t1_lib.c revision 1.5.4.3
1 /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ 2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com) 3 * All rights reserved. 4 * 5 * This package is an SSL implementation written 6 * by Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). 7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. 8 * 9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as 10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions 11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, 12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation 13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms 14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 15 * 16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in 17 * the code are not to be removed. 18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution 19 * as the author of the parts of the library used. 20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or 21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. 22 * 23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 25 * are met: 26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright 27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the 30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. 31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software 32 * must display the following acknowledgement: 33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by 34 * Eric Young (eay (at) cryptsoft.com)" 35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library 36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-). 37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: 39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com)" 40 * 41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND 42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE 44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE 45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS 47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT 49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY 50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 51 * SUCH DAMAGE. 52 * 53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or 54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be 55 * copied and put under another distribution licence 56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.] 57 */ 58 /* ==================================================================== 59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. 60 * 61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 63 * are met: 64 * 65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 67 * 68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 71 * distribution. 72 * 73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this 74 * software must display the following acknowledgment: 75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" 77 * 78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to 79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without 80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact 81 * openssl-core (at) openssl.org. 82 * 83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" 84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written 85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project. 86 * 87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following 88 * acknowledgment: 89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project 90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" 91 * 92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY 93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE 94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR 96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; 99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) 100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, 101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) 102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 104 * ==================================================================== 105 * 106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young 107 * (eay (at) cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim 108 * Hudson (tjh (at) cryptsoft.com). 109 * 110 */ 111 112 #include <stdio.h> 113 #include <openssl/objects.h> 114 #include <openssl/evp.h> 115 #include <openssl/hmac.h> 116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 117 #include <openssl/rand.h> 118 #include "ssl_locl.h" 119 120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; 121 122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, 124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 125 SSL_SESSION **psess); 126 #endif 127 128 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ 129 tls1_enc, 130 tls1_mac, 131 tls1_setup_key_block, 132 tls1_generate_master_secret, 133 tls1_change_cipher_state, 134 tls1_final_finish_mac, 135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, 136 tls1_cert_verify_mac, 137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, 139 tls1_alert_code, 140 tls1_export_keying_material, 141 }; 142 143 long tls1_default_timeout(void) 144 { 145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec 146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ 147 return(60*60*2); 148 } 149 150 int tls1_new(SSL *s) 151 { 152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); 153 s->method->ssl_clear(s); 154 return(1); 155 } 156 157 void tls1_free(SSL *s) 158 { 159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) 161 { 162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); 163 } 164 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ 165 ssl3_free(s); 166 } 167 168 void tls1_clear(SSL *s) 169 { 170 ssl3_clear(s); 171 s->version = s->method->version; 172 } 173 174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 175 176 static int nid_list[] = 177 { 178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ 203 }; 204 205 static int pref_list[] = 206 { 207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ 210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ 212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ 225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ 229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ 230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 232 }; 233 234 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) 235 { 236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > 238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) 239 return 0; 240 return nid_list[curve_id-1]; 241 } 242 243 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) 244 { 245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ 246 switch (nid) 247 { 248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ 249 return 1; 250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ 251 return 2; 252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ 253 return 3; 254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ 255 return 4; 256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ 257 return 5; 258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ 259 return 6; 260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ 261 return 7; 262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ 263 return 8; 264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ 265 return 9; 266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ 267 return 10; 268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ 269 return 11; 270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ 271 return 12; 272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ 273 return 13; 274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ 275 return 14; 276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ 277 return 15; 278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ 279 return 16; 280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ 281 return 17; 282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ 283 return 18; 284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ 285 return 19; 286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ 287 return 20; 288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ 289 return 21; 290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ 291 return 22; 292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ 293 return 23; 294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ 295 return 24; 296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ 297 return 25; 298 default: 299 return 0; 300 } 301 } 302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 303 304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT 305 306 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this 307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. 308 */ 309 310 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 311 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ 312 #else 313 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, 314 #endif 315 316 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 317 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ 318 #else 319 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, 320 #endif 321 322 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 323 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ 324 #else 325 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, 326 #endif 327 328 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ 329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ 330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ 331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) 332 333 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { 334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) 336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) 337 #endif 338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) 340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) 341 #endif 342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) 344 #endif 345 }; 346 347 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) 348 { 349 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 350 if (p) 351 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); 352 return (int)slen; 353 } 354 355 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 356 { 357 int extdatalen=0; 358 unsigned char *ret = p; 359 360 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ 361 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION 362 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 363 return p; 364 365 ret+=2; 366 367 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 368 369 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 370 { 371 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ 372 unsigned long size_str; 373 long lenmax; 374 375 /* check for enough space. 