1 /* 2 * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. 3 * 4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use 5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy 6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at 7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html 8 */ 9 10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h> 11 #include "../ssl_local.h" 12 #include "statem_local.h" 13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h" 14 15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 1 16 17 /* 18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for 19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for 20 * key_share present flag, 8 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen, 21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie 22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing. 23 */ 24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 8 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \ 25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) 26 27 /* 28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes + 29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id 30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression 31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension 32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie 33 */ 34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \ 35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \ 36 + MAX_COOKIE_SIZE) 37 38 /* 39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right 40 */ 41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 43 { 44 unsigned int ilen; 45 const unsigned char *data; 46 47 /* Parse the length byte */ 48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen) 49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) { 50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, 51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); 52 return 0; 53 } 54 55 /* Check that the extension matches */ 56 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) { 57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, 58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); 59 return 0; 60 } 61 62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, 63 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) { 64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, 65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); 66 return 0; 67 } 68 69 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; 70 71 return 1; 72 } 73 74 /*- 75 * The servername extension is treated as follows: 76 * 77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. 78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, 79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated. 80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. 81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order 82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. 83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when 84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. 85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time 86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the 87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and 88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername 89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches 90 * the value of the Host: field. 91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the 93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername 94 * extension. 95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. 96 */ 97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 99 { 100 unsigned int servname_type; 101 PACKET sni, hostname; 102 103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni) 104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ 105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { 106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 108 return 0; 109 } 110 111 /* 112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366 113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations, 114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types. 115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types 116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other 117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. 118 * 119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, 120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. 121 */ 122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) 123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name 124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { 125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 127 return 0; 128 } 129 130 /* 131 * In TLSv1.2 and below the SNI is associated with the session. In TLSv1.3 132 * we always use the SNI value from the handshake. 133 */ 134 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 135 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { 136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, 137 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 138 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 139 return 0; 140 } 141 142 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { 143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME, 144 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 145 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 146 return 0; 147 } 148 149 /* 150 * Store the requested SNI in the SSL as temporary storage. 151 * If we accept it, it will get stored in the SSL_SESSION as well. 152 */ 153 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); 154 s->ext.hostname = NULL; 155 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->ext.hostname)) { 156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, 157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 158 return 0; 159 } 160 161 s->servername_done = 1; 162 } else { 163 /* 164 * In TLSv1.2 and below we should check if the SNI is consistent between 165 * the initial handshake and the resumption. In TLSv1.3 SNI is not 166 * associated with the session. 167 */ 168 /* 169 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST 170 * fall back to a full handshake. 171 */ 172 s->servername_done = (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) 173 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname, 174 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname)); 175 } 176 177 return 1; 178 } 179 180 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 181 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 182 { 183 unsigned int value; 184 185 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { 186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, 187 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 188 return 0; 189 } 190 191 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */ 192 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { 193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, 195 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); 196 return 0; 197 } 198 199 /* 200 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session 201 * including session resumptions. 202 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session ! 203 */ 204 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) { 205 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 206 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, 207 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); 208 return 0; 209 } 210 211 /* 212 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us 213 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello. 214 */ 215 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; 216 return 1; 217 } 218 219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP 220 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 221 size_t chainidx) 222 { 223 PACKET srp_I; 224 225 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I) 226 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) { 227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 228 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, 229 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 230 return 0; 231 } 232 233 /* 234 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user 235 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. 236 */ 237 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { 238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP, 239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 240 return 0; 241 } 242 243 return 1; 244 } 245 #endif 246 247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 248 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 249 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 250 { 251 PACKET ec_point_format_list; 252 253 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list) 254 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { 255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, 256 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 257 return 0; 258 } 259 260 if (!s->hit) { 261 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, 262 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, 263 &s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len)) { 264 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 265 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 266 return 0; 267 } 268 } 269 270 return 1; 271 } 272 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ 273 274 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 275 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 276 { 277 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb && 278 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), 279 PACKET_remaining(pkt), 280 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { 281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 282 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 283 return 0; 284 } 285 286 return 1; 287 } 288 289 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 