pkcs5_pbkdf2.c revision 1.9 1 /* $NetBSD: pkcs5_pbkdf2.c,v 1.9 2006/08/26 18:14:28 christos Exp $ */
2
3 /*-
4 * Copyright (c) 2002, 2003 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
5 * All rights reserved.
6 *
7 * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
8 * by Roland C. Dowdeswell.
9 *
10 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
11 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * are met:
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
17 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
18 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
19 * must display the following acknowledgement:
20 * This product includes software developed by the NetBSD
21 * Foundation, Inc. and its contributors.
22 * 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its
23 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
24 * from this software without specific prior written permission.
25 *
26 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
27 * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
28 * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
29 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
30 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
31 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
32 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
33 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
34 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
35 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
36 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
37 */
38
39 /*
40 * This code is an implementation of PKCS #5 PBKDF2 which is described
41 * in:
42 *
43 * ``PKCS #5 v2.0: Password-Based Cryptography Standard'', RSA Laboratories,
44 * March 25, 1999.
45 *
46 * and can be found at the following URL:
47 *
48 * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-5/
49 *
50 * It was also republished as RFC 2898.
51 */
52
53
54 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
55 #ifndef lint
56 __RCSID("$NetBSD: pkcs5_pbkdf2.c,v 1.9 2006/08/26 18:14:28 christos Exp $");
57 #endif
58
59 #include <sys/resource.h>
60
61 #include <assert.h>
62 #include <stdlib.h>
63 #include <string.h>
64 #include <err.h>
65 #include <util.h>
66
67 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
68
69 #include "pkcs5_pbkdf2.h"
70 #include "utils.h"
71
72 static void int_encode(u_int8_t *, int);
73 static void prf_iterate(u_int8_t *, const u_int8_t *, int,
74 const u_int8_t *, int, int, int);
75 static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(int, int);
76
77 #define PRF_BLOCKLEN 20
78
79 /*
80 * int_encode encodes i as a four octet integer, most significant
81 * octet first. (from the end of Step 3).
82 */
83
84 static void
85 int_encode(u_int8_t *res, int i)
86 {
87
88 *res++ = (i >> 24) & 0xff;
89 *res++ = (i >> 16) & 0xff;
90 *res++ = (i >> 8) & 0xff;
91 *res = (i ) & 0xff;
92 }
93
94 static void
95 prf_iterate(u_int8_t *r, const u_int8_t *P, int Plen,
96 const u_int8_t *S, int Slen, int c, int ind)
97 {
98 int first_time = 1;
99 int i;
100 int datalen;
101 u_int tmplen;
102 u_int8_t *data;
103 u_int8_t tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
104
105 data = emalloc(Slen + 4);
106 memcpy(data, S, Slen);
107 int_encode(data + Slen, ind);
108 datalen = Slen + 4;
109
110 for (i=0; i < c; i++) {
111 HMAC(EVP_sha1(), P, Plen, data, datalen, tmp, &tmplen);
112
113 assert(tmplen == PRF_BLOCKLEN);
114
115 if (first_time) {
116 memcpy(r, tmp, PRF_BLOCKLEN);
117 first_time = 0;
118 } else
119 memxor(r, tmp, PRF_BLOCKLEN);
120 memcpy(data, tmp, PRF_BLOCKLEN);
121 datalen = PRF_BLOCKLEN;
122 }
123 free(data);
124 }
125
126 /*
127 * pkcs5_pbkdf2 takes all of its lengths in bytes.
128 */
129
130 int
131 pkcs5_pbkdf2(u_int8_t **r, int dkLen, const u_int8_t *P, int Plen,
132 const u_int8_t *S, int Slen, int c, int compat)
133 {
134 int i;
135 int l;
136
137 /* sanity */
138 if (!r)
139 return -1;
140 if (dkLen <= 0)
141 return -1;
142 if (c < 1)
143 return -1;
144
145 /* Step 2 */
146 l = (dkLen + PRF_BLOCKLEN - 1) / PRF_BLOCKLEN;
147
148 /* allocate the output */
149 *r = emalloc(l * PRF_BLOCKLEN);
150
151 /* Step 3 */
152 for (i=0; i < l; i++)
153 prf_iterate(*r + (PRF_BLOCKLEN * i), P, Plen, S, Slen, c,
154 (compat?i:i+1));
155
156 /* Step 4 and 5
157 * by the structure of the code, we do not need to concatenate
158 * the blocks, they're already concatenated. We do not extract
159 * the first dkLen octets, since we [naturally] assume that the
160 * calling function will use only the octets that it needs and
161 * the free(3) will free all of the allocated memory.
162 */
163 return 0;
164 }
165
166 /*
167 * We use predefined lengths for the password and salt to ensure that
168 * no analysis can be done on the output of the calibration based on
169 * those parameters. We do not do the same for dkLen because:
170 * 1. dkLen is known to the attacker if they know the iteration
171 * count, and
172 * 2. using the wrong dkLen will skew the calibration by an
173 * integral factor n = (dkLen / 160).
174 */
175
176 #define CAL_PASSLEN 64
177 #define CAL_SALTLEN 64
178 #define CAL_TIME 30000 /* Minimum number of microseconds that
179 * are considered significant.
180 */
181
182 /*
183 * We return the user time in microseconds that c iterations
184 * of the algorithm take.
185 */
186
187 static int
188 pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(int dkLen, int c)
189 {
190 struct rusage start;
191 struct rusage end;
192 int ret;
193 u_int8_t *r = NULL;
194 u_int8_t P[CAL_PASSLEN];
195 u_int8_t S[CAL_SALTLEN];
196
197 getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &start);
198 /* XXX compat flag at end to be removed when _OLD keygen method is */
199 ret = pkcs5_pbkdf2(&r, dkLen, P, sizeof(P), S, sizeof(S), c, 0);
200 if (ret)
201 return ret;
202 getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &end);
203 free(r);
204
205 return (end.ru_utime.tv_sec - start.ru_utime.tv_sec) * 1000000
206 + (end.ru_utime.tv_usec - start.ru_utime.tv_usec);
207 }
208
209 int
210 pkcs5_pbkdf2_calibrate(int dkLen, int microseconds)
211 {
212 int c;
213 int t = 0;
214 int ret;
215
216 /*
217 * First we get a meaningfully long time by doubling the
218 * iteration count until it takes longer than CAL_TIME. This
219 * should take approximately 2 * CAL_TIME.
220 */
221 for (c=1;; c *= 2) {
222 t = pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(dkLen, c);
223 if (t > CAL_TIME)
224 break;
225 }
226
227 /* Now that we know that, we scale it. */
228 ret = (int) ((u_int64_t) c * microseconds / t);
229
230 /*
231 * Since it is quite important to not get this wrong,
232 * we test the result.
233 */
234
235 t = pkcs5_pbkdf2_time(dkLen, ret);
236
237 /* if we are over 5% off, return an error */
238 if (abs(microseconds - t) > (microseconds / 20))
239 return -1;
240
241 return ret;
242 }
243