376 4 for the servername type and entension length 377 2 for servernamelist length 378 1 for the hostname type 379 2 for hostname length 380 + hostname length 381 */ 382 383 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 384 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) 385 return NULL; 386 387 /* extension type and length */ 388 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 389 s2n(size_str+5,ret); 390 391 /* length of servername list */ 392 s2n(size_str+3,ret); 393 394 /* hostname type, length and hostname */ 395 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; 396 s2n(size_str,ret); 397 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); 398 ret+=size_str; 399 } 400 401 /* Add RI if renegotiating */ 402 if (s->renegotiate) 403 { 404 int el; 405 406 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 407 { 408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 409 return NULL; 410 } 411 412 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 413 414 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 415 s2n(el,ret); 416 417 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 418 { 419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 420 return NULL; 421 } 422 423 ret += el; 424 } 425 426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 427 /* Add SRP username if there is one */ 428 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 429 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */ 430 431 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); 432 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) 433 { 434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 435 return NULL; 436 } 437 438 /* check for enough space. 439 4 for the srp type type and entension length 440 1 for the srp user identity 441 + srp user identity length 442 */ 443 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL; 444 445 /* fill in the extension */ 446 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret); 447 s2n(login_len+1,ret); 448 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len; 449 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); 450 ret+=login_len; 451 } 452 #endif 453 454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 455 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 456 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 457 { 458 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ 459 long lenmax; 460 461 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 462 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 464 { 465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 466 return NULL; 467 } 468 469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 470 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 471 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 472 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 473 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 474 } 475 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && 476 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 477 { 478 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ 479 long lenmax; 480 481 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; 482 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) 484 { 485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 486 return NULL; 487 } 488 489 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); 490 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); 491 492 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for 493 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. 494 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html 495 * resolves this to two bytes. 496 */ 497 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); 498 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 499 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; 500 } 501 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 502 503 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 504 { 505 int ticklen; 506 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) 507 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; 508 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 509 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) 510 { 511 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; 512 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); 513 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) 514 return NULL; 515 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, 516 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, 517 ticklen); 518 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; 519 } 520 else 521 ticklen = 0; 522 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && 523 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) 524 goto skip_ext; 525 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len 526 * rest for ticket 527 */ 528 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; 529 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 530 s2n(ticklen,ret); 531 if (ticklen) 532 { 533 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); 534 ret += ticklen; 535 } 536 } 537 skip_ext: 538 539 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 540 { 541 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) 542 return NULL; 543 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret); 544 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); 545 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); 546 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); 547 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); 548 } 549 550 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 551 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 552 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 553 { 554 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; 555 556 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) 557 return NULL; 558 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 559 return NULL; 560 561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 562 s2n(col + 2, ret); 563 s2n(col, ret); 564 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); 565 ret += col; 566 } 567 #endif 568 569 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && 570 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 571 { 572 int i; 573 long extlen, idlen, itmp; 574 OCSP_RESPID *id; 575 576 idlen = 0; 577 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 578 { 579 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 580 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); 581 if (itmp <= 0) 582 return NULL; 583 idlen += itmp + 2; 584 } 585 586 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 587 { 588 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); 589 if (extlen < 0) 590 return NULL; 591 } 592 else 593 extlen = 0; 594 595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; 596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); 597 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) 598 return NULL; 599 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); 600 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; 601 s2n(idlen, ret); 602 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) 603 { 604 /* save position of id len */ 605 unsigned char *q = ret; 606 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); 607 /* skip over id len */ 608 ret += 2; 609 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); 610 /* write id len */ 611 s2n(itmp, q); 612 } 613 s2n(extlen, ret); 614 if (extlen > 0) 615 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); 616 } 617 618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 619 /* Add Heartbeat extension */ 620 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 621 return NULL; 622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 623 s2n(1,ret); 624 /* Set mode: 625 * 1: peer may send requests 626 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 627 */ 628 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 629 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 630 else 631 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 632 #endif 633 634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 635 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) 636 { 637 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its 638 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */ 639 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) 640 return NULL; 641 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 642 s2n(0,ret); 643 } 644 #endif 645 646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 647 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) 648 { 649 int el; 650 651 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 652 653 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 654 655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 656 s2n(el,ret); 657 658 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 659 { 660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 661 return NULL; 662 } 663 ret += el; 664 } 665 #endif 666 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. 