kern_veriexec.c revision 1.20 1 /* $NetBSD: kern_veriexec.c,v 1.20 2019/04/28 21:36:19 alnsn Exp $ */
2
3 /*-
4 * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Elad Efrat <elad (at) NetBSD.org>
5 * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Brett Lymn <blymn (at) NetBSD.org>
6 * All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
12 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
16 * 3. The name of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote products
17 * derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
18 *
19 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
20 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
21 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
22 * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
23 * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
24 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
25 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
26 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
27 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
28 * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
29 */
30
31 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
32 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_veriexec.c,v 1.20 2019/04/28 21:36:19 alnsn Exp $");
33
34 #include "opt_veriexec.h"
35
36 #include <sys/param.h>
37 #include <sys/mount.h>
38 #include <sys/kmem.h>
39 #include <sys/vnode.h>
40 #include <sys/namei.h>
41 #include <sys/once.h>
42 #include <sys/proc.h>
43 #include <sys/rwlock.h>
44 #include <sys/syslog.h>
45 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
46 #include <sys/inttypes.h>
47 #include <sys/verified_exec.h>
48 #include <sys/sha1.h>
49 #include <sys/sha2.h>
50 #include <sys/rmd160.h>
51 #include <sys/md5.h>
52 #include <sys/fileassoc.h>
53 #include <sys/kauth.h>
54 #include <sys/conf.h>
55 #include <miscfs/specfs/specdev.h>
56 #include <prop/proplib.h>
57 #include <sys/fcntl.h>
58
59 /* Readable values for veriexec_file_report(). */
60 #define REPORT_ALWAYS 0x01 /* Always print */
61 #define REPORT_VERBOSE 0x02 /* Print when verbose >= 1 */
62 #define REPORT_DEBUG 0x04 /* Print when verbose >= 2 (debug) */
63 #define REPORT_PANIC 0x08 /* Call panic() */
64 #define REPORT_ALARM 0x10 /* Alarm - also print pid/uid/.. */
65 #define REPORT_LOGMASK (REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_VERBOSE|REPORT_DEBUG)
66
67 /* state of locking for veriexec_file_verify */
68 #define VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED 0x00 /* Nothing locked, callee does it */
69 #define VERIEXEC_LOCKED 0x01 /* Global op lock held */
70
71 /* state of file locking for veriexec_file_verify */
72 #define VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED 0x02 /* Nothing locked, callee does it */
73 #define VERIEXEC_FILE_LOCKED 0x04 /* File locked */
74
75 #define VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(lock) while((rw_tryupgrade(lock)) == 0){};
76
77 struct veriexec_fpops {
78 const char *type;
79 size_t hash_len;
80 size_t context_size;
81 veriexec_fpop_init_t init;
82 veriexec_fpop_update_t update;
83 veriexec_fpop_final_t final;
84 LIST_ENTRY(veriexec_fpops) entries;
85 };
86
87 /* Veriexec per-file entry data. */
88 struct veriexec_file_entry {
89 krwlock_t lock; /* r/w lock */
90 u_char *filename; /* File name. */
91 u_char type; /* Entry type. */
92 u_char status; /* Evaluation status. */
93 u_char *fp; /* Fingerprint. */
94 struct veriexec_fpops *ops; /* Fingerprint ops vector*/
95 size_t filename_len; /* Length of filename. */
96 };
97
98 /* Veriexec per-table data. */
99 struct veriexec_table_entry {
100 uint64_t vte_count; /* Number of Veriexec entries. */
101 const struct sysctlnode *vte_node;
102 };
103
104 static int veriexec_verbose;
105 static int veriexec_strict;
106 static int veriexec_bypass = 1;
107
108 static char *veriexec_fp_names = NULL;
109 static size_t veriexec_name_max = 0;
110
111 static const struct sysctlnode *veriexec_count_node;
112
113 static fileassoc_t veriexec_hook;
114 static specificdata_key_t veriexec_mountspecific_key;
115
116 static LIST_HEAD(, veriexec_fpops) veriexec_fpops_list =
117 LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(veriexec_fpops_list);
118
119 static int veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t, kauth_action_t, void *,
120 void *, void *, void *, void *);
121 static struct veriexec_fpops *veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *);
122 static void veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *);
123
124 static unsigned int veriexec_tablecount = 0;
125
126 /*
127 * Veriexec operations global lock - most ops hold this as a read
128 * lock, it is upgraded to a write lock when destroying veriexec file
129 * table entries.
130 */
131 static krwlock_t veriexec_op_lock;
132
133 /*
134 * Sysctl helper routine for Veriexec.
