kern_veriexec.c revision 1.12.4.1 1 /* $NetBSD: kern_veriexec.c,v 1.12.4.1 2017/08/31 11:46:23 martin Exp $ */
2
3 /*-
4 * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Elad Efrat <elad (at) NetBSD.org>
5 * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Brett Lymn <blymn (at) NetBSD.org>
6 * All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * 3. The name of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote products
17 * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
18 *
19 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
21 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
22 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
23 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
24 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
25 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
26 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
27 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
28 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
29 */
30
31 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
32 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_veriexec.c,v 1.12.4.1 2017/08/31 11:46:23 martin Exp $");
33
34 #include "opt_veriexec.h"
35
36 #include <sys/param.h>
37 #include <sys/mount.h>
38 #include <sys/kmem.h>
39 #include <sys/vnode.h>
40 #include <sys/namei.h>
41 #include <sys/once.h>
42 #include <sys/proc.h>
43 #include <sys/rwlock.h>
44 #include <sys/syslog.h>
45 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
46 #include <sys/inttypes.h>
47 #include <sys/verified_exec.h>
48 #include <sys/sha1.h>
49 #include <sys/sha2.h>
50 #include <sys/rmd160.h>
51 #include <sys/md5.h>
52 #include <sys/fileassoc.h>
53 #include <sys/kauth.h>
54 #include <sys/conf.h>
55 #include <miscfs/specfs/specdev.h>
56 #include <prop/proplib.h>
57 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
58
59 /* Readable values for veriexec_file_report(). */
60 #define REPORT_ALWAYS 0x01 /* Always print */
61 #define REPORT_VERBOSE 0x02 /* Print when verbose >= 1 */
62 #define REPORT_DEBUG 0x04 /* Print when verbose >= 2 (debug) */
63 #define REPORT_PANIC 0x08 /* Call panic() */
64 #define REPORT_ALARM 0x10 /* Alarm - also print pid/uid/.. */
65 #define REPORT_LOGMASK (REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_VERBOSE|REPORT_DEBUG)
66
67 /* state of locking for veriexec_file_verify */
68 #define VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED 0x00 /* Nothing locked, callee does it */
69 #define VERIEXEC_LOCKED 0x01 /* Global op lock held */
70
71 /* state of file locking for veriexec_file_verify */
72 #define VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED 0x02 /* Nothing locked, callee does it */
73 #define VERIEXEC_FILE_LOCKED 0x04 /* File locked */
74
75 #define VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(lock) while((rw_tryupgrade(lock)) == 0){};
76
77 struct veriexec_fpops {
78 const char *type;
79 size_t hash_len;
80 size_t context_size;
81 veriexec_fpop_init_t init;
82 veriexec_fpop_update_t update;
83 veriexec_fpop_final_t final;
84 LIST_ENTRY(veriexec_fpops) entries;
85 };
86
87 /* Veriexec per-file entry data. */
88 struct veriexec_file_entry {
89 krwlock_t lock; /* r/w lock */
90 u_char *filename; /* File name. */
91 u_char type; /* Entry type. */
92 u_char status; /* Evaluation status. */
93 u_char *fp; /* Fingerprint. */
94 struct veriexec_fpops *ops; /* Fingerprint ops vector*/
95 size_t filename_len; /* Length of filename. */
96 };
97
98 /* Veriexec per-table data. */
99 struct veriexec_table_entry {
100 uint64_t vte_count; /* Number of Veriexec entries. */
101 const struct sysctlnode *vte_node;
102 };
103
104 static int veriexec_verbose;
105 static int veriexec_strict;
106 static int veriexec_bypass = 1;
107
108 static char *veriexec_fp_names = NULL;
109 static size_t veriexec_name_max = 0;
110
111 static const struct sysctlnode *veriexec_count_node;
112
113 static fileassoc_t veriexec_hook;
114 static specificdata_key_t veriexec_mountspecific_key;
115
116 static LIST_HEAD(, veriexec_fpops) veriexec_fpops_list =
117 LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(veriexec_fpops_list);
118
119 static int veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t, kauth_action_t, void *,
120 void *, void *, void *, void *);
121 static struct veriexec_fpops *veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *);
122 static void veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *);
123
124 static unsigned int veriexec_tablecount = 0;
125
126 /*
127 * Veriexec operations global lock - most ops hold this as a read
128 * lock, it is upgraded to a write lock when destroying veriexec file
129 * table entries.
130 */
131 static krwlock_t veriexec_op_lock;
132
133 /*
134 * Sysctl helper routine for Veriexec.