667 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 668 * 669 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing 670 * extensions it MUST always appear last. 671 */ 672 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) 673 { 674 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 675 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages 676 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while 677 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not. 678 */ 679 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) 680 hlen -= 5; 681 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) 682 { 683 hlen = 0x200 - hlen; 684 if (hlen >= 4) 685 hlen -= 4; 686 else 687 hlen = 0; 688 689 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); 690 s2n(hlen, ret); 691 memset(ret, 0, hlen); 692 ret += hlen; 693 } 694 } 695 696 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 697 return p; 698 699 s2n(extdatalen,p); 700 return ret; 701 } 702 703 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) 704 { 705 int extdatalen=0; 706 unsigned char *ret = p; 707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 708 int next_proto_neg_seen; 709 #endif 710 711 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ 712 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) 713 return p; 714 715 ret+=2; 716 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ 717 718 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) 719 { 720 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 721 722 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); 723 s2n(0,ret); 724 } 725 726 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) 727 { 728 int el; 729 730 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) 731 { 732 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 733 return NULL; 734 } 735 736 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 737 738 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); 739 s2n(el,ret); 740 741 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 742 { 743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 744 return NULL; 745 } 746 747 ret += el; 748 } 749 750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 751 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && 752 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 753 { 754 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ 755 long lenmax; 756 757 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 758 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; 759 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) 760 { 761 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 762 return NULL; 763 } 764 765 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); 766 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); 767 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 768 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 769 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; 770 771 } 772 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ 773 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 774 775 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected 776 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 777 { 778 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 779 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); 780 s2n(0,ret); 781 } 782 783 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) 784 { 785 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 786 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); 787 s2n(0,ret); 788 } 789 790 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 791 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 792 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 793 { 794 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; 795 796 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) 797 return NULL; 798 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ 799 return NULL; 800 801 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); 802 s2n(sol + 2, ret); 803 s2n(sol, ret); 804 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); 805 ret += sol; 806 } 807 #endif 808 809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 810 if(s->srtp_profile) 811 { 812 int el; 813 814 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); 815 816 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; 817 818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret); 819 s2n(el,ret); 820 821 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) 822 { 823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 824 return NULL; 825 } 826 ret+=el; 827 } 828 #endif 829 830 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 831 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) 832 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 833 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ 834 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ 835 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 836 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 837 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 838 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; 839 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; 840 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); 841 ret+=36; 842 843 } 844 845 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 846 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ 847 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) 848 { 849 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) 850 return NULL; 851 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret); 852 s2n(1,ret); 853 /* Set mode: 854 * 1: peer may send requests 855 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests 856 */ 857 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) 858 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 859 else 860 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 861 862 } 863 #endif 864 865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 866 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; 867 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 868 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) 869 { 870 const unsigned char *npa; 871 unsigned int npalen; 872 int r; 873 874 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); 875 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 876 { 877 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL; 878 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret); 879 s2n(npalen,ret); 880 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); 881 ret += npalen; 882 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 883 } 884 } 885 #endif 886 887 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 888 return p; 889 890 s2n(extdatalen,p); 891 return ret; 892 } 893 894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 895 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X 896 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. 897 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: 898 * SNI, 899 * elliptic_curves 900 * ec_point_formats 901 * 902 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, 903 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. 904 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from 905 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). 906 */ 907 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { 908 unsigned short type, size; 909 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 910 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 911 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ 912 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ 913 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ 914 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ 915 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ 916 917 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ 918 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 919 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 920 0x00, /* uncompressed */ 921 }; 922 923 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 924 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { 925 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 926 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 927 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ 928 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ 929 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ 930 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ 931 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ 932 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ 933 }; 934 935 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 936 return; 937 data += 2; 938 939 if (data > (d+n-4)) 940 return; 941 n2s(data,type); 942 n2s(data,size); 943 944 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 945 return; 946 947 if (data+size > d+n) 948 return; 949 data += size; 950 951 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) 952 { 953 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 954 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); 955 956 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) 957 return; 958 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) 959 return; 960 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) 961 return; 962 } 963 else 964 { 965 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); 966 967 if (data + len != d+n) 968 return; 969 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) 970 return; 971 } 972 973 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; 974 } 975 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 976 977 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 978 { 979 unsigned short type; 980 unsigned short size; 981 unsigned short len; 982 unsigned char *data = *p; 983 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 984 int sigalg_seen = 0; 985 986 s->servername_done = 0; 987 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 989 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 990 #endif 991 992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 993 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 994 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 995 #endif 996 997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 998 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) 999 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); 1000 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1001 1002 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1003 goto ri_check; 1004 n2s(data,len); 1005 1006 if (data > (d+n-len)) 1007 goto ri_check; 1008 1009 while (data <= (d+n-4)) 1010 { 1011 n2s(data,type); 1012 n2s(data,size); 1013 1014 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1015 goto ri_check; 1016 #if 0 1017 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); 1018 #endif 1019 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1020 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, 1021 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1022 /* The servername extension is treated as follows: 1023 1024 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 1025 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 1026 in which case an fatal alert is generated. 1027 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 1028 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 1029 to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 1030 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 1031 it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 1032 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 1033 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 1034 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 1035 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 1036 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 1037 the value of the Host: field. 