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subr_cprng.c revision 1.30.2.4
      1 /*	$NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.30.2.4 2020/05/18 18:57:31 martin Exp $ */
      2 
      3 /*-
      4  * Copyright (c) 2011-2013 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
      5  * All rights reserved.
      6  *
      7  * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
      8  * by Thor Lancelot Simon and Taylor R. Campbell.
      9  *
     10  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
     11  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
     12  * are met:
     13  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
     14  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
     15  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
     16  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
     17  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
     18  *
     19  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
     20  * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
     21  * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
     22  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
     23  * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
     24  * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
     25  * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
     26  * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
     27  * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
     28  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
     29  * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
     30  */
     31 
     32 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
     33 __KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: subr_cprng.c,v 1.30.2.4 2020/05/18 18:57:31 martin Exp $");
     34 
     35 #include <sys/param.h>
     36 #include <sys/types.h>
     37 #include <sys/condvar.h>
     38 #include <sys/cprng.h>
     39 #include <sys/errno.h>
     40 #include <sys/event.h>		/* XXX struct knote */
     41 #include <sys/fcntl.h>		/* XXX FNONBLOCK */
     42 #include <sys/kernel.h>
     43 #include <sys/kmem.h>
     44 #include <sys/lwp.h>
     45 #include <sys/once.h>
     46 #include <sys/percpu.h>
     47 #include <sys/poll.h>		/* XXX POLLIN/POLLOUT/&c. */
     48 #include <sys/select.h>
     49 #include <sys/systm.h>
     50 #include <sys/sysctl.h>
     51 #include <sys/rndsink.h>
     52 
     53 #include <crypto/nist_hash_drbg/nist_hash_drbg.h>
     54 
     55 #if defined(__HAVE_CPU_COUNTER)
     56 #include <machine/cpu_counter.h>
     57 #endif
     58 
     59 static int sysctl_kern_urnd(SYSCTLFN_PROTO);
     60 static int sysctl_kern_arnd(SYSCTLFN_PROTO);
     61 
     62 static void	cprng_strong_generate(struct cprng_strong *, void *, size_t);
     63 static void	cprng_strong_reseed(struct cprng_strong *);
     64 static void	cprng_strong_reseed_from(struct cprng_strong *, const void *,
     65 		    size_t, bool);
     66 
     67 static rndsink_callback_t	cprng_strong_rndsink_callback;
     68 
     69 void
     70 cprng_init(void)
     71 {
     72 	static struct sysctllog *random_sysctllog;
     73 
     74 	if (nist_hash_drbg_initialize() != 0)
     75 		panic("NIST Hash_DRBG failed self-test");
     76 
     77 	sysctl_createv(&random_sysctllog, 0, NULL, NULL,
     78 		       CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
     79 		       CTLTYPE_INT, "urandom",
     80 		       SYSCTL_DESCR("Random integer value"),
     81 		       sysctl_kern_urnd, 0, NULL, 0,
     82 		       CTL_KERN, KERN_URND, CTL_EOL);
     83 	sysctl_createv(&random_sysctllog, 0, NULL, NULL,
     84 		       CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
     85 		       CTLTYPE_INT, "arandom",
     86 		       SYSCTL_DESCR("n bytes of random data"),
     87 		       sysctl_kern_arnd, 0, NULL, 0,
     88 		       CTL_KERN, KERN_ARND, CTL_EOL);
     89 }
     90 
     91 static inline uint32_t
     92 cprng_counter(void)
     93 {
     94 	struct timeval tv;
     95 
     96 #if defined(__HAVE_CPU_COUNTER)
     97 	if (cpu_hascounter())
     98 		return cpu_counter32();
     99 #endif
    100 	if (__predict_false(cold)) {
    101 		static int ctr;
    102 		/* microtime unsafe if clock not running yet */
    103 		return ctr++;
    104 	}
    105 	getmicrotime(&tv);
    106 	return (tv.tv_sec * 1000000 + tv.tv_usec);
    107 }
    108 
    109 struct cprng_strong {
    110 	char		cs_name[16];
    111 	int		cs_flags;
    112 	kmutex_t	cs_lock;
    113 	percpu_t	*cs_percpu;
    114 	kcondvar_t	cs_cv;
    115 	struct selinfo	cs_selq;
    116 	struct rndsink	*cs_rndsink;
    117 	bool		cs_ready;
    118 	NIST_HASH_DRBG	cs_drbg;
    119 
    120 	/* XXX Kludge for /dev/random `information-theoretic' properties.   */
    121 	unsigned int	cs_remaining;
    122 };
    123 
    124 struct cprng_strong *
    125 cprng_strong_create(const char *name, int ipl, int flags)
    126 {
    127 	const uint32_t cc = cprng_counter();
    128 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kmem_alloc(sizeof(*cprng),
    129 	    KM_SLEEP);
    130 
    131 	/*
    132 	 * rndsink_request takes a spin lock at IPL_VM, so we can be no
    133 	 * higher than that.