135 */
136 static int
137 sysctl_kern_veriexec_algorithms(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
138 {
139 size_t len;
140 int error;
141 const char *p;
142
143 if (newp != NULL)
144 return EPERM;
145
146 if (namelen != 0)
147 return EINVAL;
148
149 p = veriexec_fp_names == NULL ? "" : veriexec_fp_names;
150
151 len = strlen(p) + 1;
152
153 if (*oldlenp < len && oldp)
154 return ENOMEM;
155
156 if (oldp && (error = copyout(p, oldp, len)) != 0)
157 return error;
158
159 *oldlenp = len;
160 return 0;
161 }
162
163 static int
164 sysctl_kern_veriexec_strict(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
165 {
166 struct sysctlnode node;
167 int error, newval;
168
169 node = *rnode;
170 node.sysctl_data = &newval;
171
172 newval = veriexec_strict;
173 error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
174 if (error || newp == NULL)
175 return error;
176
177 if (newval < veriexec_strict)
178 return EPERM;
179
180 veriexec_strict = newval;
181
182 return 0;
183 }
184
185 SYSCTL_SETUP(sysctl_kern_veriexec_setup, "sysctl kern.veriexec setup")
186 {
187 const struct sysctlnode *rnode = NULL;
188
189 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, NULL, &rnode,
190 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
191 CTLTYPE_NODE, "veriexec",
192 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec"),
193 NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
194 CTL_KERN, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
195
196 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
197 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
198 CTLTYPE_INT, "verbose",
199 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec verbose level"),
200 NULL, 0, &veriexec_verbose, 0,
201 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
202 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
203 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
204 CTLTYPE_INT, "strict",
205 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec strict level"),
206 sysctl_kern_veriexec_strict, 0, NULL, 0,
207 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
208 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
209 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
210 CTLTYPE_STRING, "algorithms",
211 SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec supported hashing "
212 "algorithms"),
213 sysctl_kern_veriexec_algorithms, 0, NULL, 0,
214 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
215 sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, &veriexec_count_node,
216 CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
217 CTLTYPE_NODE, "count",
218 SYSCTL_DESCR("Number of fingerprints on mount(s)"),
219 NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
220 CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
221 }
222
223 /*
224 * Add ops to the fingerprint ops vector list.
225 */
226 int
227 veriexec_fpops_add(const char *fp_type, size_t hash_len, size_t ctx_size,
228 veriexec_fpop_init_t init, veriexec_fpop_update_t update,
229 veriexec_fpop_final_t final)
230 {
231 struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
232
233 KASSERT((init != NULL) && (update != NULL) && (final != NULL));
234 KASSERT((hash_len != 0) && (ctx_size != 0));
235 KASSERT(fp_type != NULL);
236
237 if (veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type) != NULL)
238 return (EEXIST);
239
240 ops = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*ops), KM_SLEEP);
241 ops->type = fp_type;
242 ops->hash_len = hash_len;
243 ops->context_size = ctx_size;
244 ops->init = init;
245 ops->update = update;
246 ops->final = final;
247
248 LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&veriexec_fpops_list, ops, entries);
249
250 /*
251 * If we don't have space for any names, allocate enough for six
252 * which should be sufficient. (it's also enough for all algorithms
253 * we can support at the moment)
254 */
255 if (veriexec_fp_names == NULL) {
256 veriexec_name_max = 64;
257 veriexec_fp_names = kmem_zalloc(veriexec_name_max, KM_SLEEP);
258 }
259
260 /*
261 * If we're running out of space for storing supported algorithms,
262 * extend the buffer with space for four names.
263 */
264 while (veriexec_name_max - (strlen(veriexec_fp_names) + 1) <
265 strlen(fp_type)) {
266 char *newp;
267 unsigned int new_max;
268
269 /* Add space for four algorithm names. */
270 new_max = veriexec_name_max + 64;
271 newp = kmem_zalloc(new_max, KM_SLEEP);
272 strlcpy(newp, veriexec_fp_names, new_max);
273 kmem_free(veriexec_fp_names, veriexec_name_max);
274 veriexec_fp_names = newp;
275 veriexec_name_max = new_max;
276 }
277
278 if (*veriexec_fp_names != '\0')
279 strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, " ", veriexec_name_max);
280
281 strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, fp_type, veriexec_name_max);
282
283 return (0);
284 }
285
286 static void
287 veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(void *v)
288 {
289 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte = v;
290
291 if (vte == NULL) {
292 return;
293 }
294 sysctl_free(__UNCONST(vte->vte_node));
295 veriexec_tablecount--;
296 kmem_free(vte, sizeof(*vte));
297 }
298
299 static int
300 veriexec_listener_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
301 void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
302 {
303 int result;
304 enum kauth_system_req req;
305
306 if (action != KAUTH_SYSTEM_VERIEXEC)
307 return KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
308
309 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
310 req = (enum kauth_system_req)arg0;
311
312 if (req == KAUTH_REQ_SYSTEM_VERIEXEC_MODIFY &&
313 veriexec_strict > VERIEXEC_LEARNING) {
314 log(LOG_WARNING, "Veriexec: Strict mode, modifying "
315 "tables not permitted.\n");
316
317 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
318 }
319
320 return result;
321 }
322
323 /*
324 * Initialise Veriexec.