1038 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 1039 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, 1040 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. 1041 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 1042 1043 */ 1044 1045 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1046 { 1047 unsigned char *sdata; 1048 int servname_type; 1049 int dsize; 1050 1051 if (size < 2) 1052 { 1053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1054 return 0; 1055 } 1056 n2s(data,dsize); 1057 size -= 2; 1058 if (dsize > size ) 1059 { 1060 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1061 return 0; 1062 } 1063 1064 sdata = data; 1065 while (dsize > 3) 1066 { 1067 servname_type = *(sdata++); 1068 n2s(sdata,len); 1069 dsize -= 3; 1070 1071 if (len > dsize) 1072 { 1073 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1074 return 0; 1075 } 1076 if (s->servername_done == 0) 1077 switch (servname_type) 1078 { 1079 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: 1080 if (!s->hit) 1081 { 1082 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1083 { 1084 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1085 return 0; 1086 } 1087 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) 1088 { 1089 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1090 return 0; 1091 } 1092 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1093 { 1094 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1095 return 0; 1096 } 1097 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); 1098 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; 1099 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { 1100 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); 1101 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; 1102 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1103 return 0; 1104 } 1105 s->servername_done = 1; 1106 1107 } 1108 else 1109 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname 1110 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len 1111 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; 1112 1113 break; 1114 1115 default: 1116 break; 1117 } 1118 1119 dsize -= len; 1120 } 1121 if (dsize != 0) 1122 { 1123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1124 return 0; 1125 } 1126 1127 } 1128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 1129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) 1130 { 1131 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1)) 1132 { 1133 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1134 return 0; 1135 } 1136 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) 1137 { 1138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1139 return 0; 1140 } 1141 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) 1142 return -1; 1143 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); 1144 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0'; 1145 1146 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) 1147 { 1148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1149 return 0; 1150 } 1151 } 1152 #endif 1153 1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1155 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1156 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1157 { 1158 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1159 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1160 1161 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) 1162 { 1163 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1164 return 0; 1165 } 1166 if (!s->hit) 1167 { 1168 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) 1169 { 1170 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1171 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; 1172 } 1173 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1174 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1175 { 1176 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1177 return 0; 1178 } 1179 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1180 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1181 } 1182 #if 0 1183 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); 1184 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1185 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1186 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1187 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1188 #endif 1189 } 1190 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && 1191 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1192 { 1193 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1194 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); 1195 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); 1196 1197 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || 1198 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1) 1199 { 1200 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1201 return 0; 1202 } 1203 if (!s->hit) 1204 { 1205 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) 1206 { 1207 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1208 return 0; 1209 } 1210 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1211 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1212 { 1213 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1214 return 0; 1215 } 1216 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; 1217 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); 1218 } 1219 #if 0 1220 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); 1221 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; 1222 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) 1223 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1224 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1225 #endif 1226 } 1227 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1228 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1229 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1230 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1231 { 1232 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1233 1234 if (size < 2) 1235 { 1236 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1237 return 0; 1238 } 1239 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1241 { 1242 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1243 return 0; 1244 } 1245 1246 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1247 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1248 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1249 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1250 else 1251 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); 1252 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1253 { 1254 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1255 return 0; 1256 } 1257 } 1258 #endif 1259 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1260 { 1261 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1262 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1263 { 1264 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1265 return 0; 1266 } 1267 } 1268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1269 { 1270 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1271 return 0; 1272 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1273 } 1274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) 1275 { 1276 int dsize; 1277 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 1278 { 1279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1280 return 0; 1281 } 1282 sigalg_seen = 1; 1283 n2s(data,dsize); 1284 size -= 2; 1285 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 1286 { 1287 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1288 return 0; 1289 } 1290 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) 1291 { 1292 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1293 return 0; 1294 } 1295 } 1296 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1297 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1298 { 1299 1300 if (size < 5) 1301 { 1302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1303 return 0; 1304 } 1305 1306 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; 1307 size--; 1308 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) 1309 { 1310 const unsigned char *sdata; 1311 int dsize; 1312 /* Read in responder_id_list */ 1313 n2s(data,dsize); 1314 size -= 2; 1315 if (dsize > size ) 1316 { 1317 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1318 return 0; 1319 } 1320 while (dsize > 0) 1321 { 1322 OCSP_RESPID *id; 1323 int idsize; 1324 if (dsize < 4) 1325 { 1326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1327 return 0; 1328 } 1329 n2s(data, idsize); 1330 dsize -= 2 + idsize; 1331 size -= 2 + idsize; 1332 if (dsize < 0) 1333 { 1334 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1335 return 0; 1336 } 1337 sdata = data; 1338 data += idsize; 1339 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, 1340 &sdata, idsize); 1341 if (!id) 1342 { 1343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1344 return 0; 1345 } 1346 if (data != sdata) 1347 { 1348 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1350 return 0; 1351 } 1352 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids 1353 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = 1354 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) 1355 { 1356 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1357 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1358 return 0; 1359 } 1360 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( 1361 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) 1362 { 1363 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 1364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1365 return 0; 1366 } 1367 } 1368 1369 /* Read in request_extensions */ 1370 if (size < 2) 1371 { 1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1373 return 0; 1374 } 1375 n2s(data,dsize); 1376 size -= 2; 1377 if (dsize != size) 1378 { 1379 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1380 return 0; 1381 } 1382 sdata = data; 1383 if (dsize > 0) 1384 { 1385 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) 1386 { 1387 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, 1388 X509_EXTENSION_free); 1389 } 1390 1391 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = 1392 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, 1393 &sdata, dsize); 1394 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts 1395 || (data + dsize != sdata)) 1396 { 1397 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1398 return 0; 1399 } 1400 } 1401 } 1402 /* We don't know what to do with any other type 1403 * so ignore it. 1404 */ 1405 else 1406 s->tlsext_status_type = -1; 1407 } 1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1409 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1410 { 1411 switch(data[0]) 1412 { 1413 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ 1414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1415 break; 1416 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ 1417 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1418 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1419 break; 1420 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1421 return 0; 1422 } 1423 } 1424 #endif 1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1427 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1428 { 1429 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a 1430 * renegotiation. 