    134 	 */
    135 	KASSERT(ipl != IPL_SCHED && ipl != IPL_HIGH);
    136 
    137 	/* Initialize the easy fields.  */
    138 	memset(cprng->cs_name, 0, sizeof(cprng->cs_name));
    139 	(void)strlcpy(cprng->cs_name, name, sizeof(cprng->cs_name));
    140 	cprng->cs_flags = flags;
    141 	mutex_init(&cprng->cs_lock, MUTEX_DEFAULT, ipl);
    142 	cv_init(&cprng->cs_cv, cprng->cs_name);
    143 	selinit(&cprng->cs_selq);
    144 	cprng->cs_rndsink = rndsink_create(NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES,
    145 	    &cprng_strong_rndsink_callback, cprng);
    146 
    147 	/* Get some initial entropy.  Record whether it is full entropy.  */
    148 	uint8_t seed[NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES];
    149 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    150 	cprng->cs_ready = rndsink_request(cprng->cs_rndsink, seed,
    151 	    sizeof(seed));
    152 	if (nist_hash_drbg_instantiate(&cprng->cs_drbg, seed, sizeof(seed),
    153 		&cc, sizeof(cc), cprng->cs_name, sizeof(cprng->cs_name)))
    154 		/* XXX Fix nist_hash_drbg API so this can't happen.  */
    155 		panic("cprng %s: NIST Hash_DRBG instantiation failed",
    156 		    cprng->cs_name);
    157 	explicit_memset(seed, 0, sizeof(seed));
    158 
    159 	if (ISSET(flags, CPRNG_HARD))
    160 		cprng->cs_remaining = NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES;
    161 	else
    162 		cprng->cs_remaining = 0;
    163 
    164 	if (!cprng->cs_ready && !ISSET(flags, CPRNG_INIT_ANY))
    165 		printf("cprng %s: creating with partial entropy\n",
    166 		    cprng->cs_name);
    167 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    168 
    169 	return cprng;
    170 }
    171 
    172 void
    173 cprng_strong_destroy(struct cprng_strong *cprng)
    174 {
    175 
    176 	/*
    177 	 * Destroy the rndsink first to prevent calls to the callback.
    178 	 */
    179 	rndsink_destroy(cprng->cs_rndsink);
    180 
    181 	KASSERT(!cv_has_waiters(&cprng->cs_cv));
    182 #if 0
    183 	KASSERT(!select_has_waiters(&cprng->cs_selq)) /* XXX ? */
    184 #endif
    185 
    186 	nist_hash_drbg_destroy(&cprng->cs_drbg);
    187 	seldestroy(&cprng->cs_selq);
    188 	cv_destroy(&cprng->cs_cv);
    189 	mutex_destroy(&cprng->cs_lock);
    190 
    191 	explicit_memset(cprng, 0, sizeof(*cprng)); /* paranoia */
    192 	kmem_free(cprng, sizeof(*cprng));
    193 }
    194 
    195 /*
    196  * Generate some data from cprng.  Block or return zero bytes,
    197  * depending on flags & FNONBLOCK, if cprng was created without
    198  * CPRNG_REKEY_ANY.
