pkcs5_pbkdf2.c revision 1.7 1 /* $NetBSD: pkcs5_pbkdf2.c,v 1.7 2005/03/30 17:10:18 christos Exp $ */
2
3 /*-
4 * Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
8 * by Roland C. Dowdeswell.
9 *
10 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * are met:
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
19 * must display the following acknowledgement:
20 * This product includes software developed by the NetBSD
21 * Foundation, Inc. and its contributors.
22 * 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its
23 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
24 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
25 *
26 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
27 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
28 * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
29 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
30 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
31 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
32 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
33 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
34 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
35 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
36 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
37 */
38
39 /*
40 * This code is an implementation of PKCS #5 PBKDF2 which is described
41 * in:
42 *
43 * ``PKCS #5 v2.0: Password-Based Cryptography Standard'', RSA Laboratories,
44 * March 25, 1999.
45 *
46 * and can be found at the following URL:
47 *
48 * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-5/
49 *
50 * It was also republished as RFC 2898.
51 */
52
53
54 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
55 #ifndef lint
56 __RCSID("$NetBSD: pkcs5_pbkdf2.c,v 1.7 2005/03/30 17:10:18 christos Exp $");
57 #endif
58
59 #include <sys/resource.h>
60
61 #include <assert.h>
62 #include <stdlib.h>
63 #include <string.h>
64
65 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
66
67 #include "pkcs5_pbkdf2.h"
68 #include "utils.h"
69
70 static void int_encode(u_int8_t *, int);
71 static void prf_iterate(u_int8_t *, const u_int8_t *, int,
72 const u_int8_t *, int, int, int);
73 static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(int, int);
74
75 #define PRF_BLOCKLEN 20
76
77 /*
78 * int_encode encodes i as a four octet integer, most significant
79 * octet first. (from the end of Step 3).
80 */
81
82 static void
83 int_encode(u_int8_t *res, int i)
84 {
85
86 *res++ = (i >> 24) & 0xff;
87 *res++ = (i >> 16) & 0xff;
88 *res++ = (i >> 8) & 0xff;
89 *res = (i ) & 0xff;
90 }
91
92 static void
93 prf_iterate(u_int8_t *r, const u_int8_t *P, int Plen,
94 const u_int8_t *S, int Slen, int c, int ind)
95 {
96 int first_time = 1;
97 int i;
98 int datalen;
99 int tmplen;
100 u_int8_t *data;
101 u_int8_t tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
102
103 data = emalloc(Slen + 4);
104 memcpy(data, S, Slen);
105 int_encode(data + Slen, ind);
106 datalen = Slen + 4;
107
108 for (i=0; i < c; i++) {
109 HMAC(EVP_sha1(), P, Plen, data, datalen, tmp, &tmplen);
110
111 assert(tmplen == PRF_BLOCKLEN);
112
113 if (first_time) {
114 memcpy(r, tmp, PRF_BLOCKLEN);
115 first_time = 0;
116 } else
117 memxor(r, tmp, PRF_BLOCKLEN);
118 memcpy(data, tmp, PRF_BLOCKLEN);
119 datalen = PRF_BLOCKLEN;
120 }
121 free(data);
122 }
123
124 /*
125 * pkcs5_pbkdf2 takes all of its lengths in bytes.
126 */
127
128 int
129 pkcs5_pbkdf2(u_int8_t **r, int dkLen, const u_int8_t *P, int Plen,
130 const u_int8_t *S, int Slen, int c, int compat)
131 {
132 int i;
133 int l;
134
135 /* sanity */
136 if (!r)
137 return -1;
138 if (dkLen <= 0)
139 return -1;
140 if (c < 1)
141 return -1;
142
143 /* Step 2 */
144 l = (dkLen + PRF_BLOCKLEN - 1) / PRF_BLOCKLEN;
145
146 /* allocate the output */
147 *r = emalloc(l * PRF_BLOCKLEN);
148
149 /* Step 3 */
150 for (i=0; i < l; i++)
151 prf_iterate(*r + (PRF_BLOCKLEN * i), P, Plen, S, Slen, c,
152 (compat?i:i+1));
153
154 /* Step 4 and 5
155 * by the structure of the code, we do not need to concatenate
156 * the blocks, they're already concatenated. We do not extract
157 * the first dkLen octets, since we [naturally] assume that the
158 * calling function will use only the octets that it needs and
159 * the free(3) will free all of the allocated memory.
160 */
161 return 0;
162 }
163
164 /*
165 * We use predefined lengths for the password and salt to ensure that
166 * no analysis can be done on the output of the calibration based on
167 * those parameters. We do not do the same for dkLen because:
168 * 1. dkLen is known to the attacker if they know the iteration
169 * count, and
170 * 2. using the wrong dkLen will skew the calibration by an
171 * integral factor n = (dkLen / 160).
172 */
173
174 #define CAL_PASSLEN 64
175 #define CAL_SALTLEN 64
176 #define CAL_TIME 30000 /* Minimum number of microseconds that
177 * are considered significant.
178 */
179
180 /*
181 * We return the user time in microseconds that c iterations
182 * of the algorithm take.
183 */
184
185 static int
186 pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(int dkLen, int c)
187 {
188 struct rusage start;
189 struct rusage end;
190 int ret;
191 u_int8_t *r = NULL;
192 u_int8_t P[CAL_PASSLEN];
193 u_int8_t S[CAL_SALTLEN];
194
195 getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &start);
196 /* XXX compat flag at end to be removed when _OLD keygen method is */
197 ret = pkcs5_pbkdf2(&r, dkLen, P, sizeof(P), S, sizeof(S), c, 0);
198 if (ret)
199 return ret;
200 getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &end);
201 free(r);
202
203 return (end.ru_utime.tv_sec - start.ru_utime.tv_sec) * 1000000
204 + (end.ru_utime.tv_usec - start.ru_utime.tv_usec);
205 }
206
207 int
208 pkcs5_pbkdf2_calibrate(int dkLen, int microseconds)
209 {
210 int c;
211 int t = 0;
212 int ret;
213
214 /*
215 * First we get a meaningfully long time by doubling the
216 * iteration count until it takes longer than CAL_TIME. This
217 * should take approximately 2 * CAL_TIME.
218 */
219 for (c=1;; c *= 2) {
220 t = pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(dkLen, c);
221 if (t > CAL_TIME)
222 break;
223 }
224
225 /* Now that we know that, we scale it. */
226 ret = (int) ((u_int64_t) c * microseconds / t);
227
228 /*
229 * Since it is quite important to not get this wrong,
230 * we test the result.
231 */
232
233 t = pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(dkLen, ret);
234
235 /* if we are over 5% off, return an error */
236 if (abs(microseconds - t) > (microseconds / 20))
237 return -1;
238
239 return ret;
240 }
241