1431 * 1432 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we 1433 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on 1434 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when 1435 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an 1436 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing 1437 * anything like that, but this might change). 1438 1439 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake 1440 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 1441 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen 1442 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new 1443 * Finished message could have been computed.) */ 1444 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1445 } 1446 #endif 1447 1448 /* session ticket processed earlier */ 1449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1450 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1451 { 1452 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1453 al)) 1454 return 0; 1455 } 1456 #endif 1457 1458 data+=size; 1459 } 1460 1461 *p = data; 1462 1463 ri_check: 1464 1465 /* Need RI if renegotiating */ 1466 1467 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && 1468 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1469 { 1470 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, 1472 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1473 return 0; 1474 } 1475 1476 return 1; 1477 } 1478 1479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1480 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No 1481 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill 1482 * the length of the block. */ 1483 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) 1484 { 1485 unsigned int off = 0; 1486 1487 while (off < len) 1488 { 1489 if (d[off] == 0) 1490 return 0; 1491 off += d[off]; 1492 off++; 1493 } 1494 1495 return off == len; 1496 } 1497 #endif 1498 1499 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) 1500 { 1501 unsigned short length; 1502 unsigned short type; 1503 unsigned short size; 1504 unsigned char *data = *p; 1505 int tlsext_servername = 0; 1506 int renegotiate_seen = 0; 1507 1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1509 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; 1510 #endif 1511 1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1513 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | 1514 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); 1515 #endif 1516 1517 if (data >= (d+n-2)) 1518 goto ri_check; 1519 1520 n2s(data,length); 1521 if (data+length != d+n) 1522 { 1523 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1524 return 0; 1525 } 1526 1527 while(data <= (d+n-4)) 1528 { 1529 n2s(data,type); 1530 n2s(data,size); 1531 1532 if (data+size > (d+n)) 1533 goto ri_check; 1534 1535 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) 1536 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, 1537 s->tlsext_debug_arg); 1538 1539 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1540 { 1541 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) 1542 { 1543 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1544 return 0; 1545 } 1546 tlsext_servername = 1; 1547 } 1548 1549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1550 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && 1551 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1552 { 1553 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1554 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); 1555 1556 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 1557 ecpointformatlist_length < 1) 1558 { 1559 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1560 return 0; 1561 } 1562 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; 1563 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1564 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) 1565 { 1566 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1567 return 0; 1568 } 1569 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; 1570 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); 1571 #if 0 1572 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); 1573 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 1574 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 1575 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); 1576 fprintf(stderr,"\n"); 1577 #endif 1578 } 1579 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1580 1581 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1582 { 1583 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && 1584 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) 1585 { 1586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1587 return 0; 1588 } 1589 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 1590 || (size > 0)) 1591 { 1592 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1593 return 0; 1594 } 1595 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 1596 } 1597 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1598 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && 1599 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1600 { 1601 unsigned char *sdata = data; 1602 1603 if (size < 2) 1604 { 1605 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1606 return 0; 1607 } 1608 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1609 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) 1610 { 1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1612 return 0; 1613 } 1614 1615 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1616 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1617 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1618 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1619 else 1620 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); 1621 1622 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1623 { 1624 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1625 return 0; 1626 } 1627 } 1628 #endif 1629 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && 1630 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) 1631 { 1632 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested 1633 * a status request message. 1634 */ 1635 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) 1636 { 1637 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1638 return 0; 1639 } 1640 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ 1641 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 1642 } 1643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1644 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && 1645 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) 1646 { 1647 unsigned char *selected; 1648 unsigned char selected_len; 1649 1650 /* We must have requested it. */ 1651 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) 1652 { 1653 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; 1654 return 0; 1655 } 1656 /* The data must be valid */ 1657 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) 1658 { 1659 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1660 return 0; 1661 } 1662 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) 1663 { 1664 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1665 return 0; 1666 } 1667 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); 1668 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) 1669 { 1670 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1671 return 0; 1672 } 1673 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); 1674 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; 1675 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; 1676 } 1677 #endif 1678 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1679 { 1680 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) 1681 return 0; 1682 renegotiate_seen = 1; 1683 } 1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 1685 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) 1686 { 1687 switch(data[0]) 1688 { 1689 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ 1690 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1691 break; 1692 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ 1693 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; 1694 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; 1695 break; 1696 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 1697 return 0; 1698 } 1699 } 1700 #endif 1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1702 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1703 { 1704 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, 1705 al)) 1706 return 0; 1707 } 1708 #endif 1709 1710 data+=size; 1711 } 1712 1713 if (data != d+n) 1714 { 1715 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1716 return 0; 1717 } 1718 1719 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) 1720 { 1721 if (s->tlsext_hostname) 1722 { 1723 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) 1724 { 1725 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); 1726 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) 1727 { 1728 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1729 return 0; 1730 } 1731 } 1732 else 1733 { 1734 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; 1735 return 0; 1736 } 1737 } 1738 } 1739 1740 *p = data; 1741 1742 ri_check: 1743 1744 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to 1745 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server 1746 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an 1747 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server 1748 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI 1749 * absence on initial connect only. 1750 */ 1751 if (!renegotiate_seen 1752 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) 1753 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) 1754 { 1755 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, 1757 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); 1758 return 0; 1759 } 1760 1761 return 1; 1762 } 1763 1764 1765 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1766 { 1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1768 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats 1769 * and elliptic curves we support. 