135 */
136 static int
137 sysctl_kern_veriexec_algorithms(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
138 {
139 size_t len;
140 int error;
141 const char *p;
142
143 if (newp != NULL)
144 return EPERM;
145
146 if (namelen != 0)
147 return EINVAL;
148
149 p = veriexec_fp_names == NULL ? "" : veriexec_fp_names;
150
151 len = strlen(p) + 1;
152
153 if (*oldlenp < len && oldp)
154 return ENOMEM;
155
156 if (oldp && (error = copyout(p, oldp, len)) != 0)
157 return error;
158
159 *oldlenp = len;
160 return 0;
161 }
162
163 static int
164 sysctl_kern_veriexec_strict(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
165 {
166 struct sysctlnode node;
167 int error, newval;
168
169 node = *rnode;
170 node.sysctl_data = &newval;
171
172 newval = veriexec_strict;
173 error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
174 if (error || newp == NULL)
175 return error;
176
177 if (newval < veriexec_strict)
178 return EPERM;
179
180 veriexec_strict = newval;
181
182 return 0;
183 }
184
185 SYSCTL_SETUP(sysctl_kern_veriexec_setup, "sysctl kern.veriexec setup")
186 {
187 const struct sysctlnode *rnode = NULL;
188
189 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, NULL, &rnode,
190 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
191 CTLTYPE_NODE, "veriexec",
192 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec"),
193 NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
194 CTL_KERN, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
195
196 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
197 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
198 CTLTYPE_INT, "verbose",
199 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec verbose level"),
200 NULL, 0, &veriexec_verbose, 0,
201 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
202 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
203 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
204 CTLTYPE_INT, "strict",
205 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec strict level"),
206 sysctl_kern_veriexec_strict, 0, NULL, 0,
207 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
208 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
209 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
210 CTLTYPE_STRING, "algorithms",
211 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec supported hashing "
212 "algorithms"),
213 sysctl_kern_veriexec_algorithms, 0, NULL, 0,
214 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
215 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, &veriexec_count_node,
216 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
217 CTLTYPE_NODE, "count",
218 SYSCTL_DESCR("Number of fingerprints on mount(s)"),
219 NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
220 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
221 }
222
223 /*
224 * Add ops to the fingerprint ops vector list.
225 */
226 int
227 veriexec_fpops_add(const char *fp_type, size_t hash_len, size_t ctx_size,
228 veriexec_fpop_init_t init, veriexec_fpop_update_t update,
229 veriexec_fpop_final_t final)
230 {
231 struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
232
233 KASSERT((init != NULL) && (update != NULL) && (final != NULL));
234 KASSERT((hash_len != 0) && (ctx_size != 0));
235 KASSERT(fp_type != NULL);
236
237 if (veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type) != NULL)
238 return (EEXIST);
239
240 ops = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*ops), KM_SLEEP);
241 ops->type = fp_type;
242 ops->hash_len = hash_len;
243 ops->context_size = ctx_size;
244 ops->init = init;
245 ops->update = update;
246 ops->final = final;
247
248 LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&veriexec_fpops_list, ops, entries);
249
250 /*
251 * If we don't have space for any names, allocate enough for six
252 * which should be sufficient. (it's also enough for all algorithms
253 * we can support at the moment)
254 */
255 if (veriexec_fp_names == NULL) {
256 veriexec_name_max = 64;
257 veriexec_fp_names = kmem_zalloc(veriexec_name_max, KM_SLEEP);
258 }
259
260 /*
261 * If we're running out of space for storing supported algorithms,
262 * extend the buffer with space for four names.
263 */
264 while (veriexec_name_max - (strlen(veriexec_fp_names) + 1) <
265 strlen(fp_type)) {
266 char *newp;
267 unsigned int new_max;
268
269 /* Add space for four algorithm names. */
270 new_max = veriexec_name_max + 64;
271 newp = kmem_zalloc(new_max, KM_SLEEP);
272 strlcpy(newp, veriexec_fp_names, new_max);
273 kmem_free(veriexec_fp_names, veriexec_name_max);
274 veriexec_fp_names = newp;
275 veriexec_name_max = new_max;
276 }
277
278 if (*veriexec_fp_names != '\0')
279 strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, " ", veriexec_name_max);
280
281 strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, fp_type, veriexec_name_max);
282
283 return (0);
284 }
285
286 static void
287 veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(void *v)
288 {
289 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte = v;
290
291 if (vte == NULL) {
292 return;
293 }
294 sysctl_free(__UNCONST(vte->vte_node));
295 veriexec_tablecount--;
296 kmem_free(vte, sizeof(*vte));
297 }
298
299 static int
300 veriexec_listener_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
301 void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
302 {
303 int result;
304 enum kauth_system_req req;
305
306 if (action != KAUTH_SYSTEM_VERIEXEC)
307 return KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
308
309 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
310 req = (enum kauth_system_req)arg0;
311
312 if (req == KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_VERIEXEC_MODIFY &&
313 veriexec_strict > VERIEXEC_LEARNING) {
314 log(LOG_WARNING, "Veriexec: Strict mode, modifying "
315 "tables not permitted.\n");
316
317 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
318 }
319
320 return result;
321 }
322
323 /*
324 * Initialise Veriexec.
