Home | History | Annotate | Line # | Download | only in roadmaps 
      1 $NetBSD: security,v 1.1 2017/01/13 10:14:58 dholland Exp $
      2 
      3 NetBSD Security Roadmap
      4 =======================
      5 
      6 This roadmap discusses security-related features.
      7 
      8 The following elements, projects, and goals are considered strategic
      9 priorities for the project:
     10 
     11  1. PaX aslr, mprotect, and segvguard are on by default now; this will
     12     be in 8.0.
     13  2. Transparent full-disk encryption (discussed in the storage roadmap)
     14  3. User-switching and secure attention key (see desktop roadmap)
     15 
     16 The following elements, projects, and goals are not strategic
     17 priorities but are still important undertakings worth doing:
     18 
     19  4. Security restriction framework for large/less trusted applications
     20  5. Interface for location, accelerometer, and similar sensitive services
     21 
     22 
     23 Explanations
     24 ============
     25 
     26 
     27 4. Security restriction framework for large/less trusted applications
     28 
     29 Traditionally in Unix permissions go with the user logged in, and all
     30 programs that are run execute with the credentials and permissions of
     31 that user. (Except for setugid programs, which execute with additional
     32 permissions.)
     33 
     34 This makes sense for programs like cat(1) or grep(1) that work with
     35 user data in the traditional shell environment. However, it is
     36 unsatisfactory for large semi-trusted applications such as web
     37 browsers, and entirely unsuitable for 3rd-party "apps" such as found
     38 on phones, which routinely contain spyware.
     39 
     40 We would like to have a permissions framework that works on a
     41 per-application basis and allows imposing restrictions on what apps
     42 may do, what data apps may read, and also supports policies like
     43 "cannot talk on the network after reading user data".
     44 
     45 Such a framework is entirely different from traditional Unix
     46 permissions and requires careful thought and design. Prior art is
     47 mostly not very good; e.g. Android's app permissions framework is both
     48 not expressive enough to pose serious barriers to spyware, and too
     49 complicated for typical users to cope with effectively. Meanwhile,
     50 system-call-based restrictions like seccomp/seccomp-bpf in Linux are
     51 messy and complicated and hard to use effectively. OpenBSD's "pledge"
     52 has been widely criticized for a range of reasons. Most of these
     53 models also do not provide for lying to apps that demand access you
     54 don't want to give them.
     55 
     56 dholland was working on this with some undergrads a while back and
     57 there's a design that may be of some value, although the prototype
     58 implementation was not a success.
     59 
     60  - As of January 2017 nobody is known to be working on this.
     61  - There is currently no clear timeframe or release target.
     62  - Contact dholland for further information.
     63 
     64 
     65 5. Interface for location, accelerometer, and similar sensitive services
     66 
     67 Currently in NetBSD we have no infrastructure for the "new" hardware
     68 interfaces typically found in phones, like GPS location information,
     69 accelerometer and orientation data, and so forth.
     70 
     71 There is probably no need to invent new APIs for retrieving this data,
     72 but we do need a sound underlying framework with security controls in
     73 place, as many of these data sources provide information that is
     74 either sensitive or can be used to derive sensitive information.
     75 
     76 (Note also that it's been shown that location data can be derived from
     77 monitoring battery level so that one's also sensitive.)
     78 
     79  - As of January 2017 nobody is known to be working on this.
     80  - There is currently no clear timeframe or release target.
     81  - Contact: ? (XXX)
     82 
     83