643 goto tickerr; 1644 if (rv == 2) 1645 renew_ticket = 1; 1646 } 1647 else 1648 { 1649 /* Check key name matches */ 1650 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 1651 goto tickerr; 1652 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 1653 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 1654 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 1655 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 1656 } 1657 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 1658 * integrity checks on ticket. 1659 */ 1660 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 1661 if (mlen < 0) 1662 { 1663 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1664 return -1; 1665 } 1666 eticklen -= mlen; 1667 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 1668 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 1669 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 1670 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 1671 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 1672 goto tickerr; 1673 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 1674 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 1675 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 1676 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 1677 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 1678 if (!sdec) 1679 { 1680 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1681 return -1; 1682 } 1683 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 1684 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 1685 goto tickerr; 1686 slen += mlen; 1687 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 1688 p = sdec; 1689 1690 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 1691 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 1692 if (sess) 1693 { 1694 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to 1695 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 1696 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 1697 * as required by standard. 1698 */ 1699 if (sesslen) 1700 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 1701 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 1702 *psess = sess; 1703 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; 1704 return 1; 1705 } 1706 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to 1707 * send a new ticket 1708 */ 1709 tickerr: 1710 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1711 return 0; 1712 } 1713 1714 #endif 1715
Indexes created Sat Feb 28 05:31:39 UTC 2026