290 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 291 { 292 PACKET supported_sig_algs; 293 294 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) 295 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { 296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 297 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 298 return 0; 299 } 300 301 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) { 302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 303 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 304 return 0; 305 } 306 307 return 1; 308 } 309 310 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 311 size_t chainidx) 312 { 313 PACKET supported_sig_algs; 314 315 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs) 316 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { 317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 318 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 319 return 0; 320 } 321 322 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) { 323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 324 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 325 return 0; 326 } 327 328 return 1; 329 } 330 331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP 332 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 333 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 334 { 335 PACKET responder_id_list, exts; 336 337 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */ 338 if (s->hit) 339 return 1; 340 341 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */ 342 if (x != NULL) 343 return 1; 344 345 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) { 346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 347 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 348 return 0; 349 } 350 351 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { 352 /* 353 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. 354 */ 355 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; 356 return 1; 357 } 358 359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) { 360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 361 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 362 return 0; 363 } 364 365 /* 366 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake 367 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 368 */ 369 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); 370 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { 371 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); 372 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) { 373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 374 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 375 return 0; 376 } 377 } else { 378 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; 379 } 380 381 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { 382 OCSP_RESPID *id; 383 PACKET responder_id; 384 const unsigned char *id_data; 385 386 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id) 387 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { 388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 390 return 0; 391 } 392 393 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); 394 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */ 395 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, 396 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); 397 if (id == NULL) { 398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 399 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 400 return 0; 401 } 402 403 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { 404 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 406 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 407 408 return 0; 409 } 410 411 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) { 412 OCSP_RESPID_free(id); 413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 414 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 415 416 return 0; 417 } 418 } 419 420 /* Read in request_extensions */ 421 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) { 422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 423 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 424 return 0; 425 } 426 427 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { 428 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); 429 430 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, 431 X509_EXTENSION_free); 432 s->ext.ocsp.exts = 433 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts)); 434 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { 435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 436 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 437 return 0; 438 } 439 } 440 441 return 1; 442 } 443 #endif 444 445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 446 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 447 size_t chainidx) 448 { 449 /* 450 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a 451 * renegotiation. 452 */ 453 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 454 s->s3->npn_seen = 1; 455 456 return 1; 457 } 458 #endif 459 460 /* 461 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN 462 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. 463 */ 464 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 465 size_t chainidx) 466 { 467 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; 468 469 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) 470 return 1; 471 472 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) 473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { 474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, 475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 476 return 0; 477 } 478 479 save_protocol_list = protocol_list; 480 do { 481 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ 482 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) 483 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { 484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, 485 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 486 return 0; 487 } 488 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); 489 490 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); 491 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; 492 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; 493 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, 494 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { 495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN, 496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 497 return 0; 498 } 499 500 return 1; 501 } 502 503 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 504 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 505 size_t chainidx) 506 { 507 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr; 508 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id; 509 int i, srtp_pref; 510 PACKET subpkt; 511 512 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */ 513 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL) 514 return 1; 515 516 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */ 517 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0 518 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) { 519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 520 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); 521 return 0; 522 } 523 524 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); 525 s->srtp_profile = NULL; 526 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */ 527 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr); 528 529 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) { 530 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) { 531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 532 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); 533 return 0; 534 } 535 536 /* 537 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than 538 * current match. 539 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this 540 * does nothing. 541 */ 542 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) { 543 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof = 544 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i); 545 546 if (sprof->id == id) { 547 s->srtp_profile = sprof; 548 srtp_pref = i; 549 break; 550 } 551 } 552 } 553 554 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ 555 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) { 556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 557 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); 558 return 0; 559 } 560 561 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len) 562 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { 563 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, 564 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); 565 return 0; 566 } 567 568 return 1; 569 } 570 #endif 571 572 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 573 size_t chainidx) 574 { 575 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) 576 s->ext.use_etm = 1; 577 578 return 1; 579 } 580 581 /* 582 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains 583 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 584 */ 585 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 586 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 587 { 588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 589 PACKET psk_kex_modes; 590 unsigned int mode; 591 592 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes) 593 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) { 594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, 595 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 596 return 0; 597 } 598 599 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) { 600 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) 601 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; 602 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE 603 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0) 604 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; 605 } 606 #endif 607 608 return 1; 609 } 610 611 /* 612 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains 613 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. 