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authreadkeys.c revision 1.2.8.3
      1 /*	$NetBSD: authreadkeys.c,v 1.2.8.3 2016/05/08 22:02:09 snj Exp $	*/
      2 
      3 /*
      4  * authreadkeys.c - routines to support the reading of the key file
      5  */
      6 #include <config.h>
      7 #include <stdio.h>
      8 #include <ctype.h>
      9 
     10 #include "ntpd.h"	/* Only for DPRINTF */
     11 #include "ntp_fp.h"
     12 #include "ntp.h"
     13 #include "ntp_syslog.h"
     14 #include "ntp_stdlib.h"
     15 #include "ntp_keyacc.h"
     16 
     17 #ifdef OPENSSL
     18 #include "openssl/objects.h"
     19 #include "openssl/evp.h"
     20 #endif	/* OPENSSL */
     21 
     22 /* Forwards */
     23 static char *nexttok (char **);
     24 
     25 /*
     26  * nexttok - basic internal tokenizing routine
     27  */
     28 static char *
     29 nexttok(
     30 	char	**str
     31 	)
     32 {
     33 	register char *cp;
     34 	char *starttok;
     35 
     36 	cp = *str;
     37 
     38 	/*
     39 	 * Space past white space
     40 	 */
     41 	while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
     42 		cp++;
     43 
     44 	/*
     45 	 * Save this and space to end of token
     46 	 */
     47 	starttok = cp;
     48 	while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '\n' && *cp != ' '
     49 	       && *cp != '\t' && *cp != '#')
     50 		cp++;
     51 
     52 	/*
     53 	 * If token length is zero return an error, else set end of
     54 	 * token to zero and return start.
     55 	 */
     56 	if (starttok == cp)
     57 		return NULL;
     58 
     59 	if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t')
     60 		*cp++ = '\0';
     61 	else
     62 		*cp = '\0';
     63 
     64 	*str = cp;
     65 	return starttok;
     66 }
     67 
     68 
     69 /* TALOS-CAN-0055: possibly DoS attack by setting the key file to the
     70  * log file. This is hard to prevent (it would need to check two files
     71  * to be the same on the inode level, which will not work so easily with
     72  * Windows or VMS) but we can avoid the self-amplification loop: We only
     73  * log the first 5 errors, silently ignore the next 10 errors, and give
     74  * up when when we have found more than 15 errors.
     75  *
     76  * This avoids the endless file iteration we will end up with otherwise,
     77  * and also avoids overflowing the log file.
     78  *
     79  * Nevertheless, once this happens, the keys are gone since this would
     80  * require a save/swap strategy that is not easy to apply due to the
     81  * data on global/static level.
     82  */
     83 
     84 static const u_int nerr_loglimit = 5u;
     85 static const u_int nerr_maxlimit = 15;
     86 
     87 static void log_maybe(u_int*, const char*, ...) NTP_PRINTF(2, 3);
     88 
     89 typedef struct keydata KeyDataT;
     90 struct keydata {
     91 	KeyDataT *next;		/* queue/stack link		*/
     92 	KeyAccT  *keyacclist;	/* key access list		*/
     93 	keyid_t   keyid;	/* stored key ID		*/
     94 	u_short   keytype;	/* stored key type		*/
     95 	u_short   seclen;	/* length of secret		*/
     96 	u_char    secbuf[1];	/* begin of secret (formal only)*/
     97 };
     98 
     99 static void
    100 log_maybe(
    101 	u_int      *pnerr,
    102 	const char *fmt  ,
    103 	...)
    104 {
    105 	va_list ap;
    106 	if ((NULL == pnerr) || (++(*pnerr) <= nerr_loglimit)) {
    107 		va_start(ap, fmt);
    108 		mvsyslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, ap);
    109 		va_end(ap);
    110 	}
    111 }
    112 
    113 static void
    114 free_keydata(
    115 	KeyDataT *node
    116 	)
    117 {
    118 	KeyAccT *kap;
    119 
    120 	if (node) {
    121 		while (node->keyacclist) {
    122 			kap = node->keyacclist;
    123 			node->keyacclist = kap->next;
    124 			free(kap);
    125 		}
    126 
    127 		/* purge secrets from memory before free()ing it */
    128 		memset(node, 0, sizeof(*node) + node->seclen);
    129 		free(node);
    130 	}
    131 }
    132 
    133 /*
    134  * authreadkeys - (re)read keys from a file.