325 */
326 void
327 veriexec_init(void)
328 {
329 int error;
330
331 /* Register a fileassoc for Veriexec. */
332 error = fileassoc_register("veriexec",
333 (fileassoc_cleanup_cb_t)veriexec_file_free, &veriexec_hook);
334 if (error)
335 panic("Veriexec: Can't register fileassoc: error=%d", error);
336
337 /* Register listener to handle raw disk access. */
338 if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_DEVICE, veriexec_raw_cb, NULL) ==
339 NULL)
340 panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on device scope");
341
342 error = mount_specific_key_create(&veriexec_mountspecific_key,
343 veriexec_mountspecific_dtor);
344 if (error)
345 panic("Veriexec: Can't create mountspecific key");
346
347 if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_SYSTEM, veriexec_listener_cb,
348 NULL) == NULL)
349 panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on system scope");
350
351 rw_init(&veriexec_op_lock);
352
353 #define FPOPS_ADD(a, b, c, d, e, f) \
354 veriexec_fpops_add(a, b, c, (veriexec_fpop_init_t)d, \
355 (veriexec_fpop_update_t)e, (veriexec_fpop_final_t)f)
356
357 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160
358 FPOPS_ADD("RMD160", RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(RMD160_CTX),
359 RMD160Init, RMD160Update, RMD160Final);
360 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160 */
361
362 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256
363 FPOPS_ADD("SHA256", SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
364 SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final);
365 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256 */
366
367 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384
368 FPOPS_ADD("SHA384", SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
369 SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final);
370 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384 */
371
372 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512
373 FPOPS_ADD("SHA512", SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
374 SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update, SHA512_Final);
375 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512 */
376
377 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1
378 FPOPS_ADD("SHA1", SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
379 SHA1Init, SHA1Update, SHA1Final);
380 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1 */
381
382 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5
383 FPOPS_ADD("MD5", MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX),
384 MD5Init, MD5Update, MD5Final);
385 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5 */
386
387 #undef FPOPS_ADD
388 }
389
390 static struct veriexec_fpops *
391 veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *name)
392 {
393 struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
394
395 if (name == NULL)
396 return (NULL);
397
398 LIST_FOREACH(ops, &veriexec_fpops_list, entries) {
399 if (strcasecmp(name, ops->type) == 0)
400 return (ops);
401 }
402
403 return (NULL);
404 }
405
406 /*
407 * Calculate fingerprint. Information on hash length and routines used is
408 * extracted from veriexec_hash_list according to the hash type.
409 *
410 * NOTE: vfe is assumed to be locked for writing on entry.
411 */
412 static int
413 veriexec_fp_calc(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, int file_lock_state,
414 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, u_char *fp)
415 {
416 struct vattr va;
417 void *ctx;
418 u_char *buf;
419 off_t offset, len;
420 size_t resid;
421 int error;
422
423 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
424 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
425
426 if (file_lock_state == VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED)
427 vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
428 error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, l->l_cred);
429 if (file_lock_state == VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED)
430 VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
431 if (error)
432 return (error);
433
434 ctx = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->context_size, KM_SLEEP);
435 buf = kmem_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, KM_SLEEP);
436
437 (vfe->ops->init)(ctx);
438
439 len = 0;
440 error = 0;
441 for (offset = 0; offset < va.va_size; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
442 len = ((va.va_size - offset) < PAGE_SIZE) ?
443 (va.va_size - offset) : PAGE_SIZE;
444
445 error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, buf, len, offset,
446 UIO_SYSSPACE,
447 ((file_lock_state == VERIEXEC_FILE_LOCKED)?