1770 */ 1771 int using_ecc = 0; 1772 int i; 1773 unsigned char *j; 1774 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; 1775 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); 1776 1777 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) 1778 { 1779 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); 1780 1781 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; 1782 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; 1783 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 1784 { 1785 using_ecc = 1; 1786 break; 1787 } 1788 } 1789 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); 1790 if (using_ecc) 1791 { 1792 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1793 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1794 { 1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1796 return -1; 1797 } 1798 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1799 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1800 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1801 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1802 1803 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ 1804 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); 1805 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; 1806 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) 1807 { 1808 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; 1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1810 return -1; 1811 } 1812 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < 1813 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) 1814 { 1815 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); 1816 s2n(id,j); 1817 } 1818 } 1819 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1820 1821 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1822 { 1823 int r = 1; 1824 1825 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1826 { 1827 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1828 if (!r) 1829 return -1; 1830 } 1831 1832 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1833 { 1834 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1835 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); 1836 1837 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1838 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1839 else 1840 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1841 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1842 { 1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1844 return -1; 1845 } 1846 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1847 } 1848 1849 if (r == 2) 1850 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ 1851 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1852 } 1853 #endif 1854 1855 return 1; 1856 } 1857 1858 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 1859 { 1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1861 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 1862 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not 1863 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. 1864 */ 1865 1866 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1867 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1868 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); 1869 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); 1870 1871 if (using_ecc) 1872 { 1873 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); 1874 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) 1875 { 1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1877 return -1; 1878 } 1879 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; 1880 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; 1881 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; 1882 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; 1883 } 1884 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 1885 1886 return 1; 1887 } 1888 1889 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) 1890 { 1891 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 1892 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 1893 1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1895 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1896 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1897 */ 1898 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in 1899 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. 1900 */ 1901 #endif 1902 1903 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1904 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1905 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 1906 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 1907 1908 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 1909 { 1910 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), 1911 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, 1912 * so this has to happen here in 1913 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */ 1914 1915 int r = 1; 1916 1917 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) 1918 { 1919 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); 1920 if (!r) 1921 { 1922 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1923 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1924 goto err; 1925 } 1926 } 1927 1928 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ 1929 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); 1930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; 1931 1932 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) 1933 { 1934 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && 1935 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) 1936 { 1937 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input 1938 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ 1939 1940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) 1941 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ 1942 else 1943 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); 1944 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1945 { 1946 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 1948 goto err; 1949 } 1950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; 1951 } 1952 } 1953 1954 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 1955 { 1956 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, 1957 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; 1958 * abort the handshake. 1959 */ 1960 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 1961 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 1962 } 1963 } 1964 1965 err: 1966 #endif 1967 switch (ret) 1968 { 1969 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 1970 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 1971 return -1; 1972 1973 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 1974 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 1975 return 1; 1976 1977 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 1978 s->servername_done=0; 1979 default: 1980 return 1; 1981 } 1982 } 1983 1984 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) 1985 { 1986 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 1987 int al; 1988 1989 /* If status request then ask callback what to do. 1990 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 1991 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher 1992 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent 1993 */ 1994 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 1995 { 1996 int r; 1997 CERT_PKEY *certpkey; 1998 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); 1999 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ 2000 if (certpkey == NULL) 2001 { 2002 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2003 return 1; 2004 } 2005 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so 2006 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. 2007 */ 2008 s->cert->key = certpkey; 2009 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2010 switch (r) 2011 { 2012 /* We don't want to send a status request response */ 2013 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2014 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2015 break; 2016 /* status request response should be sent */ 2017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: 2018 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2019 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; 2020 else 2021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2022 break; 2023 /* something bad happened */ 2024 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2025 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2026 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2027 goto err; 2028 } 2029 } 2030 else 2031 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; 2032 2033 err: 2034 switch (ret) 2035 { 2036 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2037 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2038 return -1; 2039 2040 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2041 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2042 return 1; 2043 2044 default: 2045 return 1; 2046 } 2047 } 2048 2049 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) 2050 { 2051 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; 2052 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; 2053 2054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 2055 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher 2056 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension 2057 * it must contain uncompressed. 2058 */ 2059 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 2060 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 2061 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2062 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && 2063 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) 2064 { 2065 /* we are using an ECC cipher */ 2066 size_t i; 2067 unsigned char *list; 2068 int found_uncompressed = 0; 2069 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; 2070 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) 2071 { 2072 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) 2073 { 2074 found_uncompressed = 1; 2075 break; 2076 } 2077 } 2078 if (!found_uncompressed) 2079 { 2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); 2081 return -1; 2082 } 2083 } 2084 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; 2085 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 2086 2087 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2088 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2089 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 2090 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); 2091 2092 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input 2093 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) 2094 { 2095 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. 