325 */
326 void
327 veriexec_init(void)
328 {
329 int error;
330
331 /* Register a fileassoc for Veriexec. */
332 error = fileassoc_register("veriexec",
333 (fileassoc_cleanup_cb_t)veriexec_file_free, &veriexec_hook);
334 if (error)
335 panic("Veriexec: Can't register fileassoc: error=%d", error);
336
337 /* Register listener to handle raw disk access. */
338 if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_DEVICE, veriexec_raw_cb, NULL) ==
339 NULL)
340 panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on device scope");
341
342 error = mount_specific_key_create(&veriexec_mountspecific_key,
343 veriexec_mountspecific_dtor);
344 if (error)
345 panic("Veriexec: Can't create mountspecific key");
346
347 if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_SYSTEM, veriexec_listener_cb,
348 NULL) == NULL)
349 panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on system scope");
350
351 rw_init(&veriexec_op_lock);
352
353 #define FPOPS_ADD(a, b, c, d, e, f) \
354 veriexec_fpops_add(a, b, c, (veriexec_fpop_init_t)d, \
355 (veriexec_fpop_update_t)e, (veriexec_fpop_final_t)f)
356
357 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256
358 FPOPS_ADD("SHA256", SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
359 SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final);
360 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256 */
361
362 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384
363 FPOPS_ADD("SHA384", SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
364 SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final);
365 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384 */
366
367 #ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512
368 FPOPS_ADD("SHA512", SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
369 SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update, SHA512_Final);
370 #endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512 */
371
372 #undef FPOPS_ADD
373 }
374
375 static struct veriexec_fpops *
376 veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *name)
377 {
378 struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
379
380 if (name == NULL)
381 return (NULL);
382
383 LIST_FOREACH(ops, &veriexec_fpops_list, entries) {
384 if (strcasecmp(name, ops->type) == 0)
385 return (ops);
386 }
387
388 return (NULL);
389 }
390
391 /*
392 * Calculate fingerprint. Information on hash length and routines used is
393 * extracted from veriexec_hash_list according to the hash type.
394 *
395 * NOTE: vfe is assumed to be locked for writing on entry.
396 */
397 static int
398 veriexec_fp_calc(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, int file_lock_state,
399 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, u_char *fp)
400 {
401 struct vattr va;
402 void *ctx;
403 u_char *buf;
404 off_t offset, len;
405 size_t resid;
406 int error;
407
408 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
409 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
410
411 if (file_lock_state == VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED)
412 vn_lock(vp, LK_SHARED | LK_RETRY);
413 error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, l->l_cred);
414 if (file_lock_state == VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED)
415 VOP_UNLOCK(vp);
416 if (error)
417 return (error);
418
419 ctx = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->context_size, KM_SLEEP);
420 buf = kmem_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, KM_SLEEP);
421
422 (vfe->ops->init)(ctx);
423
424 len = 0;
425 error = 0;
426 for (offset = 0; offset < va.va_size; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
427 len = ((va.va_size - offset) < PAGE_SIZE) ?
428 (va.va_size - offset) : PAGE_SIZE;
429
430 error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, buf, len, offset,
431 UIO_SYSSPACE,
432 ((file_lock_state == VERIEXEC_FILE_LOCKED)?
433 IO_NODELOCKED : 0),
434 l->l_cred, &resid, NULL);
435
436 if (error) {
437 goto bad;
438 }
439
440 (vfe->ops->update)(ctx, buf, (unsigned int) len);
441
442 if (len != PAGE_SIZE)
443 break;
444 }
445
446 (vfe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
447
448 bad:
449 kmem_free(ctx, vfe->ops->context_size);
450 kmem_free(buf, PAGE_SIZE);
451
452 return (error);
453 }
454
455 /* Compare two fingerprints of the same type. */
456 static int
457 veriexec_fp_cmp(struct veriexec_fpops *ops, u_char *fp1, u_char *fp2)
458 {
459 if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
460 int i;
461
462 printf("comparing hashes...\n");
463 printf("fp1: ");
464 for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
465 printf("%02x", fp1[i]);
466 }
467 printf("\nfp2: ");
468 for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
469 printf("%02x", fp2[i]);
470 }
471 printf("\n");
472 }
473
474 return (memcmp(fp1, fp2, ops->hash_len));
475 }
476
477 static int
478 veriexec_fp_status(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, int file_lock_state,
479 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, u_char *status)
480 {
481 size_t hash_len = vfe->ops->hash_len;
482 u_char *digest;
483 int error;
484
485 digest = kmem_zalloc(hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
486
487 error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, vp, file_lock_state, vfe, digest);
488 if (error)
489 goto out;
490
491 /* Compare fingerprint with loaded data. */
492 if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, vfe->fp, digest) == 0)
493 *status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
494 else
495 *status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
496
497 out:
498 kmem_free(digest, hash_len);
499 return error;
500 }
501
502
503 static struct veriexec_table_entry *
504 veriexec_table_lookup(struct mount *mp)
505 {
506 /* XXX: From raidframe init */
507 if (mp == NULL)
508 return NULL;
509
510 return mount_getspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key);
511 }
512
513 static struct veriexec_file_entry *
514 veriexec_get(struct vnode *vp)
515 {
516 return (fileassoc_lookup(vp, veriexec_hook));
517 }
518
519 bool
520 veriexec_lookup(struct vnode *vp)
521 {
522 return (veriexec_get(vp) == NULL ? false : true);
523 }
524
525 /*
526 * Routine for maintaining mostly consistent message formats in Veriexec.