448 IO_NODELOCKED : 0),
449 l->l_cred, &resid, NULL);
450
451 if (error) {
452 goto bad;
453 }
454
455 (vfe->ops->update)(ctx, buf, (unsigned int) len);
456
457 if (len != PAGE_SIZE)
458 break;
459 }
460
461 (vfe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
462
463 bad:
464 kmem_free(ctx, vfe->ops->context_size);
465 kmem_free(buf, PAGE_SIZE);
466
467 return (error);
468 }
469
470 /* Compare two fingerprints of the same type. */
471 static int
472 veriexec_fp_cmp(struct veriexec_fpops *ops, u_char *fp1, u_char *fp2)
473 {
474 if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
475 int i;
476
477 printf("comparing hashes...\n");
478 printf("fp1: ");
479 for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
480 printf("%02x", fp1[i]);
481 }
482 printf("\nfp2: ");
483 for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
484 printf("%02x", fp2[i]);
485 }
486 printf("\n");
487 }
488
489 return (memcmp(fp1, fp2, ops->hash_len));
490 }
491
492 static int
493 veriexec_fp_status(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, int file_lock_state,
494 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, u_char *status)
495 {
496 size_t hash_len = vfe->ops->hash_len;
497 u_char *digest;
498 int error;
499
500 digest = kmem_zalloc(hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
501
502 error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, vp, file_lock_state, vfe, digest);
503 if (error)
504 goto out;
505
506 /* Compare fingerprint with loaded data. */
507 if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, vfe->fp, digest) == 0)
508 *status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
509 else
510 *status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
511
512 out:
513 kmem_free(digest, hash_len);
514 return error;
515 }
516
517
518 static struct veriexec_table_entry *
519 veriexec_table_lookup(struct mount *mp)
520 {
521 /* XXX: From raidframe init */
522 if (mp == NULL)
523 return NULL;
524
525 return mount_getspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key);
526 }
527
528 static struct veriexec_file_entry *
529 veriexec_get(struct vnode *vp)
530 {
531 return (fileassoc_lookup(vp, veriexec_hook));
532 }
533
534 bool
535 veriexec_lookup(struct vnode *vp)
536 {
537 return (veriexec_get(vp) == NULL ? false : true);
538 }
539
540 /*
541 * Routine for maintaining mostly consistent message formats in Veriexec.
542 */
543 static void
544 veriexec_file_report(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, const u_char *msg,
545 const u_char *filename, struct lwp *l, int f)
546 {
547 if (vfe != NULL && vfe->filename != NULL)
548 filename = vfe->filename;
549 if (filename == NULL)
550 return;
551
552 if (((f & REPORT_LOGMASK) >> 1) <= veriexec_verbose) {
553 if (!(f & REPORT_ALARM) || (l == NULL))
554 log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s [%s]\n", msg,
555 filename);
556 else
557 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: %s [%s, prog=%s pid=%u, "
558 "uid=%u, gid=%u]\n", msg, filename,
559 l->l_proc->p_comm, l->l_proc->p_pid,
560 kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred),
561 kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred));
562 }
563
564 if (f & REPORT_PANIC)
565 panic("Veriexec: Unrecoverable error.");
566 }
567
568 /*
569 * Verify the fingerprint of the given file. If we're called directly from
570 * sys_execve(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_DIRECT. If we're called from
571 * exec_script(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_INDIRECT. If we are called from
572 * vn_open(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_FILE.
573 *
574 * 'veriexec_op_lock' must be locked (and remains locked).
575 *
576 * NOTE: The veriexec file entry pointer (vfep) will be returned LOCKED
577 * on no error.
578 */
579 static int
580 veriexec_file_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name,
581 int flag, int file_lock_state, struct veriexec_file_entry **vfep)
582 {
583 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
584 int error = 0;
585
586 KASSERT(rw_lock_held(&veriexec_op_lock));
587 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
588 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
589
590 #define VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe) ((vfe->status == FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL) || \
591 (vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED))
592
593 if (vfep != NULL)
594 *vfep = NULL;
595
596 if (vp->v_type != VREG)
597 return (0);
598
599 /* Lookup veriexec table entry, save pointer if requested. */
600 vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
601 if (vfep != NULL)
602 *vfep = vfe;
603
604 /* No entry in the veriexec tables. */
605 if (vfe == NULL) {
606 veriexec_file_report(NULL, "No entry.", name,
607 l, REPORT_VERBOSE);
608
609 /*
610 * Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files.
611 * IPS mode: Deny execution of non-monitored files.
612 */
613 if ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) ||
614 ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) &&
615 (flag != VERIEXEC_FILE)))
616 return (EPERM);
617
618 return (0);
619 }
620
621 /*
622 * Grab the lock for the entry, if we need to do an evaluation
623 * then the lock is a write lock, after we have the write
624 * lock, check if we really need it - some other thread may
625 * have already done the work for us.