    199  */
    200 size_t
    201 cprng_strong(struct cprng_strong *cprng, void *buffer, size_t bytes, int flags)
    202 {
    203 	size_t result;
    204 
    205 	/* Caller must loop for more than CPRNG_MAX_LEN bytes.  */
    206 	bytes = MIN(bytes, CPRNG_MAX_LEN);
    207 
    208 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    209 
    210 	if (ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_REKEY_ANY)) {
    211 		if (!cprng->cs_ready)
    212 			cprng_strong_reseed(cprng);
    213 	} else {
    214 		while (!cprng->cs_ready) {
    215 			if (ISSET(flags, FNONBLOCK) ||
    216 			    !ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_USE_CV) ||
    217 			    cv_wait_sig(&cprng->cs_cv, &cprng->cs_lock)) {
    218 				result = 0;
    219 				goto out;
    220 			}
    221 		}
    222 	}
    223 
    224 	/*
    225 	 * Debit the entropy if requested.
    226 	 *
    227 	 * XXX Kludge for /dev/random `information-theoretic' properties.
    228 	 */
    229 	if (__predict_false(ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_HARD))) {
    230 		KASSERT(0 < cprng->cs_remaining);
    231 		KASSERT(cprng->cs_remaining <=
    232 		    NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES);
    233 		if (bytes < cprng->cs_remaining) {
    234 			cprng->cs_remaining -= bytes;
    235 		} else {
    236 			bytes = cprng->cs_remaining;
    237 			cprng->cs_remaining = NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES;
    238 			cprng->cs_ready = false;
    239 			rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink);
    240 		}
    241 		KASSERT(bytes <= NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES);
    242 		KASSERT(0 < cprng->cs_remaining);
    243 		KASSERT(cprng->cs_remaining <=
    244 		    NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES);
    245 	}
    246 
    247 	cprng_strong_generate(cprng, buffer, bytes);
    248 	result = bytes;
    249 
    250 out:	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    251 	return result;
    252 }
    253 
    254 static void
    255 filt_cprng_detach(struct knote *kn)
    256 {
    257 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kn->kn_hook;
    258 
    259 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    260 	SLIST_REMOVE(&cprng->cs_selq.sel_klist, kn, knote, kn_selnext);
    261 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    262 }
    263 
    264 static int
    265 filt_cprng_read_event(struct knote *kn, long hint)
    266 {
    267 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kn->kn_hook;
    268 	int ret;
    269 
    270 	if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
    271 		KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    272 	else
    273 		mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    274 	if (cprng->cs_ready) {
    275 		kn->kn_data = CPRNG_MAX_LEN; /* XXX Too large?  */
    276 		ret = 1;
    277 	} else {
    278 		ret = 0;
    279 	}
    280 	if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
    281 		KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    282 	else
    283 		mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    284 
    285 	return ret;
    286 }
    287 
    288 static int
    289 filt_cprng_write_event(struct knote *kn, long hint)
    290 {
    291 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = kn->kn_hook;
    292 
    293 	if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
    294 		KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    295 	else
    296 		mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    297 
    298 	kn->kn_data = 0;
    299 
    300 	if (hint == NOTE_SUBMIT)
    301 		KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    302 	else
    303 		mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    304 
    305 	return 0;
    306 }
    307 
    308 static const struct filterops cprng_read_filtops = {
    309 	.f_isfd = 1,
    310 	.f_attach = NULL,
    311 	.f_detach = filt_cprng_detach,
    312 	.f_event = filt_cprng_read_event,
    313 };
    314 
    315 static const struct filterops cprng_write_filtops = {
    316 	.f_isfd = 1,
    317 	.f_attach = NULL,
    318 	.f_detach = filt_cprng_detach,
    319 	.f_event = filt_cprng_write_event,
    320 };
    321 
    322 int
    323 cprng_strong_kqfilter(struct cprng_strong *cprng, struct knote *kn)
    324 {
    325 
    326 	switch (kn->kn_filter) {
    327 	case EVFILT_READ:
    328 		kn->kn_fop = &cprng_read_filtops;
    329 		break;
    330 	case EVFILT_WRITE:
    331 		kn->kn_fop = &cprng_write_filtops;
    332 		break;
    333 	default:
    334 		return EINVAL;
    335 	}
    336 
    337 	kn->kn_hook = cprng;
    338 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    339 	SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&cprng->cs_selq.sel_klist, kn, kn_selnext);
    340 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    341 	return 0;
    342 }
    343 
    344 int
    345 cprng_strong_poll(struct cprng_strong *cprng, int events)
    346 {
    347 	int revents;
    348 
    349 	if (!ISSET(events, (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM)))
    350 		return 0;
    351 
    352 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    353 	if (cprng->cs_ready) {
    354 		revents = (events & (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM));
    355 	} else {
    356 		selrecord(curlwp, &cprng->cs_selq);
    357 		revents = 0;
    358 	}
    359 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    360 
    361 	return revents;
    362 }
    363 
    364 /*
    365  * XXX Move nist_hash_drbg_reseed_advised_p and
    366  * nist_hash_drbg_reseed_needed_p into the nist_hash_drbg API and make
    367  * the NIST_HASH_DRBG structure opaque.