614 */ 615 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 616 size_t chainidx) 617 { 618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 619 unsigned int group_id; 620 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt; 621 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups; 622 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups; 623 int found = 0; 624 625 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) 626 return 1; 627 628 /* Sanity check */ 629 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { 630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 631 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 632 return 0; 633 } 634 635 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) { 636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 637 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 638 return 0; 639 } 640 641 /* Get our list of supported groups */ 642 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups); 643 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */ 644 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups); 645 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) { 646 /* 647 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent, 648 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that 649 * extension. 650 */ 651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 652 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION); 653 return 0; 654 } 655 656 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) { 657 /* 658 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR 659 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an 660 * error 661 */ 662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 663 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); 664 return 0; 665 } 666 667 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) { 668 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id) 669 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt) 670 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { 671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 672 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 673 return 0; 674 } 675 676 /* 677 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the 678 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them. 679 */ 680 if (found) 681 continue; 682 683 /* 684 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group 685 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent. 686 */ 687 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 688 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id 689 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) { 690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 691 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); 692 return 0; 693 } 694 695 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */ 696 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) { 697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 698 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); 699 return 0; 700 } 701 702 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */ 703 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) { 704 /* Share not suitable */ 705 continue; 706 } 707 708 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) { 709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, 710 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); 711 return 0; 712 } 713 714 s->s3->group_id = group_id; 715 716 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp, 717 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), 718 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { 719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 720 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); 721 return 0; 722 } 723 724 found = 1; 725 } 726 #endif 727 728 return 1; 729 } 730 731 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 732 size_t chainidx) 733 { 734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 735 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id; 736 EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; 737 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 738 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie; 739 WPACKET hrrpkt; 740 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata; 741 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; 742 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE]; 743 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen; 744 uint64_t tm, now; 745 746 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */ 747 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL 748 || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 749 return 1; 750 751 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) { 752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 754 return 0; 755 } 756 757 raw = cookie; 758 data = PACKET_data(&raw); 759 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw); 760 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 761 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { 762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 763 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 764 return 0; 765 } 766 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw); 767 768 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */ 769 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 770 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, 771 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, 772 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext 773 .cookie_hmac_key)); 774 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { 775 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 776 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 778 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 779 return 0; 780 } 781 782 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; 783 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 784 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data, 785 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0 786 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { 787 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 788 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 791 return 0; 792 } 793 794 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 795 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 796 797 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) { 798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 799 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 800 return 0; 801 } 802 803 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) { 804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 805 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 806 return 0; 807 } 808 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */ 809 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) 810 return 1; 811 812 /* 813 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the 814 * HMAC above. 815 */ 816 817 /* Check the version number is sane */ 818 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) { 819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 820 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 821 return 0; 822 } 823 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { 824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 825 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); 826 return 0; 827 } 828 829 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) { 830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 831 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 832 return 0; 833 } 834 835 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie); 836 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) { 837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 838 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 839 return 0; 840 } 841 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id 842 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher 843 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) { 844 /* 845 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is 846 * in the cookie. Something must have changed. 847 */ 848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 849 SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER); 850 return 0; 851 } 852 853 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share) 854 || !PACKET_get_net_8(&cookie, &tm) 855 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash) 856 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie) 857 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) { 858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 859 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); 860 return 0; 861 } 862 863 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */ 864 now = time(NULL); 865 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) { 866 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */ 867 return 1; 868 } 869 870 /* Verify the app cookie */ 871 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie), 872 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) { 873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 874 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); 875 return 0; 876 } 877 878 /* 879 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original 880 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash. 881 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions 882 */ 883 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) { 884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 886 return 0; 887 } 888 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) 889 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt) 890 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION) 891 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) 