2096 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ 2097 2098 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) 2099 { 2100 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2101 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; 2102 } 2103 2104 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check 2105 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ 2106 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || 2107 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) 2108 { 2109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2110 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; 2111 } 2112 } 2113 #endif 2114 2115 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one 2116 * tell the callback 2117 */ 2118 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) 2119 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) 2120 { 2121 int r; 2122 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows 2123 * there is no response. 2124 */ 2125 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) 2126 { 2127 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); 2128 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; 2129 } 2130 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; 2131 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); 2132 if (r == 0) 2133 { 2134 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; 2135 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2136 } 2137 if (r < 0) 2138 { 2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; 2140 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; 2141 } 2142 } 2143 2144 switch (ret) 2145 { 2146 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: 2147 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 2148 return -1; 2149 2150 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: 2151 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); 2152 return 1; 2153 2154 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: 2155 s->servername_done=0; 2156 default: 2157 return 1; 2158 } 2159 } 2160 2161 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the 2162 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle 2163 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. 2164 * 2165 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will 2166 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket 2167 * extension, if any. 2168 * len: the length of the session ID. 2169 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. 2170 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2171 * point to the resulting session. 2172 * 2173 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key 2174 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will 2175 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. 2176 * 2177 * Returns: 2178 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2179 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). 2180 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports 2181 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. 2182 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but 2183 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. 2184 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. 2185 * 2186 * Side effects: 2187 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue 2188 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support 2189 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have 2190 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if 2191 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. 2192 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. 2193 */ 2194 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, 2195 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) 2196 { 2197 /* Point after session ID in client hello */ 2198 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; 2199 unsigned short i; 2200 2201 *ret = NULL; 2202 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; 2203 2204 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present 2205 * to permit stateful resumption. 2206 */ 2207 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) 2208 return 0; 2209 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) 2210 return 0; 2211 if (p >= limit) 2212 return -1; 2213 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ 2214 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) 2215 { 2216 i = *(p++); 2217 p+= i; 2218 if (p >= limit) 2219 return -1; 2220 } 2221 /* Skip past cipher list */ 2222 n2s(p, i); 2223 p+= i; 2224 if (p >= limit) 2225 return -1; 2226 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ 2227 i = *(p++); 2228 p += i; 2229 if (p > limit) 2230 return -1; 2231 /* Now at start of extensions */ 2232 if ((p + 2) >= limit) 2233 return 0; 2234 n2s(p, i); 2235 while ((p + 4) <= limit) 2236 { 2237 unsigned short type, size; 2238 n2s(p, type); 2239 n2s(p, size); 2240 if (p + size > limit) 2241 return 0; 2242 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 2243 { 2244 int r; 2245 if (size == 0) 2246 { 2247 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't 2248 * currently have one. */ 2249 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2250 return 1; 2251 } 2252 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) 2253 { 2254 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be 2255 * decrypted rather than generating the session 2256 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated 2257 * handshake based on external mechanism to 2258 * calculate the master secret later. */ 2259 return 2; 2260 } 2261 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); 2262 switch (r) 2263 { 2264 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ 2265 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2266 return 2; 2267 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ 2268 return r; 2269 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ 2270 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; 2271 return 3; 2272 default: /* fatal error */ 2273 return -1; 2274 } 2275 } 2276 p += size; 2277 } 2278 return 0; 2279 } 2280 2281 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. 2282 * 2283 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. 2284 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. 2285 * sess_id: points at the session ID. 2286 * sesslen: the length of the session ID. 2287 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to 2288 * point to the resulting session. 2289 * 2290 * Returns: 2291 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. 2292 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. 2293 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. 2294 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. 2295 */ 2296 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, 2297 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, 2298 SSL_SESSION **psess) 2299 { 2300 SSL_SESSION *sess; 2301 unsigned char *sdec; 2302 const unsigned char *p; 2303 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; 2304 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; 2305 HMAC_CTX hctx; 2306 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; 2307 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; 2308 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ 2309 if (eticklen < 48) 2310 return 2; 2311 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ 2312 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); 2313 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); 2314 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) 2315 { 2316 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; 2317 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, 2318 &ctx, &hctx, 0); 2319 if (rv < 0) 2320 return -1; 2321 if (rv == 0) 2322 return 2; 2323 if (rv == 2) 2324 renew_ticket = 1; 2325 } 2326 else 2327 { 2328 /* Check key name matches */ 2329 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) 2330 return 2; 2331 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, 2332 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); 2333 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, 2334 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); 2335 } 2336 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and 2337 * integrity checks on ticket. 2338 */ 2339 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); 2340 if (mlen < 0) 2341 { 2342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2343 return -1; 2344 } 2345 eticklen -= mlen; 2346 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ 2347 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); 2348 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); 2349 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); 2350 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) 2351 return 2; 2352 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ 2353 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ 2354 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2355 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); 2356 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); 2357 if (!sdec) 2358 { 2359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2360 return -1; 2361 } 2362 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); 2363 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) 2364 return 2; 2365 slen += mlen; 2366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); 2367 p = sdec; 2368 2369 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); 2370 OPENSSL_free(sdec); 2371 if (sess) 2372 { 2373 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to 2374 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to 2375 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero 2376 * as required by standard. 