527 */
528 static void
529 veriexec_file_report(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, const u_char *msg,
530 const u_char *filename, struct lwp *l, int f)
531 {
532 if (vfe != NULL && vfe->filename != NULL)
533 filename = vfe->filename;
534 if (filename == NULL)
535 return;
536
537 if (((f & REPORT_LOGMASK) >> 1) <= veriexec_verbose) {
538 if (!(f & REPORT_ALARM) || (l == NULL))
539 log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s [%s]\n", msg,
540 filename);
541 else
542 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: %s [%s, prog=%s pid=%u, "
543 "uid=%u, gid=%u]\n", msg, filename,
544 l->l_proc->p_comm, l->l_proc->p_pid,
545 kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred),
546 kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred));
547 }
548
549 if (f & REPORT_PANIC)
550 panic("Veriexec: Unrecoverable error.");
551 }
552
553 /*
554 * Verify the fingerprint of the given file. If we're called directly from
555 * sys_execve(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_DIRECT. If we're called from
556 * exec_script(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_INDIRECT. If we are called from
557 * vn_open(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_FILE.
558 *
559 * 'veriexec_op_lock' must be locked (and remains locked).
560 *
561 * NOTE: The veriexec file entry pointer (vfep) will be returned LOCKED
562 * on no error.
563 */
564 static int
565 veriexec_file_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name,
566 int flag, int file_lock_state, struct veriexec_file_entry **vfep)
567 {
568 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
569 int error = 0;
570
571 KASSERT(rw_lock_held(&veriexec_op_lock));
572 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
573 KASSERT(file_lock_state != VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
574
575 #define VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe) ((vfe->status == FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL) || \
576 (vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED))
577
578 if (vfep != NULL)
579 *vfep = NULL;
580
581 if (vp->v_type != VREG)
582 return (0);
583
584 /* Lookup veriexec table entry, save pointer if requested. */
585 vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
586 if (vfep != NULL)
587 *vfep = vfe;
588
589 /* No entry in the veriexec tables. */
590 if (vfe == NULL) {
591 veriexec_file_report(NULL, "No entry.", name,
592 l, REPORT_VERBOSE);
593
594 /*
595 * Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files.
596 * IPS mode: Deny execution of non-monitored files.
597 */
598 if ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) ||
599 ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) &&
600 (flag != VERIEXEC_FILE)))
601 return (EPERM);
602
603 return (0);
604 }
605
606 /*
607 * Grab the lock for the entry, if we need to do an evaluation
608 * then the lock is a write lock, after we have the write
609 * lock, check if we really need it - some other thread may
610 * have already done the work for us.
611 */
612 if (VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe)) {
613 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_WRITER);
614 if (!VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe))
615 rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
616 } else
617 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_READER);
618
619 /* Evaluate fingerprint if needed. */
620 if (VFE_NEEDS_EVAL(vfe)) {
621 u_char status;
622
623 error = veriexec_fp_status(l, vp, file_lock_state, vfe, &status);
624 if (error) {
625 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Fingerprint calculation error.",
626 name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS);
627 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
628 return (error);
629 }
630 vfe->status = status;
631 rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
632 }
633
634 if (!(vfe->type & flag)) {
635 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Incorrect access type.", name, l,
636 REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
637
638 /* IPS mode: Enforce access type. */
639 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
640 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
641 return (EPERM);
642 }
643 }
644
645 switch (vfe->status) {
646 case FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL:
647 /* Should not happen. */
648 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
649 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Not-evaluated status "
650 "post evaluation; inconsistency detected.", name,
651 NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
652 __builtin_unreachable();
653 /* NOTREACHED */
654
655 case FINGERPRINT_VALID:
656 /* Valid fingerprint. */
657 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Match.", name, NULL,
658 REPORT_VERBOSE);
659
660 break;
661
662 case FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH:
663 /* Fingerprint mismatch. */
664 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Mismatch.", name,
665 NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
666
667 /* IDS mode: Deny access on fingerprint mismatch. */
668 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS) {
669 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
670 error = EPERM;
671 }
672
673 break;
674
675 default:
676 /* Should never happen. */
677 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
678 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Invalid status "
679 "post evaluation.", name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
680 /* NOTREACHED */
681 }
682
683 return (error);
684 }
685
686 int
687 veriexec_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name, int flag,
688 bool *found)
689 {
690 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
691 int r;
692
693 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
694 return 0;
695
696 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
697 r = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, name, flag, VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED,
698 &vfe);
699 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
700
701 if ((r == 0) && (vfe != NULL))
702 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
703
704 if (found != NULL)
705 *found = (vfe != NULL) ? true : false;
706
707 return (r);
708 }
709
710 /*
711 * Veriexec remove policy code.