626 */
627 if (VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe)) {
628 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_WRITER);
629 if (!VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe))
630 rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
631 } else
632 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_READER);
633
634 /* Evaluate fingerprint if needed. */
635 if (VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe)) {
636 u_char status;
637
638 error = veriexec_fp_status(l, vp, file_lock_state, vfe, &status);
639 if (error) {
640 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Fingerprint calculation error.",
641 name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS);
642 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
643 return (error);
644 }
645 vfe->status = status;
646 rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
647 }
648
649 if (!(vfe->type & flag)) {
650 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Incorrect access type.", name, l,
651 REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
652
653 /* IPS mode: Enforce access type. */
654 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
655 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
656 return (EPERM);
657 }
658 }
659
660 switch (vfe->status) {
661 case FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL:
662 /* Should not happen. */
663 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
664 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Not-evaluated status "
665 "post evaluation; inconsistency detected.", name,
666 NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
667 /* NOTREACHED */
668
669 case FINGERPRINT_VALID:
670 /* Valid fingerprint. */
671 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Match.", name, NULL,
672 REPORT_VERBOSE);
673
674 break;
675
676 case FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH:
677 /* Fingerprint mismatch. */
678 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Mismatch.", name,
679 NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
680
681 /* IDS mode: Deny access on fingerprint mismatch. */
682 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS) {
683 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
684 error = EPERM;
685 }
686
687 break;
688
689 default:
690 /* Should never happen. */
691 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
692 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Invalid status "
693 "post evaluation.", name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
694 /* NOTREACHED */
695 }
696
697 return (error);
698 }
699
700 int
701 veriexec_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name, int flag,
702 bool *found)
703 {
704 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
705 int r;
706
707 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
708 return 0;
709
710 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
711 r = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, name, flag, VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED,
712 &vfe);
713 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
714
715 if ((r == 0) && (vfe != NULL))
716 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
717
718 if (found != NULL)
719 *found = (vfe != NULL) ? true : false;
720
721 return (r);
722 }
723
724 /*
725 * Veriexec remove policy code.
726 */
727 int
728 veriexec_removechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *pathbuf)
729 {
730 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
731 int error;
732
733 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
734 return 0;
735
736 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
737 vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
738 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
739
740 if (vfe == NULL) {
741 /* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files. */
742 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN)
743 return (EPERM);
744
745 return (0);
746 }
747
748 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Remove request.", pathbuf, l,
749 REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
750
751 /* IDS mode: Deny removal of monitored files. */
752 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS)
753 error = EPERM;
754 else
755 error = veriexec_file_delete(l, vp);
756
757 return error;
758 }
759
760 /*
761 * Veriexec rename policy.
762 *
763 * XXX: Once there's a way to hook after a successful rename, it would be
764 * XXX: nice to update vfe->filename to the new name if it's not NULL and
765 * XXX: the new name is absolute (ie., starts with a slash).
766 */
767 int
768 veriexec_renamechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *fromvp, const char *fromname,
769 struct vnode *tovp, const char *toname)
770 {
771 struct veriexec_file_entry *fvfe = NULL, *tvfe = NULL;
772
773 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
774 return 0;
775
776 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
777
778 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
779 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' to "
780 "`%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: Lockdown mode.\n", fromname, toname,
781 kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
782 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
783 return (EPERM);
784 }
785
786 fvfe = veriexec_get(fromvp);
787 if (tovp != NULL)
788 tvfe = veriexec_get(tovp);
789
790 if ((fvfe == NULL) && (tvfe == NULL)) {
791 /* None of them is monitored */
792 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
793 return 0;
794 }
795
796 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
797 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' "
798 "to `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: IPS mode, %s "
799 "monitored.\n", fromname, toname,
800 kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred),
801 l->l_proc->p_pid, (fvfe != NULL && tvfe != NULL) ?
802 "files" : "file");
803 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
804 return (EPERM);
805 }
806
807 if (fvfe != NULL) {
808 /*
809 * Monitored file is renamed; filename no longer relevant.
810 */
811
812 /*
813 * XXX: We could keep the buffer, and when (and if) updating the
814 * XXX: filename post-rename, re-allocate it only if it's not
815 * XXX: big enough for the new filename.
816 */
817
818 /* XXX: Get write lock on fvfe here? */
819
820 VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(&veriexec_op_lock);
821 /* once we have the op lock in write mode
822 * there should be no locks on any file
823 * entries so we can destroy the object.
824 */
825
826 if (fvfe->filename_len > 0)
827 kmem_free(fvfe->filename, fvfe->filename_len);
828
829 fvfe->filename = NULL;
830 fvfe->filename_len = 0;
831
832 rw_downgrade(&veriexec_op_lock);
833 }
834
835 log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s file `%s' renamed to "
836 "%s file `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u.\n", (fvfe != NULL) ?
837 "Monitored" : "Non-monitored", fromname, (tvfe != NULL) ?
838 "monitored" : "non-monitored", toname,
839 kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
840
841 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
842
843 if (tvfe != NULL) {
844 /*
845 * Monitored file is overwritten. Remove the entry.
846 */
847 (void)veriexec_file_delete(l, tovp);
848 }
849
850 return (0);
851 }
852
853 static void
854 veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe)
855 {
856 if (vfe != NULL) {
857 if (vfe->fp != NULL)
858 kmem_free(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len);
859 if (vfe->filename != NULL)
860 kmem_free(vfe->filename, vfe->filename_len);
861 rw_destroy(&vfe->lock);
862 kmem_free(vfe, sizeof(*vfe));
863 }
864 }
865
866 static void
867 veriexec_file_purge(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, int have_lock)
868 {
869 if (vfe == NULL)
870 return;
871
872 if (have_lock == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
873 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_WRITER);
874 else
875 VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(&vfe->lock);
876
877 vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
878 if (have_lock == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
879 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
880 else
881 rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
882 }
883
884 static void
885 veriexec_file_purge_cb(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, void *cookie)
886 {
887 veriexec_file_purge(vfe, VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
888 }
889
890 /*
891 * Invalidate a Veriexec file entry.