2377 */ 2378 if (sesslen) 2379 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); 2380 sess->session_id_length = sesslen; 2381 *psess = sess; 2382 if (renew_ticket) 2383 return 4; 2384 else 2385 return 3; 2386 } 2387 ERR_clear_error(); 2388 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new 2389 * ticket. */ 2390 return 2; 2391 } 2392 2393 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ 2394 2395 typedef struct 2396 { 2397 int nid; 2398 int id; 2399 } tls12_lookup; 2400 2401 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { 2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 2403 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, 2404 #endif 2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2406 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, 2407 #endif 2408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2409 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, 2410 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, 2411 #endif 2412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2413 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, 2414 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} 2415 #endif 2416 }; 2417 2418 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { 2419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2420 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, 2421 #endif 2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2423 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, 2424 #endif 2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2426 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} 2427 #endif 2428 }; 2429 2430 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2431 { 2432 size_t i; 2433 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2434 { 2435 if (table[i].nid == nid) 2436 return table[i].id; 2437 } 2438 return -1; 2439 } 2440 #if 0 2441 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) 2442 { 2443 size_t i; 2444 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) 2445 { 2446 if (table[i].id == id) 2447 return table[i].nid; 2448 } 2449 return -1; 2450 } 2451 #endif 2452 2453 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) 2454 { 2455 int sig_id, md_id; 2456 if (!md) 2457 return 0; 2458 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, 2459 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2460 if (md_id == -1) 2461 return 0; 2462 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); 2463 if (sig_id == -1) 2464 return 0; 2465 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; 2466 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; 2467 return 1; 2468 } 2469 2470 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) 2471 { 2472 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, 2473 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup)); 2474 } 2475 2476 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) 2477 { 2478 switch(hash_alg) 2479 { 2480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA 2481 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: 2482 return EVP_sha1(); 2483 #endif 2484 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 2485 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: 2486 return EVP_sha224(); 2487 2488 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: 2489 return EVP_sha256(); 2490 #endif 2491 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 2492 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: 2493 return EVP_sha384(); 2494 2495 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: 2496 return EVP_sha512(); 2497 #endif 2498 default: 2499 return NULL; 2500 2501 } 2502 } 2503 2504 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ 2505 2506 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) 2507 { 2508 int i, idx; 2509 const EVP_MD *md; 2510 CERT *c = s->cert; 2511 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ 2512 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) 2513 return 1; 2514 /* Should never happen */ 2515 if (!c) 2516 return 0; 2517 2518 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2519 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; 2520 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; 2521 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; 2522 2523 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) 2524 { 2525 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1]; 2526 2527 switch(sig_alg) 2528 { 2529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2530 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: 2531 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; 2532 break; 2533 #endif 2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2535 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: 2536 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; 2537 break; 2538 #endif 2539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2540 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: 2541 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; 2542 break; 2543 #endif 2544 default: 2545 continue; 2546 } 2547 2548 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) 2549 { 2550 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); 2551 if (md) 2552 { 2553 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; 2554 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) 2555 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; 2556 } 2557 } 2558 2559 } 2560 2561 2562 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not 2563 * supported it stays as NULL. 2564 */ 2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA 2566 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) 2567 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2568 #endif 2569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA 2570 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) 2571 { 2572 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2573 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2574 } 2575 #endif 2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA 2577 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) 2578 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); 2579 #endif 2580 return 1; 2581 } 2582 2583 #endif 2584 2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS 2586 int 2587 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2588 { 2589 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 2590 unsigned short hbtype; 2591 unsigned int payload; 2592 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2593 2594 if (s->msg_callback) 2595 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2596 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, 2597 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2598 2599 /* Read type and payload length first */ 2600 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2601 return 0; /* silently discard */ 2602 hbtype = *p++; 2603 n2s(p, payload); 2604 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) 2605 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ 2606 pl = p; 2607 2608 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) 2609 { 2610 unsigned char *buffer, *bp; 2611 int r; 2612 2613 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes 2614 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 2615 * payload, plus padding 2616 */ 2617 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2618 bp = buffer; 2619 2620 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ 2621 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; 2622 s2n(payload, bp); 2623 memcpy(bp, pl, payload); 2624 bp += payload; 2625 /* Random padding */ 2626 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); 2627 2628 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); 2629 2630 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) 2631 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2632 buffer, 3 + payload + padding, 2633 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2634 2635 OPENSSL_free(buffer); 2636 2637 if (r < 0) 2638 return r; 2639 } 2640 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) 2641 { 2642 unsigned int seq; 2643 2644 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), 2645 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the 2646 * sequence number */ 2647 n2s(pl, seq); 2648 2649 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) 2650 { 2651 s->tlsext_hb_seq++; 2652 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; 2653 } 2654 } 2655 2656 return 0; 2657 } 2658 2659 int 2660 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) 2661 { 2662 unsigned char *buf, *p; 2663 int ret; 2664 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ 2665 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ 2666 2667 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ 2668 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || 2669 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) 2670 { 2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); 2672 return -1; 2673 } 2674 2675 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ 2676 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) 2677 { 2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); 2679 return -1; 2680 } 2681 2682 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ 2683 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) 2684 { 2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); 2686 return -1; 2687 } 2688 2689 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding 2690 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. 2691 */ 2692 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); 2693 2694 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number 2695 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add 2696 * some random stuff. 2697 * - Message Type, 1 byte 2698 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) 2699 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) 2700 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) 2701 * - Padding 2702 */ 2703 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 2704 p = buf; 2705 /* Message Type */ 2706 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; 2707 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ 2708 s2n(payload, p); 2709 /* Sequence number */ 2710 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); 2711 /* 16 random bytes */ 2712 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); 2713 p += 16; 2714 /* Random padding */ 2715 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); 2716 2717 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); 2718 if (ret >= 0) 2719 { 2720 if (s->msg_callback) 2721 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, 2722 buf, 3 + payload + padding, 2723 s, s->msg_callback_arg); 2724 2725 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; 2726 } 2727 2728 OPENSSL_free(buf); 2729 2730 return ret; 2731 } 2732 #endif 2733
Indexes created Sat Feb 28 05:31:39 UTC 2026