712 */
713 int
714 veriexec_removechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *pathbuf)
715 {
716 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
717 int error;
718
719 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
720 return 0;
721
722 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
723 vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
724 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
725
726 if (vfe == NULL) {
727 /* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files. */
728 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN)
729 return (EPERM);
730
731 return (0);
732 }
733
734 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Remove request.", pathbuf, l,
735 REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
736
737 /* IDS mode: Deny removal of monitored files. */
738 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS)
739 error = EPERM;
740 else
741 error = veriexec_file_delete(l, vp);
742
743 return error;
744 }
745
746 /*
747 * Veriexec rename policy.
748 *
749 * XXX: Once there's a way to hook after a successful rename, it would be
750 * XXX: nice to update vfe->filename to the new name if it's not NULL and
751 * XXX: the new name is absolute (ie., starts with a slash).
752 */
753 int
754 veriexec_renamechk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *fromvp, const char *fromname,
755 struct vnode *tovp, const char *toname)
756 {
757 struct veriexec_file_entry *fvfe = NULL, *tvfe = NULL;
758
759 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
760 return 0;
761
762 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
763
764 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
765 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' to "
766 "`%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: Lockdown mode.\n", fromname, toname,
767 kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
768 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
769 return (EPERM);
770 }
771
772 fvfe = veriexec_get(fromvp);
773 if (tovp != NULL)
774 tvfe = veriexec_get(tovp);
775
776 if ((fvfe == NULL) && (tvfe == NULL)) {
777 /* None of them is monitored */
778 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
779 return 0;
780 }
781
782 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
783 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' "
784 "to `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: IPS mode, %s "
785 "monitored.\n", fromname, toname,
786 kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred),
787 l->l_proc->p_pid, (fvfe != NULL && tvfe != NULL) ?
788 "files" : "file");
789 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
790 return (EPERM);
791 }
792
793 if (fvfe != NULL) {
794 /*
795 * Monitored file is renamed; filename no longer relevant.
796 */
797
798 /*
799 * XXX: We could keep the buffer, and when (and if) updating the
800 * XXX: filename post-rename, re-allocate it only if it's not
801 * XXX: big enough for the new filename.
802 */
803
804 /* XXX: Get write lock on fvfe here? */
805
806 VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(&veriexec_op_lock);
807 /* once we have the op lock in write mode
808 * there should be no locks on any file
809 * entries so we can destroy the object.
810 */
811
812 if (fvfe->filename_len > 0)
813 kmem_free(fvfe->filename, fvfe->filename_len);
814
815 fvfe->filename = NULL;
816 fvfe->filename_len = 0;
817
818 rw_downgrade(&veriexec_op_lock);
819 }
820
821 log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s file `%s' renamed to "
822 "%s file `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u.\n", (fvfe != NULL) ?
823 "Monitored" : "Non-monitored", fromname, (tvfe != NULL) ?
824 "monitored" : "non-monitored", toname,
825 kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
826
827 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
828
829 if (tvfe != NULL) {
830 /*
831 * Monitored file is overwritten. Remove the entry.
832 */
833 (void)veriexec_file_delete(l, tovp);
834 }
835
836 return (0);
837 }
838
839 static void
840 veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe)
841 {
842 if (vfe != NULL) {
843 if (vfe->fp != NULL)
844 kmem_free(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len);
845 if (vfe->filename != NULL)
846 kmem_free(vfe->filename, vfe->filename_len);
847 rw_destroy(&vfe->lock);
848 kmem_free(vfe, sizeof(*vfe));
849 }
850 }
851
852 static void
853 veriexec_file_purge(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, int have_lock)
854 {
855 if (vfe == NULL)
856 return;
857
858 if (have_lock == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
859 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_WRITER);
860 else
861 VERIEXEC_RW_UPGRADE(&vfe->lock);
862
863 vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
864 if (have_lock == VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED)
865 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
866 else
867 rw_downgrade(&vfe->lock);
868 }
869
870 static void
871 veriexec_file_purge_cb(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, void *cookie)
872 {
873 veriexec_file_purge(vfe, VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
874 }
875
876 /*
877 * Invalidate a Veriexec file entry.