892 * XXX: This should be updated when per-page fingerprints are added.
893 */
894 void
895 veriexec_purge(struct vnode *vp)
896 {
897 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
898 veriexec_file_purge(veriexec_get(vp), VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
899 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
900 }
901
902 /*
903 * Enforce raw disk access policy.
904 *
905 * IDS mode: Invalidate fingerprints on a mount if it's opened for writing.
906 * IPS mode: Don't allow raw writing to disks we monitor.
907 * Lockdown mode: Don't allow raw writing to all disks.
908 *
909 * XXX: This is bogus. There's an obvious race condition between the time
910 * XXX: the disk is open for writing, in which an attacker can access a
911 * XXX: monitored file to get its signature cached again, and when the raw
912 * XXX: file is overwritten on disk.
913 * XXX:
914 * XXX: To solve this, we need something like the following:
915 * XXX: open raw disk:
916 * XXX: - raise refcount,
917 * XXX: - invalidate fingerprints,
918 * XXX: - mark all entries for that disk with "no cache" flag
919 * XXX:
920 * XXX: veriexec_verify:
921 * XXX: - if "no cache", don't cache evaluation result
922 * XXX:
923 * XXX: close raw disk:
924 * XXX: - lower refcount,
925 * XXX: - if refcount == 0, remove "no cache" flag from all entries
926 */
927 static int
928 veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
929 void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
930 {
931 int result;
932 enum kauth_device_req req;
933 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
934
935 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
936 req = (enum kauth_device_req)arg0;
937
938 switch (action) {
939 case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC: {
940 struct vnode *vp, *bvp;
941 int error;
942
943 if (req == KAUTH_REQ_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC_READ) {
944 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
945 break;
946 }
947
948 vp = arg1;
949 KASSERT(vp != NULL);
950
951 /* Handle /dev/mem and /dev/kmem. */
952 if (iskmemvp(vp)) {
953 if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
954 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
955
956 break;
957 }
958
959 error = rawdev_mounted(vp, &bvp);
960 if (error == EINVAL) {
961 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
962 break;
963 }
964
965 /*
966 * XXX: See vfs_mountedon() comment in rawdev_mounted().
967 */
968 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(bvp->v_mount);
969 if (vte == NULL) {
970 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
971 break;
972 }
973
974 switch (veriexec_strict) {
975 case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
976 case VERIEXEC_IDS:
977 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
978
979 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
980 fileassoc_table_run(bvp->v_mount, veriexec_hook,
981 (fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_purge_cb, NULL);
982 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
983
984 break;
985 case VERIEXEC_IPS:
986 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
987 break;
988 case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
989 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
990 break;
991 }
992
993 break;
994 }
995
996 case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_PASSTHRU:
997 /* XXX What can we do here? */
998 if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
999 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
1000
1001 break;
1002
1003 default:
1004 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
1005 break;
1006 }
1007
1008 return (result);
1009 }
1010
1011 /*
1012 * Create a new Veriexec table.
1013 */
1014 static struct veriexec_table_entry *
1015 veriexec_table_add(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp)
1016 {
1017 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1018 u_char buf[16];
1019
1020 vte = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*vte), KM_SLEEP);
1021 mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, vte);
1022
1023 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "table%u", veriexec_tablecount++);
1024 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &veriexec_count_node, &vte->vte_node,
1025 0, CTLTYPE_NODE, buf, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
1026 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1027
1028 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
1029 CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "mntpt",
1030 NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname,
1031 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1032 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
1033 CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "fstype",
1034 NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_fstypename,
1035 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1036 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
1037 CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_QUAD, "nentries",
1038 NULL, NULL, 0, &vte->vte_count, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1039
1040 return (vte);
1041 }
1042
1043 /*
1044 * Add a file to be monitored by Veriexec.
1045 *
1046 * Expected elements in dict: file, fp, fp-type, entry-type.
