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c8c3bf63 |
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02-Nov-2024 |
mrg <mrg@NetBSD.org> |
merge upstream change 8f454b793e1f13c99872c15f0eed1d7f3b823fe8: Subject: [PATCH] Xi: avoid integer truncation in length check of ProcXIChangeProperty This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure. Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With the correct stuff->num_items value the expected request size was truncated, passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check. The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->num_items bytes (depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it finds into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least stuff->num_items bytes, i.e. 4GB. The same bug exists in ProcChangeProperty and ProcXChangeDeviceProperty, so let's fix that too. CVE-2022-46344, ZDI-CAN 19405 |