878 * XXX: This should be updated when per-page fingerprints are added.
879 */
880 void
881 veriexec_purge(struct vnode *vp)
882 {
883 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
884 veriexec_file_purge(veriexec_get(vp), VERIEXEC_UNLOCKED);
885 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
886 }
887
888 /*
889 * Enforce raw disk access policy.
890 *
891 * IDS mode: Invalidate fingerprints on a mount if it's opened for writing.
892 * IPS mode: Don't allow raw writing to disks we monitor.
893 * Lockdown mode: Don't allow raw writing to all disks.
894 *
895 * XXX: This is bogus. There's an obvious race condition between the time
896 * XXX: the disk is open for writing, in which an attacker can access a
897 * XXX: monitored file to get its signature cached again, and when the raw
898 * XXX: file is overwritten on disk.
899 * XXX:
900 * XXX: To solve this, we need something like the following:
901 * XXX: open raw disk:
902 * XXX: - raise refcount,
903 * XXX: - invalidate fingerprints,
904 * XXX: - mark all entries for that disk with "no cache" flag
905 * XXX:
906 * XXX: veriexec_verify:
907 * XXX: - if "no cache", don't cache evaluation result
908 * XXX:
909 * XXX: close raw disk:
910 * XXX: - lower refcount,
911 * XXX: - if refcount == 0, remove "no cache" flag from all entries
912 */
913 static int
914 veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
915 void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
916 {
917 int result;
918 enum kauth_device_req req;
919 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
920
921 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
922 req = (enum kauth_device_req)arg0;
923
924 switch (action) {
925 case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC: {
926 struct vnode *vp, *bvp;
927 int error;
928
929 if (req == KAUTH_REQ_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC_READ) {
930 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
931 break;
932 }
933
934 vp = arg1;
935 KASSERT(vp != NULL);
936
937 /* Handle /dev/mem and /dev/kmem. */
938 if (iskmemvp(vp)) {
939 if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
940 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
941
942 break;
943 }
944
945 error = rawdev_mounted(vp, &bvp);
946 if (error == EINVAL) {
947 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
948 break;
949 }
950
951 /*
952 * XXX: See vfs_mountedon() comment in rawdev_mounted().
953 */
954 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(bvp->v_mount);
955 if (vte == NULL) {
956 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
957 break;
958 }
959
960 switch (veriexec_strict) {
961 case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
962 case VERIEXEC_IDS:
963 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
964
965 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
966 fileassoc_table_run(bvp->v_mount, veriexec_hook,
967 (fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_purge_cb, NULL);
968 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
969
970 break;
971 case VERIEXEC_IPS:
972 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
973 break;
974 case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
975 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
976 break;
977 }
978
979 break;
980 }
981
982 case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_PASSTHRU:
983 /* XXX What can we do here? */
984 if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
985 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
986
987 break;
988
989 default:
990 result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
991 break;
992 }
993
994 return (result);
995 }
996
997 /*
998 * Create a new Veriexec table.
999 */
1000 static struct veriexec_table_entry *
1001 veriexec_table_add(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp)
1002 {
1003 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1004 u_char buf[16];
1005
1006 vte = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*vte), KM_SLEEP);
1007 mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, vte);
1008
1009 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "table%u", veriexec_tablecount++);
1010 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &veriexec_count_node, &vte->vte_node,
1011 0, CTLTYPE_NODE, buf, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
1012 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1013
1014 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
1015 CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "mntpt",
1016 NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname,
1017 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1018 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
1019 CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "fstype",
1020 NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_fstypename,
1021 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1022 sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
1023 CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_QUAD, "nentries",
1024 NULL, NULL, 0, &vte->vte_count, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
1025
1026 return (vte);
1027 }
1028
1029 /*
1030 * Add a file to be monitored by Veriexec.
1031 *
1032 * Expected elements in dict:
1033 * file, fp, fp-type, entry-type, keep-filename, eval-on-load.