    368  */
    369 static bool
    370 nist_hash_drbg_reseed_advised_p(NIST_HASH_DRBG *drbg)
    371 {
    372 
    373 	return (drbg->reseed_counter > (NIST_HASH_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL / 2));
    374 }
    375 
    376 static bool
    377 nist_hash_drbg_reseed_needed_p(NIST_HASH_DRBG *drbg)
    378 {
    379 
    380 	return (drbg->reseed_counter >= NIST_HASH_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
    381 }
    382 
    383 /*
    384  * Generate some data from the underlying generator.
    385  */
    386 static void
    387 cprng_strong_generate(struct cprng_strong *cprng, void *buffer, size_t bytes)
    388 {
    389 	const uint32_t cc = cprng_counter();
    390 
    391 	KASSERT(bytes <= CPRNG_MAX_LEN);
    392 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    393 
    394 	/*
    395 	 * Generate some data from the NIST Hash_DRBG.  Caller
    396 	 * guarantees reseed if we're not ready, and if we exhaust the
    397 	 * generator, we mark ourselves not ready.  Consequently, this
    398 	 * call to the Hash_DRBG should not fail.
    399 	 */
    400 	if (__predict_false(nist_hash_drbg_generate(&cprng->cs_drbg, buffer,
    401 		    bytes, &cc, sizeof(cc))))
    402 		panic("cprng %s: NIST Hash_DRBG failed", cprng->cs_name);
    403 
    404 	/*
    405 	 * If we've been seeing a lot of use, ask for some fresh
    406 	 * entropy soon.
    407 	 */
    408 	if (__predict_false(nist_hash_drbg_reseed_advised_p(&cprng->cs_drbg)))
    409 		rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink);
    410 
    411 	/*
    412 	 * If we just exhausted the generator, inform the next user
    413 	 * that we need a reseed.
    414 	 */
    415 	if (__predict_false(nist_hash_drbg_reseed_needed_p(&cprng->cs_drbg))) {
    416 		cprng->cs_ready = false;
    417 		rndsink_schedule(cprng->cs_rndsink); /* paranoia */
    418 	}
    419 }
    420 
    421 /*
    422  * Reseed with whatever we can get from the system entropy pool right now.
    423  */
    424 static void
    425 cprng_strong_reseed(struct cprng_strong *cprng)
    426 {
    427 	uint8_t seed[NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES];
    428 
    429 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    430 
    431 	const bool full_entropy = rndsink_request(cprng->cs_rndsink, seed,
    432 	    sizeof(seed));
    433 	cprng_strong_reseed_from(cprng, seed, sizeof(seed), full_entropy);
    434 	explicit_memset(seed, 0, sizeof(seed));
    435 }
    436 
    437 /*
    438  * Reseed with the given seed.  If we now have full entropy, notify waiters.
    439  */
    440 static void
    441 cprng_strong_reseed_from(struct cprng_strong *cprng,
    442     const void *seed, size_t bytes, bool full_entropy)
    443 {
    444 	const uint32_t cc = cprng_counter();
    445 
    446 	KASSERT(bytes == NIST_HASH_DRBG_MIN_SEEDLEN_BYTES);
    447 	KASSERT(mutex_owned(&cprng->cs_lock));
    448 
    449 	/*
    450 	 * Notify anyone interested in the partiality of entropy in our
    451 	 * seed -- anyone waiting for full entropy, or any system
    452 	 * operators interested in knowing when the entropy pool is
    453 	 * running on fumes.