    135  */
    136 int
    137 authreadkeys(
    138 	const char *file
    139 	)
    140 {
    141 	FILE	*fp;
    142 	char	*line;
    143 	char	*token;
    144 	keyid_t	keyno;
    145 	int	keytype;
    146 	char	buf[512];		/* lots of room for line */
    147 	u_char	keystr[32];		/* Bug 2537 */
    148 	size_t	len;
    149 	size_t	j;
    150 	u_int   nerr;
    151 	KeyDataT *list = NULL;
    152 	KeyDataT *next = NULL;
    153 	/*
    154 	 * Open file.  Complain and return if it can't be opened.
    155 	 */
    156 	fp = fopen(file, "r");
    157 	if (fp == NULL) {
    158 		msyslog(LOG_ERR, "authreadkeys: file '%s': %m",
    159 		    file);
    160 		goto onerror;
    161 	}
    162 	INIT_SSL();
    163 
    164 	/*
    165 	 * Now read lines from the file, looking for key entries. Put
    166 	 * the data into temporary store for later propagation to avoid
    167 	 * two-pass processing.
    168 	 */
    169 	nerr = 0;
    170 	while ((line = fgets(buf, sizeof buf, fp)) != NULL) {
    171 		if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
    172 			break;
    173 		token = nexttok(&line);
    174 		if (token == NULL)
    175 			continue;
    176 
    177 		/*
    178 		 * First is key number.  See if it is okay.
    179 		 */
    180 		keyno = atoi(token);
    181 		if (keyno < 1) {
    182 			log_maybe(&nerr,
    183 				  "authreadkeys: cannot change key %s",
    184 				  token);
    185 			continue;
    186 		}
    187 
    188 		if (keyno > NTP_MAXKEY) {
    189 			log_maybe(&nerr,
    190 				  "authreadkeys: key %s > %d reserved for Autokey",
    191 				  token, NTP_MAXKEY);
    192 			continue;
    193 		}
    194 
    195 		/*
    196 		 * Next is keytype. See if that is all right.
    197 		 */
    198 		token = nexttok(&line);
    199 		if (token == NULL) {
    200 			log_maybe(&nerr,
    201 				  "authreadkeys: no key type for key %d",
    202 				  keyno);
    203 			continue;
    204 		}
    205 
    206 		/* We want to silently ignore keys where we do not
    207 		 * support the requested digest type. OTOH, we want to
    208 		 * make sure the file is well-formed.  That means we
    209 		 * have to process the line completely and have to
    210 		 * finally throw away the result... This is a bit more
    211 		 * work, but it also results in better error detection.
    212 		 */
    213 #ifdef OPENSSL
    214 		/*
    215 		 * The key type is the NID used by the message digest
    216 		 * algorithm. There are a number of inconsistencies in
    217 		 * the OpenSSL database. We attempt to discover them
    218 		 * here and prevent use of inconsistent data later.
    219 		 */
    220 		keytype = keytype_from_text(token, NULL);
    221 		if (keytype == 0) {
    222 			log_maybe(NULL,
    223 				  "authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
    224 				  keyno);
    225 		} else if (EVP_get_digestbynid(keytype) == NULL) {
    226 			log_maybe(NULL,
    227 				  "authreadkeys: no algorithm for key %d",
    228 				  keyno);
    229 			keytype = 0;
    230 		}
    231 #else	/* !OPENSSL follows */
    232 		/*
    233 		 * The key type is unused, but is required to be 'M' or
    234 		 * 'm' for compatibility.
    235 		 */
    236 		if (!(*token == 'M' || *token == 'm')) {
    237 			log_maybe(NULL,
    238 				  "authreadkeys: invalid type for key %d",
    239 				  keyno);
    240 			keytype = 0;
    241 		} else {
    242 		keytype = KEY_TYPE_MD5;
    243 		}
    244 #endif	/* !OPENSSL */
    245 
    246 		/*
    247 		 * Finally, get key and insert it. If it is longer than 20
    248 		 * characters, it is a binary string encoded in hex;
    249 		 * otherwise, it is a text string of printable ASCII
    250 		 * characters.