1034 */
1035 int
1036 veriexec_file_add(struct lwp *l, prop_dictionary_t dict)
1037 {
1038 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1039 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL;
1040 struct veriexec_file_entry *ovfe;
1041 struct vnode *vp;
1042 const char *file, *fp_type;
1043 int error;
1044 bool ignore_dup = false;
1045
1046 if (!prop_dictionary_get_cstring_nocopy(dict, "file", &file))
1047 return (EINVAL);
1048
1049 error = namei_simple_kernel(file, NSM_FOLLOW_NOEMULROOT, &vp);
1050 if (error)
1051 return (error);
1052
1053 /* Add only regular files. */
1054 if (vp->v_type != VREG) {
1055 log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Not adding `%s': Not a regular file.\n",
1056 file);
1057 error = EBADF;
1058 goto out;
1059 }
1060
1061 vfe = kmem_zalloc(sizeof(*vfe), KM_SLEEP);
1062 rw_init(&vfe->lock);
1063
1064 /* Lookup fingerprint hashing algorithm. */
1065 fp_type = prop_string_cstring_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict,
1066 "fp-type"));
1067 if ((vfe->ops = veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type)) == NULL) {
1068 log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Invalid or unknown fingerprint type "
1069 "`%s' for file `%s'.\n", fp_type, file);
1070 error = EOPNOTSUPP;
1071 goto out;
1072 }
1073
1074 if (prop_data_size(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")) !=
1075 vfe->ops->hash_len) {
1076 log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Bad fingerprint length for `%s'.\n",
1077 file);
1078 error = EINVAL;
1079 goto out;
1080 }
1081
1082 vfe->fp = kmem_alloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, KM_SLEEP);
1083 memcpy(vfe->fp, prop_data_data_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")),
1084 vfe->ops->hash_len);
1085
1086 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
1087
1088 /* Continue entry initialization. */
1089 if (prop_dictionary_get_uint8(dict, "entry-type", &vfe->type) == FALSE)
1090 vfe->type = 0;
1091 else {
1092 uint8_t extra_flags;
1093
1094 extra_flags = vfe->type & ~(VERIEXEC_DIRECT |
1095 VERIEXEC_INDIRECT | VERIEXEC_FILE | VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED);
1096 if (extra_flags) {
1097 log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: Contaminated flags `0x%x' "
1098 "for `%s', skipping.\n", extra_flags, file);
1099 error = EINVAL;
1100 goto unlock_out;
1101 }
1102 }
1103 if (!(vfe->type & (VERIEXEC_DIRECT | VERIEXEC_INDIRECT |
1104 VERIEXEC_FILE)))
1105 vfe->type |= VERIEXEC_DIRECT;
1106
1107 vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
1108 if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "keep-filename"))) {
1109 vfe->filename = kmem_strdupsize(file, &vfe->filename_len,
1110 KM_SLEEP);
1111 } else
1112 vfe->filename = NULL;
1113
1114 if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "eval-on-load")) ||
1115 (vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED)) {
1116 u_char status;
1117
1118 error = veriexec_fp_status(l, vp, VERIEXEC_FILE_UNLOCKED,
1119 vfe, &status);
1120 if (error)
1121 goto unlock_out;
1122 vfe->status = status;
1123 }
1124
1125 /*
1126 * If we already have an entry for this file, and it matches
1127 * the new entry exactly (except for the filename, which may
1128 * hard-linked!), we just ignore the new entry. If the new
1129 * entry differs, report the error.
1130 */
1131 if ((ovfe = veriexec_get(vp)) != NULL) {
1132 error = EEXIST;
1133 if (vfe->type == ovfe->type &&
1134 vfe->status == ovfe->status &&
1135 vfe->ops == ovfe->ops &&
1136 memcmp(vfe->fp, ovfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len) == 0)
1137 ignore_dup = true;
1138 goto unlock_out;
1139 }
1140
1141 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
1142 if (vte == NULL)
1143 vte = veriexec_table_add(l, vp->v_mount);
1144
1145 /* XXX if we bail below this, we might want to gc newly created vtes. */
1146
1147 error = fileassoc_add(vp, veriexec_hook, vfe);
1148 if (error)
1149 goto unlock_out;
1150
1151 vte->vte_count++;
1152
1153 veriexec_file_report(NULL, "New entry.", file, NULL, REPORT_DEBUG);
1154 veriexec_bypass = 0;
1155
1156 unlock_out:
1157 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1158
1159 out:
1160 vrele(vp);
1161 if (error)
1162 veriexec_file_free(vfe);
1163
1164 if (ignore_dup && error == EEXIST)
1165 error = 0;
1166
1167 return (error);
1168 }
1169
1170 int
1171 veriexec_table_delete(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp)
1172 {
1173 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1174
1175 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
1176 if (vte == NULL)
1177 return (ENOENT);
1178
1179 veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(vte);
1180 mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, NULL);
1181
1182 return (fileassoc_table_clear(mp, veriexec_hook));
1183 }
1184
1185 int
1186 veriexec_file_delete(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp)
1187 {
1188 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1189 int error;
1190
1191 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
1192 if (vte == NULL)
1193 return (ENOENT);
1194
1195 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_WRITER);
1196 error = fileassoc_clear(vp, veriexec_hook);
1197 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1198 if (!error) {
1199 KASSERT(vte->vte_count > 0);
1200 vte->vte_count--;
1201 }
1202
1203 return (error);
1204 }
1205
1206 /*
1207 * Convert Veriexec entry data to a dictionary readable by userland tools.