1047 */
1048 int
1049 veriexec_file_add(struct lwp *l, prop_dictionary_t dict)
1050 {
1051 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1052 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL;
1053 struct veriexec_file_entry *ovfe;
1054 struct vnode *vp;
1055 const char *file, *fp_type;
1056 int error;
1057 bool ignore_dup = false;
1058
1059 if (!prop_dictionary_get_cstring_nocopy(dict, "file", &file))
1060 return (EINVAL);
1061
1062 error = namei_simple_kernel(file, NSM_FOLLOW_NOEMULROOT, &vp);
1063 if (error)
1064 return (error);
1065
1066 /* Add only regular files. */
1067 if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
1068 log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Not adding `%s': Not a regular file.\n",
1069 file);
1070 error = EBADF;
1071 goto out;
1072 }
1073
1074 vfe = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*vfe), KM_SLEEP);
1075 rw_init(&vfe->lock);
1076
1077 /* Lookup fingerprint hashing algorithm. */
1078 fp_type = prop_string_cstring_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict,
1079 "fp-type"));
1080 if ((vfe->ops = veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type)) == NULL) {
1081 log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Invalid or unknown fingerprint type "
1082 "`%s' for file `%s'.\n", fp_type, file);
1083 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
1084 goto out;
1085 }
1086
1087 if (prop_data_size(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")) !=
1088 vfe->ops->hash_len) {
1089 log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Bad fingerprint length for `%s'.\n",
1090 file);
1091 error = EINVAL;
1092 goto out;
1093 }
1094
1095 vfe->fp = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
1096 memcpy(vfe->fp, prop_data_data_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")),
1097 vfe->ops->hash_len);
1098
1099 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
1100
1101 /* Continue entry initialization. */
1102 if (prop_dictionary_get_uint8(dict, "entry-type", &vfe->type) == FALSE)
1103 vfe->type = 0;
1104 else {
1105 uint8_t extra_flags;
1106
1107 extra_flags = vfe->type & ~(VERIEXEC_DIRECT |
1108 VERIEXEC_INDIRECT | VERIEXEC_FILE | VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED);
1109 if (extra_flags) {
1110 log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: Contaminated flags `0x%x' "
1111 "for `%s', skipping.\n", extra_flags, file);
1112 error = EINVAL;
1113 goto unlock_out;
1114 }
1115 }
1116 if (!(vfe->type & (VERIEXEC_DIRECT | VERIEXEC_INDIRECT |
1117 VERIEXEC_FILE)))
1118 vfe->type |= VERIEXEC_DIRECT;
1119
1120 vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
1121 if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "keep-filename"))) {
1122 vfe->filename_len = strlen(file) + 1;
1123 vfe->filename = kmem_alloc(vfe->filename_len, KM_SLEEP);
1124 strlcpy(vfe->filename, file, vfe->filename_len);
1125 } else
1126 vfe->filename = NULL;
1127
1128 if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "eval-on-load")) ||
1129 (vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED)) {
1130 u_char status;
1131
1132 error = veriexec_fp_status(l, vp, VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED,
1133 vfe, &status);
1134 if (error)
1135 goto unlock_out;
1136 vfe->status = status;
1137 }
1138
1139 /*
1140 * If we already have an entry for this file, and it matches
1141 * the new entry exactly (except for the filename, which may
1142 * hard-linked!), we just ignore the new entry. If the new
1143 * entry differs, report the error.
1144 */
1145 if ((ovfe = veriexec_get(vp)) != NULL) {
1146 error = EEXIST;
1147 if (vfe->type == ovfe->type &&
1148 vfe->status == ovfe->status &&
1149 vfe->ops == ovfe->ops &&
1150 memcmp(vfe->fp, ovfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len) == 0)
1151 ignore_dup = true;
1152 goto unlock_out;
1153 }
1154
1155 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
1156 if (vte == NULL)
1157 vte = veriexec_table_add(l, vp->v_mount);
1158
1159 /* XXX if we bail below this, we might want to gc newly created vtes. */
1160
1161 error = fileassoc_add(vp, veriexec_hook, vfe);
1162 if (error)
1163 goto unlock_out;
1164
1165 vte->vte_count++;
1166
1167 veriexec_file_report(NULL, "New entry.", file, NULL, REPORT_DEBUG);
1168 veriexec_bypass = 0;
1169
1170 unlock_out:
1171 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1172
1173 out:
1174 vrele(vp);
1175 if (error)
1176 veriexec_file_free(vfe);
1177
1178 if (ignore_dup && error == EEXIST)
1179 error = 0;
1180
1181 return (error);
1182 }
1183
1184 int
1185 veriexec_table_delete(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp)
1186 {
1187 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1188
1189 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
1190 if (vte == NULL)
1191 return (ENOENT);
1192
1193 veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(vte);
1194 mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, NULL);
1195
1196 return (fileassoc_table_clear(mp, veriexec_hook));
1197 }
1198
1199 int
1200 veriexec_file_delete(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp)
1201 {
1202 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1203 int error;
1204
1205 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
1206 if (vte == NULL)
1207 return (ENOENT);
1208
1209 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
1210 error = fileassoc_clear(vp, veriexec_hook);
1211 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1212 if (!error) {
1213 KASSERT(vte->vte_count > 0);
1214 vte->vte_count--;
1215 }
1216
1217 return (error);
1218 }
1219
1220 /*
1221 * Convert Veriexec entry data to a dictionary readable by userland tools.