892 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id, 893 s->tmp_session_id_len) 894 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt, 895 &ciphlen) 896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0) 897 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) { 898 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 901 return 0; 902 } 903 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) 904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) 905 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version) 906 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { 907 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 910 return 0; 911 } 912 if (key_share) { 913 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) 914 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) 915 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id) 916 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) { 917 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 920 return 0; 921 } 922 } 923 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) 924 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt) 925 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen) 926 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */ 927 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */ 928 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */ 929 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen) 930 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) { 931 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt); 932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE, 933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 934 return 0; 935 } 936 937 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */ 938 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash), 939 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr, 940 hrrlen)) { 941 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 942 return 0; 943 } 944 945 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */ 946 s->hello_retry_request = 1; 947 948 s->ext.cookieok = 1; 949 #endif 950 951 return 1; 952 } 953 954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 955 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 956 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 957 { 958 PACKET supported_groups_list; 959 960 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ 961 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list) 962 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0 963 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) { 964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 965 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 966 return 0; 967 } 968 969 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { 970 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups); 971 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups = NULL; 972 s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len = 0; 973 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list, 974 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups, 975 &s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len)) { 976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 977 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 979 return 0; 980 } 981 } 982 983 return 1; 984 } 985 #endif 986 987 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 988 size_t chainidx) 989 { 990 /* The extension must always be empty */ 991 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 993 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 994 return 0; 995 } 996 997 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; 998 999 return 1; 1000 } 1001 1002 1003 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1004 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1005 { 1006 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1008 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1009 return 0; 1010 } 1011 1012 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { 1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, 1014 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1015 return 0; 1016 } 1017 1018 return 1; 1019 } 1020 1021 static SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_stateful_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *tick, 1022 SSL_SESSION **sess) 1023 { 1024 SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL; 1025 1026 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; 1027 1028 switch (PACKET_remaining(tick)) { 1029 case 0: 1030 return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY; 1031 1032 case SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH: 1033 break; 1034 1035 default: 1036 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; 1037 } 1038 1039 tmpsess = lookup_sess_in_cache(s, PACKET_data(tick), 1040 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); 1041 1042 if (tmpsess == NULL) 1043 return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT; 1044 1045 *sess = tmpsess; 1046 return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS; 1047 } 1048 1049 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1050 size_t chainidx) 1051 { 1052 PACKET identities, binders, binder; 1053 size_t binderoffset, hashsize; 1054 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL; 1055 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0; 1056 const EVP_MD *md = NULL; 1057 1058 /* 1059 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so 1060 * ignore this extension 1061 */ 1062 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode 1063 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0) 1064 return 1; 1065 1066 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) { 1067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1068 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1069 return 0; 1070 } 1071 1072 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1073 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) { 1074 PACKET identity; 1075 unsigned long ticket_agel; 1076 size_t idlen; 1077 1078 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity) 1079 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) { 1080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, 1081 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1082 return 0; 1083 } 1084 1085 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity); 1086 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL 1087 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen, 1088 &sess)) { 1089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1090 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1091 return 0; 1092 } 1093 1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK 1095 if(sess == NULL 1096 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL 1097 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { 1098 char *pskid = NULL; 1099 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; 1100 unsigned int pskdatalen; 1101 1102 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) { 1103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1104 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1105 return 0; 1106 } 1107 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata, 1108 sizeof(pskdata)); 1109 OPENSSL_free(pskid); 1110 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { 1111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1112 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1113 return 0; 1114 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) { 1115 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; 1116 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; 1117 1118 /* 1119 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know 1120 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec 1121 */ 1122 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); 1123 if (cipher == NULL) { 1124 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); 1125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1126 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1127 return 0; 1128 } 1129 1130 sess = SSL_SESSION_new(); 1131 if (sess == NULL 1132 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata, 1133 pskdatalen) 1134 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher) 1135 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess, 1136 TLS1_3_VERSION)) { 1137 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); 1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1139 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1140 goto err; 1141 } 1142 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen); 1143 } 1144 } 1145 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ 1146 1147 if (sess != NULL) { 1148 /* We found a PSK */ 1149 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0); 1150 1151 if (sesstmp == NULL) { 1152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1153 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1154 goto err; 1155 } 1156 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1157 sess = sesstmp; 1158 1159 /* 1160 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so 1161 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up. 1162 */ 1163 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); 1164 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length; 1165 ext = 1; 1166 if (id == 0) 1167 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; 1168 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; 1169 } else { 1170 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, agesec, agems; 1171 int ret; 1172 1173 /* 1174 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if 1175 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there 1176 * is no point in using full stateless tickets. 