    251 		 */
    252 		token = nexttok(&line);
    253 		if (token == NULL) {
    254 			log_maybe(&nerr,
    255 				  "authreadkeys: no key for key %d", keyno);
    256 			continue;
    257 		}
    258 		next = NULL;
    259 		len = strlen(token);
    260 		if (len <= 20) {	/* Bug 2537 */
    261 			next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
    262 			next->keyacclist = NULL;
    263 			next->keyid   = keyno;
    264 			next->keytype = keytype;
    265 			next->seclen  = len;
    266 			memcpy(next->secbuf, token, len);
    267 		} else {
    268 			static const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
    269 			u_char	temp;
    270 			char	*ptr;
    271 			size_t	jlim;
    272 
    273 			jlim = min(len, 2 * sizeof(keystr));
    274 			for (j = 0; j < jlim; j++) {
    275 				ptr = strchr(hex, tolower((unsigned char)token[j]));
    276 				if (ptr == NULL)
    277 					break;	/* abort decoding */
    278 				temp = (u_char)(ptr - hex);
    279 				if (j & 1)
    280 					keystr[j / 2] |= temp;
    281 				else
    282 					keystr[j / 2] = temp << 4;
    283 			}
    284 			if (j < jlim) {
    285 				log_maybe(&nerr,
    286 					  "authreadkeys: invalid hex digit for key %d",
    287 					  keyno);
    288 				continue;
    289 			}
    290 			len = jlim/2; /* hmmmm.... what about odd length?!? */
    291 			next = emalloc(sizeof(KeyDataT) + len);
    292 			next->keyacclist = NULL;
    293 			next->keyid   = keyno;
    294 			next->keytype = keytype;
    295 			next->seclen  = len;
    296 			memcpy(next->secbuf, keystr, len);
    297 		}
    298 
    299 		token = nexttok(&line);
    300 		DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: full access list <%s>\n", (token) ? token : "NULL"));
    301 		if (token != NULL) {	/* A comma-separated IP access list */
    302 			char *tp = token;
    303 
    304 			while (tp) {
    305 				char *i;
    306 				sockaddr_u addr;
    307 
    308 				i = strchr(tp, (int)',');
    309 				if (i)
    310 					*i = '\0';
    311 				DPRINTF(0, ("authreadkeys: access list:  <%s>\n", tp));
    312 
    313 				if (is_ip_address(tp, AF_UNSPEC, &addr)) {
    314 					next->keyacclist = keyacc_new_push(
    315 						next->keyacclist, &addr);
    316 				} else {
    317 					log_maybe(&nerr,
    318 						  "authreadkeys: invalid IP address <%s> for key %d",
    319 						  tp, keyno);
    320 				}
    321 
    322 				if (i) {
    323 					tp = i + 1;
    324 				} else {
    325 					tp = 0;
    326 				}
    327 			}
    328 		}
    329 
    330 		/* check if this has to be weeded out... */
    331 		if (0 == keytype) {
    332 			free_keydata(next);
    333 			next = NULL;
    334 			continue;
    335 		}
    336 
    337 		INSIST(NULL != next);
    338 		next->next = list;
    339 		list = next;
    340 	}
    341 	fclose(fp);
    342 	if (nerr > 0) {
    343 		const char * why = "";
    344 		if (nerr > nerr_maxlimit)
    345 			why = " (emergency break)";
    346 		msyslog(LOG_ERR,
    347 			"authreadkeys: rejecting file '%s' after %u error(s)%s",
    348 			file, nerr, why);
    349 		goto onerror;
    350 	}
    351 
    352 	/* first remove old file-based keys */
    353 	auth_delkeys();
    354 	/* insert the new key material */
    355 	while (NULL != (next = list)) {
    356 		list = next->next;
    357 		MD5auth_setkey(next->keyid, next->keytype,
    358 			       next->secbuf, next->seclen, next->keyacclist);
    359 		next->keyacclist = NULL; /* consumed by MD5auth_setkey */
    360 		free_keydata(next);
    361 	}
    362 	return (1);
    363 
    364   onerror:
    365 	/* Mop up temporary storage before bailing out. */
    366 	while (NULL != (next = list)) {
    367 		list = next->next;
    368 		free_keydata(next);
    369 	}
    370 	return (0);
    371 }
    372