1 =pod 2 3 =head1 NAME 4 5 Modes of DES - the variants of DES and other crypto algorithms of OpenSSL 6 7 =head1 DESCRIPTION 8 9 Several crypto algorithms for OpenSSL can be used in a number of modes. Those 10 are used for using block ciphers in a way similar to stream ciphers, among 11 other things. 12 13 =head1 OVERVIEW 14 15 =head2 Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) 16 17 Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb_encrypt(). 18 19 =over 2 20 21 =item * 22 23 64 bits are enciphered at a time. 24 25 =item * 26 27 The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. 28 29 =item * 30 31 The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block 32 (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. 33 34 =item * 35 36 An error will only affect one ciphertext block. 37 38 =back 39 40 =head2 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) 41 42 Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cbc_encrypt(). 43 Be aware that des_cbc_encrypt() is not really DES CBC (it does 44 not update the IV); use des_ncbc_encrypt() instead. 45 46 =over 2 47 48 =item * 49 50 a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. 51 52 =item * 53 54 The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same 55 plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. 56 57 =item * 58 59 The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the 60 current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not 61 be rearranged. 62 63 =item * 64 65 The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext 66 enciphering to the same ciphertext. 67 68 =item * 69 70 An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. 71 72 =back 73 74 =head2 Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) 75 76 Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_cfb_encrypt(). 77 78 =over 2 79 80 =item * 81 82 a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. 83 84 =item * 85 86 The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same 87 plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. 88 89 =item * 90 91 The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the 92 current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are 93 chained together and can not be rearranged. 94 95 =item * 96 97 The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext 98 enciphering to the same ciphertext. 99 100 =item * 101 102 The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if 103 j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. 104 105 =item * 106 107 Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through 108 the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause 109 greater processing overheads. 110 111 =item * 112 113 Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. 114 115 =item * 116 117 An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. 118 119 =back 120 121 =head2 Output Feedback Mode (OFB) 122 123 Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ofb_encrypt(). 124 125 =over 2 126 127 128 =item * 129 130 a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. 131 132 =item * 133 134 The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same 135 plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More 136 over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same 137 key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons 138 a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. 139 140 =item * 141 142 The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. 143 144 =item * 145 146 The use of different start variables values prevents the same 147 plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different 148 key streams. 149 150 =item * 151 152 Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through 153 the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause 154 greater processing overheads. 155 156 =item * 157 158 Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. 159 160 =item * 161 162 OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the 163 resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes 164 only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. 165 166 =item * 167 168 OFB mode is not self-synchronizing. If the two operation of 169 encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs 170 to be re-initialized. 171 172 =item * 173 174 Each re-initialization should use a value of the start variable 175 different from the start variable values used before with the same 176 key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be 177 produced each time from the same parameters. This would be 178 susceptible to a 'known plaintext' attack. 179 180 =back 181 182 =head2 Triple ECB Mode 183 184 Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ecb3_encrypt(). 185 186 =over 2 187 188 =item * 189 190 Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. 191 192 =item * 193 194 As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. 195 There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective 196 key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of 197 memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. 198 199 =item * 200 201 If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with 202 just one key. 203 204 =item * 205 206 If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. 207 There are attacks that could reduce the effective key strength 208 to only slightly more than 56 bits, but these require a lot of memory. 209 210 =item * 211 212 If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal 213 ecb mode. 214 215 =back 216 217 =head2 Triple CBC Mode 218 219 Normally, this is found as the function I<algorithm>_ede3_cbc_encrypt(). 220 221 =over 2 222 223 224 =item * 225 226 Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. 227 228 =item * 229 230 As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with 231 the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. 232 233 =back 234 235 =head1 NOTES 236 237 This text was been written in large parts by Eric Young in his original 238 documentation for SSLeay, the predecessor of OpenSSL. In turn, he attributed 239 it to: 240 241 AS 2805.5.2 242 Australian Standard 243 Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, 244 Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm 245 Appendix A 246 247 =head1 SEE ALSO 248 249 L<blowfish(3)|blowfish(3)>, L<des(3)|des(3)>, L<idea(3)|idea(3)>, 250 L<rc2(3)|rc2(3)> 251 252 =cut 253 254