1177 */ 1178 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0 1179 || (s->max_early_data > 0 1180 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0)) 1181 ret = tls_get_stateful_ticket(s, &identity, &sess); 1182 else 1183 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity), 1184 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, 1185 &sess); 1186 1187 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) { 1188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1189 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1190 return 0; 1191 } 1192 1193 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC 1194 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) { 1195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1196 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1197 return 0; 1198 } 1199 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT) 1200 continue; 1201 1202 /* Check for replay */ 1203 if (s->max_early_data > 0 1204 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0 1205 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) { 1206 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1207 sess = NULL; 1208 continue; 1209 } 1210 1211 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel; 1212 agesec = (uint32_t)(time(NULL) - sess->time); 1213 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; 1214 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add; 1215 1216 /* 1217 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the 1218 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age 1219 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be 1220 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency). 1221 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for 1222 * rounding errors. 1223 */ 1224 if (id == 0 1225 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec 1226 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec 1227 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000 1228 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) { 1229 /* 1230 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it 1231 * for early data 1232 */ 1233 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; 1234 } 1235 } 1236 1237 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2); 1238 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) { 1239 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */ 1240 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1241 sess = NULL; 1242 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; 1243 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1244 continue; 1245 } 1246 break; 1247 } 1248 1249 if (sess == NULL) 1250 return 1; 1251 1252 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; 1253 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); 1254 1255 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) { 1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1257 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1258 goto err; 1259 } 1260 1261 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) { 1262 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) { 1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1264 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1265 goto err; 1266 } 1267 } 1268 1269 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) { 1270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, 1271 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); 1272 goto err; 1273 } 1274 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, 1275 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0, 1276 ext) != 1) { 1277 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1278 goto err; 1279 } 1280 1281 s->ext.tick_identity = id; 1282 1283 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); 1284 s->session = sess; 1285 return 1; 1286 err: 1287 SSL_SESSION_free(sess); 1288 return 0; 1289 } 1290 1291 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1292 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1293 { 1294 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { 1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, 1296 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR); 1297 return 0; 1298 } 1299 1300 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; 1301 1302 return 1; 1303 } 1304 1305 /* 1306 * Add the server's renegotiation binding 1307 */ 1308 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1309 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1310 size_t chainidx) 1311 { 1312 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) 1313 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1314 1315 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */ 1316 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) 1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1318 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 1319 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, 1320 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) 1321 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished, 1322 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) 1323 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1324 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, 1326 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1327 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1328 } 1329 1330 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1331 } 1332 1333 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1334 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1335 size_t chainidx) 1336 { 1337 if (s->servername_done != 1) 1338 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1339 1340 /* 1341 * Prior to TLSv1.3 we ignore any SNI in the current handshake if resuming. 1342 * We just use the servername from the initial handshake. 1343 */ 1344 if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) 1345 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1346 1347 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) 1348 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, 1350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1351 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1352 } 1353 1354 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1355 } 1356 1357 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */ 1358 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1359 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1360 size_t chainidx) 1361 { 1362 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) 1363 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1364 1365 /*- 1366 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length 1367 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. 1368 */ 1369 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) 1370 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1371 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) 1372 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1374 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1375 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1376 } 1377 1378 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1379 } 1380 1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1382 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1383 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1384 size_t chainidx) 1385 { 1386 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; 1387 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; 1388 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) 1389 && (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats != NULL); 1390 const unsigned char *plist; 1391 size_t plistlen; 1392 1393 if (!using_ecc) 1394 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1395 1396 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); 1397 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) 1398 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1399 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) 1400 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1402 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1403 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1404 } 1405 1406 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1407 } 1408 #endif 1409 1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC 1411 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1412 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1413 size_t chainidx) 1414 { 1415 const uint16_t *groups; 1416 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1; 1417 1418 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */ 1419 if (s->s3->group_id == 0) 1420 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1421 1422 /* Get our list of supported groups */ 1423 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups); 1424 if (numgroups == 0) { 1425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1426 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1427 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1428 } 1429 1430 /* Copy group ID if supported */ 1431 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) { 1432 uint16_t group = groups[i]; 1433 1434 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { 1435 if (first) { 1436 /* 1437 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If 1438 * so we don't need to add this extension 1439 */ 1440 if (s->s3->group_id == group) 1441 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1442 1443 /* Add extension header */ 1444 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) 1445 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ 1446 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1447 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 1448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1449 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 1450 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1451 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1452 } 1453 1454 first = 0; 1455 } 1456 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) { 1457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1458 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 1459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1460 