1222 */
1223 static void
1224 veriexec_file_convert(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
1225 {
1226 if (vfe->filename)
1227 prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "file",
1228 prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->filename));
1229 prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "entry-type", vfe->type);
1230 prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "status", vfe->status);
1231 prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp-type",
1232 prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->ops->type));
1233 prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp",
1234 prop_data_create_data(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len));
1235 }
1236
1237 int
1238 veriexec_convert(struct vnode *vp, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
1239 {
1240 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
1241
1242 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
1243
1244 vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
1245 if (vfe == NULL) {
1246 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1247 return (ENOENT);
1248 }
1249
1250 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_READER);
1251 veriexec_file_convert(vfe, rdict);
1252 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
1253
1254 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1255 return (0);
1256 }
1257
1258 int
1259 veriexec_unmountchk(struct mount *mp)
1260 {
1261 int error;
1262
1263 if ((veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
1264 || doing_shutdown)
1265 return (0);
1266
1267 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
1268
1269 switch (veriexec_strict) {
1270 case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
1271 error = 0;
1272 break;
1273
1274 case VERIEXEC_IDS:
1275 if (veriexec_table_lookup(mp) != NULL) {
1276 log(LOG_INFO, "Veriexec: IDS mode, allowing unmount "
1277 "of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
1278 }
1279
1280 error = 0;
1281 break;
1282
1283 case VERIEXEC_IPS: {
1284 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1285
1286 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
1287 if ((vte != NULL) && (vte->vte_count > 0)) {
1288 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: IPS mode, preventing"
1289 " unmount of \"%s\" with monitored files.\n",
1290 mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
1291
1292 error = EPERM;
1293 } else
1294 error = 0;
1295 break;
1296 }
1297
1298 case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
1299 default:
1300 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Lockdown mode, preventing unmount "
1301 "of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
1302 error = EPERM;
1303 break;
1304 }
1305
1306 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1307 return (error);
1308 }
1309
1310 int
1311 veriexec_openchk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int fmode)
1312 {
1313 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL;
1314 int error = 0;
1315
1316 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
1317 return 0;
1318
1319 if (vp == NULL) {
1320 /* If no creation requested, let this fail normally. */
1321 if (!(fmode & O_CREAT))
1322 goto out;
1323
1324 /* Lockdown mode: Prevent creation of new files. */
1325 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
1326 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing new file "
1327 "creation in `%s'.\n", path);
1328 error = EPERM;
1329 }
1330
1331 goto out;
1332 }
1333
1334 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
1335 error = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, path, VERIEXEC_FILE,
1336 VERIEXEC_FILE_LOCKED, &vfe);
1337
1338 if (error) {
1339 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1340 goto out;
1341 }
1342
1343 if ((vfe != NULL) && ((fmode & FWRITE) || (fmode & O_TRUNC))) {
1344 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Write access request.", path, l,
1345 REPORT_ALWAYS | REPORT_ALARM);
1346
1347 /* IPS mode: Deny write access to monitored files. */
1348 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS)
1349 error = EPERM;
1350 else
1351 veriexec_file_purge(vfe, VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
1352 }
1353
1354 if (vfe != NULL)
1355 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
1356
1357 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1358 out:
1359 return (error);
1360 }
1361
1362 static void
1363 veriexec_file_dump(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_array_t entries)
1364 {
1365 prop_dictionary_t entry;
1366
1367 /* If we don't have a filename, this is meaningless. */
1368 if (vfe->filename == NULL)
1369 return;
1370
1371 entry = prop_dictionary_create();
1372
1373 veriexec_file_convert(vfe, entry);
1374
1375 prop_array_add(entries, entry);
1376 }
1377
1378 int
1379 veriexec_dump(struct lwp *l, prop_array_t rarray)
1380 {
1381 mount_iterator_t *iter;
1382 struct mount *mp;
1383
1384 mountlist_iterator_init(&iter);
1385 while ((mp = mountlist_iterator_next(iter)) != NULL) {
1386 fileassoc_table_run(mp, veriexec_hook,
1387 (fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_dump, rarray);
1388 }
1389 mountlist_iterator_destroy(iter);
1390
1391 return (0);
1392 }
1393
1394 int
1395 veriexec_flush(struct lwp *l)
1396 {
1397 mount_iterator_t *iter;
1398 struct mount *mp;
1399 int error = 0;
1400
1401 mountlist_iterator_init(&iter);
1402 while ((mp = mountlist_iterator_next(iter)) != NULL) {
1403 int lerror;
1404
1405 lerror = veriexec_table_delete(l, mp);
1406 if (lerror && lerror != ENOENT)
1407 error = lerror;
1408 }
1409 mountlist_iterator_destroy(iter);
1410
1411 return (error);
1412 }
1413