    454 	 */
    455 	if (full_entropy) {
    456 		if (!cprng->cs_ready) {
    457 			cprng->cs_ready = true;
    458 			cv_broadcast(&cprng->cs_cv);
    459 			selnotify(&cprng->cs_selq, (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM),
    460 			    NOTE_SUBMIT);
    461 		}
    462 	} else {
    463 		/*
    464 		 * XXX Is there is any harm in reseeding with partial
    465 		 * entropy when we had full entropy before?  If so,
    466 		 * remove the conditional on this message.
    467 		 */
    468 		if (!cprng->cs_ready &&
    469 		    !ISSET(cprng->cs_flags, CPRNG_REKEY_ANY))
    470 			printf("cprng %s: reseeding with partial entropy\n",
    471 			    cprng->cs_name);
    472 	}
    473 
    474 	if (nist_hash_drbg_reseed(&cprng->cs_drbg, seed, bytes, &cc,
    475 		sizeof(cc)))
    476 		/* XXX Fix nist_hash_drbg API so this can't happen.  */
    477 		panic("cprng %s: NIST Hash_DRBG reseed failed",
    478 		    cprng->cs_name);
    479 }
    480 
    481 /*
    482  * Feed entropy from an rndsink request into the CPRNG for which the
    483  * request was issued.
    484  */
    485 static void
    486 cprng_strong_rndsink_callback(void *context, const void *seed, size_t bytes)
    487 {
    488 	struct cprng_strong *const cprng = context;
    489 
    490 	mutex_enter(&cprng->cs_lock);
    491 	/* Assume that rndsinks provide only full-entropy output.  */
    492 	cprng_strong_reseed_from(cprng, seed, bytes, true);
    493 	mutex_exit(&cprng->cs_lock);
    494 }
    495 
    496 static ONCE_DECL(sysctl_prng_once);
    497 static cprng_strong_t *sysctl_prng;
    498 
    499 static int
    500 makeprng(void)
    501 {
    502 
    503 	/* can't create in cprng_init(), too early */
    504 	sysctl_prng = cprng_strong_create("sysctl", IPL_NONE,
    505 					  CPRNG_INIT_ANY|CPRNG_REKEY_ANY);
    506 	return 0;
    507 }
    508 
    509 /*
    510  * sysctl helper routine for kern.urandom node. Picks a random number
    511  * for you.
    512  */
    513 static int
    514 sysctl_kern_urnd(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
    515 {
    516 	int v, rv;
    517 
    518 	RUN_ONCE(&sysctl_prng_once, makeprng);
    519 	rv = cprng_strong(sysctl_prng, &v, sizeof(v), 0);
    520 	if (rv == sizeof(v)) {
    521 		struct sysctlnode node = *rnode;
    522 		node.sysctl_data = &v;
    523 		return (sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node)));
    524 	}
    525 	else
    526 		return (EIO);	/*XXX*/
    527 }
    528 
    529 /*
    530  * sysctl helper routine for kern.arandom node.  Fills the supplied
    531  * structure with random data for you.
    532  *
    533  * This node was originally declared as type "int" but its implementation
    534  * in OpenBSD, whence it came, would happily return up to 8K of data if
    535  * requested.  Evidently this was used to key RC4 in userspace.
    536  *
    537  * In NetBSD, the libc stack-smash-protection code reads 64 bytes
    538  * from here at every program startup.  So though it would be nice
    539  * to make this node return only 32 or 64 bits, we can't.  Too bad!
    540  */
    541 static int
    542 sysctl_kern_arnd(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
    543 {
    544 	int error;
    545 	void *v;
    546 	struct sysctlnode node = *rnode;
    547 	size_t n __diagused;
    548 
    549 	switch (*oldlenp) {
    550 	    case 0:
    551 		return 0;
    552 	    default:
    553 		if (*oldlenp > 256) {
    554 			*oldlenp = 256;
    555 		}
    556 		RUN_ONCE(&sysctl_prng_once, makeprng);
    557 		v = kmem_alloc(*oldlenp, KM_SLEEP);
    558 		n = cprng_strong(sysctl_prng, v, *oldlenp, 0);
    559 		KASSERT(n == *oldlenp);
    560 		node.sysctl_data = v;
    561 		node.sysctl_size = *oldlenp;
    562 		error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
    563 		kmem_free(v, *oldlenp);
    564 		return error;
    565 	}
    566 }
    567