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1461 } 1462 } 1463 } 1464 1465 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1467 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, 1468 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1469 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1470 } 1471 1472 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1473 } 1474 #endif 1475 1476 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1477 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1478 size_t chainidx) 1479 { 1480 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) { 1481 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; 1482 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1483 } 1484 1485 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) 1486 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1488 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1489 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1490 } 1491 1492 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1493 } 1494 1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP 1496 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1497 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1498 size_t chainidx) 1499 { 1500 /* We don't currently support this extension inside a CertificateRequest */ 1501 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) 1502 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1503 1504 if (!s->ext.status_expected) 1505 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1506 1507 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0) 1508 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1509 1510 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) 1511 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { 1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1513 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1514 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1515 } 1516 1517 /* 1518 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we 1519 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a 1520 * separate message 1521 */ 1522 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) { 1523 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1524 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1525 } 1526 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1528 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1529 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1530 } 1531 1532 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1533 } 1534 #endif 1535 1536 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG 1537 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1538 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1539 size_t chainidx) 1540 { 1541 const unsigned char *npa; 1542 unsigned int npalen; 1543 int ret; 1544 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen; 1545 1546 s->s3->npn_seen = 0; 1547 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL) 1548 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1549 1550 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, 1551 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg); 1552 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { 1553 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) 1554 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { 1555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1556 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG, 1557 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1558 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1559 } 1560 s->s3->npn_seen = 1; 1561 } 1562 1563 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1564 } 1565 #endif 1566 1567 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1568 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1569 { 1570 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) 1571 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1572 1573 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 1574 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) 1575 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1576 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1577 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, 1578 s->s3->alpn_selected_len) 1579 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1580 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1582 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1583 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1584 } 1585 1586 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1587 } 1588 1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP 1590 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1591 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1592 size_t chainidx) 1593 { 1594 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL) 1595 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1596 1597 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) 1598 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1599 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) 1600 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) 1601 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) 1602 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, 1604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1605 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1606 } 1607 1608 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1609 } 1610 #endif 1611 1612 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1613 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1614 { 1615 if (!s->ext.use_etm) 1616 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1617 1618 /* 1619 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable 1620 * for other cases too. 1621 */ 1622 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD 1623 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 1624 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 1625 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) { 1626 s->ext.use_etm = 0; 1627 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1628 } 1629 1630 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) 1631 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, 1633 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1634 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1635 } 1636 1637 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1638 } 1639 1640 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1641 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1642 { 1643 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0) 1644 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1645 1646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) 1647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { 1648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, 1649 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1650 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1651 } 1652 1653 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1654 } 1655 1656 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1657 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1658 size_t chainidx) 1659 { 1660 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { 1661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1662 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, 1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1664 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1665 } 1666 1667 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) 1668 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1669 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version) 1670 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1672 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, 1673 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1674 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1675 } 1676 1677 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1678 } 1679 1680 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1681 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1682 size_t chainidx) 1683 { 1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 1685 unsigned char *encodedPoint; 1686 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0; 1687 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL; 1688 1689 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) { 1690 if (ckey != NULL) { 1691 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */ 1692 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1693 } 1694 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) 1695 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1696 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) 1697 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1699 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1700 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1701 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1702 } 1703 1704 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1705 } 1706 1707 if (ckey == NULL) { 1708 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */ 1709 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) { 1710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1711 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1712 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1713 } 1714 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1715 } 1716 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0) { 1717 /* 1718 * PSK ('hit') and explicitly not doing DHE (if the client sent the 1719 * DHE option we always take it); don't send key share. 