1208 */
1209 static void
1210 veriexec_file_convert(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
1211 {
1212 if (vfe->filename)
1213 prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "file",
1214 prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->filename));
1215 prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "entry-type", vfe->type);
1216 prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "status", vfe->status);
1217 prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp-type",
1218 prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->ops->type));
1219 prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp",
1220 prop_data_create_data(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len));
1221 }
1222
1223 int
1224 veriexec_convert(struct vnode *vp, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
1225 {
1226 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
1227
1228 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
1229
1230 vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
1231 if (vfe == NULL) {
1232 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1233 return (ENOENT);
1234 }
1235
1236 rw_enter(&vfe->lock, RW_READER);
1237 veriexec_file_convert(vfe, rdict);
1238 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
1239
1240 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1241 return (0);
1242 }
1243
1244 int
1245 veriexec_unmountchk(struct mount *mp)
1246 {
1247 int error;
1248
1249 if ((veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
1250 || doing_shutdown)
1251 return (0);
1252
1253 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
1254
1255 switch (veriexec_strict) {
1256 case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
1257 error = 0;
1258 break;
1259
1260 case VERIEXEC_IDS:
1261 if (veriexec_table_lookup(mp) != NULL) {
1262 log(LOG_INFO, "Veriexec: IDS mode, allowing unmount "
1263 "of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
1264 }
1265
1266 error = 0;
1267 break;
1268
1269 case VERIEXEC_IPS: {
1270 struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
1271
1272 vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
1273 if ((vte != NULL) && (vte->vte_count > 0)) {
1274 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: IPS mode, preventing"
1275 " unmount of \"%s\" with monitored files.\n",
1276 mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
1277
1278 error = EPERM;
1279 } else
1280 error = 0;
1281 break;
1282 }
1283
1284 case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
1285 default:
1286 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Lockdown mode, preventing unmount "
1287 "of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
1288 error = EPERM;
1289 break;
1290 }
1291
1292 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1293 return (error);
1294 }
1295
1296 int
1297 veriexec_openchk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int fmode)
1298 {
1299 struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL;
1300 int error = 0;
1301
1302 if (veriexec_bypass && (veriexec_strict == VERIEXEC_LEARNING))
1303 return 0;
1304
1305 if (vp == NULL) {
1306 /* If no creation requested, let this fail normally. */
1307 if (!(fmode & O_CREAT))
1308 goto out;
1309
1310 /* Lockdown mode: Prevent creation of new files. */
1311 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
1312 log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing new file "
1313 "creation in `%s'.\n", path);
1314 error = EPERM;
1315 }
1316
1317 goto out;
1318 }
1319
1320 rw_enter(&veriexec_op_lock, RW_READER);
1321 error = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, path, VERIEXEC_FILE,
1322 VERIEXEC_FILE_LOCKED, &vfe);
1323
1324 if (error) {
1325 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1326 goto out;
1327 }
1328
1329 if ((vfe != NULL) && ((fmode & FWRITE) || (fmode & O_TRUNC))) {
1330 veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Write access request.", path, l,
1331 REPORT_ALWAYS | REPORT_ALARM);
1332
1333 /* IPS mode: Deny write access to monitored files. */
1334 if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS)
1335 error = EPERM;
1336 else
1337 veriexec_file_purge(vfe, VERIEXEC_LOCKED);
1338 }
1339
1340 if (vfe != NULL)
1341 rw_exit(&vfe->lock);
1342
1343 rw_exit(&veriexec_op_lock);
1344 out:
1345 return (error);
1346 }
1347
1348 static void
1349 veriexec_file_dump(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_array_t entries)
1350 {
1351 prop_dictionary_t entry;
1352
1353 /* If we don't have a filename, this is meaningless. */
1354 if (vfe->filename == NULL)
1355 return;
1356
1357 entry = prop_dictionary_create();
1358
1359 veriexec_file_convert(vfe, entry);
1360
1361 prop_array_add(entries, entry);
1362 }
1363
1364 int
1365 veriexec_dump(struct lwp *l, prop_array_t rarray)
1366 {
1367 mount_iterator_t *iter;
1368 struct mount *mp;
1369
1370 mountlist_iterator_init(&iter);
1371 while ((mp = mountlist_iterator_next(iter)) != NULL) {
1372 fileassoc_table_run(mp, veriexec_hook,
1373 (fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_dump, rarray);
1374 }
1375 mountlist_iterator_destroy(iter);
1376
1377 return (0);
1378 }
1379
1380 int
1381 veriexec_flush(struct lwp *l)
1382 {
1383 mount_iterator_t *iter;
1384 struct mount *mp;
1385 int error = 0;
1386
1387 mountlist_iterator_init(&iter);
1388 while ((mp = mountlist_iterator_next(iter)) != NULL) {
1389 int lerror;
1390
1391 lerror = veriexec_table_delete(l, mp);
1392 if (lerror && lerror != ENOENT)
1393 error = lerror;
1394 }
1395 mountlist_iterator_destroy(iter);
1396
1397 return (error);
1398 }
1399