1720 */ 1721 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1722 } 1723 1724 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) 1725 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1726 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) { 1727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1728 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1729 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1730 } 1731 1732 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey); 1733 if (skey == NULL) { 1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1735 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1736 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1737 } 1738 1739 /* Generate encoding of server key */ 1740 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint); 1741 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) { 1742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1743 ERR_R_EC_LIB); 1744 EVP_PKEY_free(skey); 1745 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1746 } 1747 1748 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len) 1749 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, 1751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1752 EVP_PKEY_free(skey); 1753 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1754 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1755 } 1756 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); 1757 1758 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */ 1759 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey; 1760 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) { 1761 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1762 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1763 } 1764 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1765 #else 1766 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1767 #endif 1768 } 1769 1770 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1771 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1772 { 1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 1774 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie; 1775 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2; 1776 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen; 1777 EVP_MD_CTX *hctx; 1778 EVP_PKEY *pkey; 1779 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1780 1781 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0) 1782 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1783 1784 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) { 1785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1786 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET); 1787 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1788 } 1789 1790 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) 1791 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1792 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1793 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen) 1794 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie) 1795 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION) 1796 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION) 1797 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id) 1798 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, 1799 &ciphlen) 1800 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */ 1801 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) 1802 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u64(pkt, time(NULL)) 1803 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1804 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) { 1805 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1806 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1807 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1808 } 1809 1810 /* 1811 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates 1812 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then 1813 * subsequently allocate them (below) 1814 */ 1815 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) 1816 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { 1817 /* SSLfatal() already called */ 1818 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1819 } 1820 1821 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2) 1822 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2) 1823 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1824 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) 1825 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) { 1826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1828 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1829 } 1830 1831 /* Generate the application cookie */ 1832 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) { 1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1834 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); 1835 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1836 } 1837 1838 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2) 1839 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2) 1840 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1841 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen) 1842 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) { 1843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1845 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1846 } 1847 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; 1848 1849 totcookielen -= startlen; 1850 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { 1851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1852 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1853 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1854 } 1855 1856 /* HMAC the cookie */ 1857 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); 1858 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, 1859 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key, 1860 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext 1861 .cookie_hmac_key)); 1862 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) { 1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1864 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); 1865 goto err; 1866 } 1867 1868 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0 1869 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie, 1870 totcookielen) <= 0) { 1871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1872 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1873 goto err; 1874 } 1875 1876 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) { 1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1879 goto err; 1880 } 1881 1882 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2) 1883 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2) 1884 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen) 1885 || !WPACKET_close(pkt) 1886 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE, 1888 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1889 goto err; 1890 } 1891 1892 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1893 1894 err: 1895 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx); 1896 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); 1897 return ret; 1898 #else 1899 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1900 #endif 1901 } 1902 1903 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1904 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1905 size_t chainidx) 1906 { 1907 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { 1908 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ 1909 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ 1910 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 1911 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 1912 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 1913 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 1914 }; 1915 1916 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80 1917 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81) 1918 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0) 1919 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1920 1921 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { 1922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1923 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1924 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1925 } 1926 1927 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1928 } 1929 1930 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, 1931 unsigned int context, X509 *x, 1932 size_t chainidx) 1933 { 1934 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { 1935 if (s->max_early_data == 0) 1936 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1937 1938 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) 1939 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1940 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data) 1941 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1942 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1943 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1944 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1945 } 1946 1947 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1948 } 1949 1950 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) 1951 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1952 1953 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) 1954 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1955 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, 1957 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1958 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1959 } 1960 1961 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1962 } 1963 1964 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, 1965 X509 *x, size_t chainidx) 1966 { 1967 if (!s->hit) 1968 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; 1969 1970 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) 1971 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) 1972 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->ext.tick_identity) 1973 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { 1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, 1975 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); 1976 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; 1977 } 1978 1979 return EXT_RETURN_SENT; 1980 } 1981
Indexes created Sat Feb 28 05:31:39 UTC 2026